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Since the elections of November 1986, two elements of election re-
form have been targetted: the development of public funding programs 
and restrictions on political action committees. 
Most attention has been directed at the federal level on S.2, the 
Boren bill, sponsored by Sen. David L. Boren, a Democrat from Oklahoma. 
I call it the Re-Boren bill, since similar proposals seem to come back 
year after year. The bill is a package of PAC limitations and would set 
up a voluntary program of public financing tied to a system of expen-
diture limits. A stalemate has developed and the chances of enactment 
are not promising. 
Tending to be overlooked with the interest in federal reform are 
numerous developments at the state and local levels. 
Alfred Kahn once said: "Anybody who isn't schizophrenic these days 
just isn't thinking clearly." 
This line is particularly relevant to today's money in politics 
dilemma. On one hand, the high costs of getting elected exert pressures 
on officeholders, resulting, according to election reform advocates, in 
contradictions between conscience and contributions. One the other hand, 
the professionalization of politics and the accompanying escalation of 
costs are irreversible trends. 
The role of money in politics highlights ethical questions which 
imply conflicts of values, conflicts which result from the tug-of-war 
between constituent and financial pressures, between party and financial 
pressures. 
Any campaign reforms need to balance the integrity of the electoral 
process with rights of freedom of speech, freedom of participation, and 
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the right of association of like-minded people to petition the govern-
ment, through political contributions as well as through lobbying. 
There is a clear right for a legislature to seek to protect the integrity 
of the electoral process, but just as clearly, certain restrictions on 
electioneering would violate First Amendment rights. One speaker today, 
Professor Stephen Gottlieb, will clarify some of the constitutional 
consequences of election reform later. 
States are laboratories of reform, and efforts to change political 
finance laws preceded the Watergate era. State election laws not only 
cover the collection, distribution and expenditure of public or tax-
assisted funds, but also include public disclosure, contribution limits, 
tax incentives, and the establishment of election commissions. 
All 50 states require some form of political finance disclosure, 
which usually consists of identifying on public reports contributors 
above a certain amount -- perhaps $50 or $100 -- by name, address, 
occupation, and place of business, plus the amount and date of the 
contribution. Contributions below the threshold amount are required to 
be reported in aggregate totals. Expenditures are also required to be 
disclosed. 
Reporting requirements differ from state to state, resulting in 50 
different systems. But disclosure alone is not enough. Not only must 
campaign finance data be a matter of public record; they must be ac-
cessible to the public. Translating the reports of candidates and com-
mittees is not alone the responsibility of scholars and reporters. It 
is the responsibility of state governments which must give more than lip 
service to the dictum that public disclosure is the keystone of any at-
tempt to deal with the problem of political money. States as varied as 
California, Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washing-
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ton have demonstrated that state election offices can perform the indis-
pensable task of compiling and summarizing disclosed campaign finance 
data in ways that are useful to the press and the public. 
Half the states have election commissions that are nominally non-
partisan but mostly bipartisan. These are agencies that have multiple 
roles as judge, jury, administrator, prosecutor, enforcer and magistrate, 
yet these functions are all needed to monitor a modern election system. 
This afternoon we will hear from a panel of two practitioners, key 
staff people at two election agencies -- Frederick Herrmann and Kent 
Cooper. 
Many states have enacted contribution limits: these vary by state 
and level of candidacy. A total of 23 states have imposed contribution 
limits in some fashion, ranging from $250 to $5,000 -- not to mention New 
York State's stratospheric limit approaching $150,000. 
Corporate contributions are prohibited in some 23 states, and are 
limited in about 13 more. Some additional states permit corporate con-
tributions excepting by those in heavily regulated industries. For 
example, New Jersey bans giving by insurance companies, banks and public 
utilities. In Florida, race track owners are prohibited from contrib-
uting. 
Nine states prohibit labor union contributions, while 17 states 
limit certain union activities. 
Texas and Minnesota limit off-year contributions. In Texas, cam-
paign contributions can only be given during a 30-day period preceding 
the 120 days of the legislative session, for a total of six months out of 
the year. Different limits apply in Minnesota. For example, during the 
election year, a senate candidate can accept $1,500, while during the 
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off-year, just $300 is allowed. These limits are cut in half for the 
lower house. 
At tomorrow's Forum there will be a panel on PACs and more infor-
mation about their role and regulation will be considered then. 
In order to get some perspective on the current state of reform 
laws, consider that twenty states offer some method of public financing. 
Public financing is designed to reduce the fund-raising advantage of 
incumbents, lessen the benefits of wealthy candidates, provide an alter-
native to interest group funds, and through contribution and expenditure 
limits reduce high campaign costs. 
The goals of these programs of limitations and funding are to pro-
vide a near-equal financial base for candidates, increase participation 
in the electoral process, and reduce corruption or the appearance of 
corruption. Public financing programs, in general, are designed to help 
minimize the influence of special-interest groups and large contributors 
as well as enable greater numbers of citizens to run for political of-
fice. 
Two basic public financing systems have been set into place in 
various states: tax check-offs and tax add-ons. A tax check-off desig-
nates a dollar or two -- that the taxpayer would have to pay anyway --
to a fund for distribution according to the state's formula. An add-
on allows a taxpayer to add voluntarily a dollar or two onto his or her 
own tax liability. Add-ons may not be considered true public financing, 
since they rely on voluntary monies given by individuals through tax 
collections, intending to aid particular parties and candidates. But in 
some cases the monies are allocated according to strict government rules 
and with considerable involvement of government, thus warranting their 
being designated as public funding. 
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The check-off is far superior to the add-on in terms of inducing 
taxpayer participation, though the range of success is considerable. 
Figures from the 1984 election year show that Hawaii had the best re-
sponse, with 54 percent of taxpayers contributing. The worst response 
rate was in Kentucky, which posted a participation level of 10.8 percent. 
The overall average participation figure for all states the same 
year was 20.9 percent, down slightly from the 22 percent average obtained 
in 1980. 
Add-on participation for the 8 states with such a program is con-
siderably lower, averaging a mere 1.6 percent in 1984. The lowest par-
ticipation percentage for 1984 was in California, where only .6 percent 
of taxpayers elected to contribute, despite its liberal program of allow-
ing filers to add an extra $1, $5, $10 or $25 to their tax liability for 
political parties. 
With some exceptions, public financing of state campaigns 
\) 
has not\_ 
had a significant impact on the election process. The amounts of money 
involved have been fairly negligible in some states, and when political 
parties receive the money, they tend to use the funds that have been al-
located to support party programs and operations. This diffuses or 
minimizes the impact on candidates. 
All told, 23 states have enacted some sort of taxpayer supported or 
public funding program. Of the 21 operative programs, 19 raise money 
through the tax system. Just this year Ohio joined the group of check-
off states, with parties the beneficiaries. Just last year Florida 
enacted a public funding program with legislative appropriations. 
State elective public funding tax programs vary. Of the 12 states 
with a check-off system, only five allow the money to be allocated to 
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candidates. The rest require the funds to be allocated to political 
parties of the taxpayer's choice, with certain restrictions on the use of 
funds. In fact, only four staes -- Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey and 
Wisconsin -- generate significant amounts of monies for use by candi-
dates. 
To get some notion of the dimensions of one state's program, over an 
eight year period, New Jersey has expended some $17 million in public 
funds during three gubernatorial campaigns, covering general election 
campaigns in 1977, 1981 and 1985, and primaries as well in 1981 and 1985. 
Six states provide public funds for primary and general elections, 
whereas three limit funding to general elections. Although some states 
fund only statewide candidates for elective office, others such as Wis-
consin and Minnesota, extend public funds to state legislative offices. 
The states of Maryland, Michigan and New Jersey finance only gubernato-
rial campaigns. 
Eleven states -- Alabama, California, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah and Virginia -- make direct 
payments to political parties. Eight states -- Florida, Hawaii, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey and Wisconsin --
desposit funds with candidates' committees. 
Other selected state election information: 
• The three states with legislative public funding programs are Wis-
consin, Minnesota and Hawaii. Wisconsin and Minnesota have expen-
diture limits without public funding in the primary, with the public 
funds being disbursed only during the general election period. Be-
cause the U. s. Supreme Court in the case of Buckley -:!..• Valeo held 
that expenditure limits were constitutional only if prov~ded as a 
condition of the acceptance of public funding, these primary cover-
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ages could be the subject of litigation that might find them uncon-
stitutional. But no such suits have been brought. 
• Six states off er public funding of both primary and general election 
candidates: Hawaii, Maryland, Massachustts, Michigan, New Jersey 
and Florida. 
• Florida enacted an innovative measure in 1986. Since the state has 
no income tax, an Election Campaign Financing Trust Fund has been 
established. Monies are coming from legislative appropriations on a 
schedule prior to 1990 when the program becomes operative. It is 
estimated that more than $6 million will be paid out to candidates. 
Funding will be limited to candidates for governor and six cabinet 
seats in primary, runoff and general elections. 
• Virginia offers a tax add-on only to those taxpayers who are re-
ceiving refunds. 
The numbers of states could change soon. There are several pending 
bills and proposed initiatives, as well as other recent developments, 
that are transforming the ways states finance campaigns. Several reform 
laws have been defeated as well. Here is a brief overview: 
A campaign reform initiative was enacted in Rhode Island in November 
1986 by a 54 to 46 percent margin. It directed the Legislature to adopt 
reforms before June 1, 1988; since the Legislature failed to agree on a 
program in the 1987 session, required adoption by the 1988 session will 
delay its operation until 1990. The initiative mandated that the reforms 
include limits on contributions to all state and local candidates, create 
a system of voluntary public financing, and set overall limits on spend-
ing for gubernatorial races. 
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In 1987, the Iowa State Legislature passed a bill to establish a 
system of public financing, but Gov. Terry E. Branstad (R) vetoed the 
measure. Branstad found special interest group influence "excessive, 
especially in legislative races," but said he could not "accept a system 
in which the taxpayer foots the bill for political campaigns." 
Republican Governor James Thompson twice vetoed public funding 
enacted by the Illinois Legislature in 1984 and 1985. Governor George 
Deukmejian of California also vetoed a public funding bill in 1984. 
In California, a coalition of business, labor and public interest 
groups narrowly failed to get an initiative on the ballot in 1986. In an 
unusual move, Common Cause has attempted to re-verify previously rejected 
signatures for 1986 to re-qualify the same measure for 1988. The measure 
is a full scope program including contribution and expenditure limits, a 
well as public financing. Two campaign finance reform ballot measures 
which explicitly ban public financing may be competing with Common 
Cause on the June and November California ballots in 1988. Bob Stern 
from California is on a panel with Ruth Jones and will discuss public 
funding later. 
Expenditure limits are among the most controversial of reforms. New 
Jersey's public financing laws -- like those of several other states 
require candidates to accept expenditure limits on their campaigns as a 
condition for receiving public funds. Such expenditure limits, when they 
are set too low, tend to favor the better known candidates. The New 
Jersey gubernatorial general election in 1977 illustrates the problem of 
finding an equitable spending limit. 
Both major-party candidates raised the maximum amount in private 
contributions -- about $500,000 -- and received public funds of a little 
more than $1 million, which brought them close to the spending limit of 
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$1,518,576. This gave the advantage to the incumbent, Brendan Byrne, who 
was better known. 
The limits worked to the disadvantage of his challenger, State 
Senator Ray Bateman. When Bateman wanted to change strategies and revise 
campaign themes late in the campaign, he was unable to do so and stay 
within the limit. Low limits in this case rigidified the system. Sub-
sequently, the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission three 
times has recommended that expenditure limits be repealed, stating that 
contribution limits guard against undue influence and that expenditure 
limits are troubling. But the State Legislature has not agreed to a 
formula of what I call floors without ceilings. 
Seven states currently impose expenditure limits. 
In addition to tax check-offs and add-ons, some states allow other 
procedures for use of the tax system. Oregon, Minnesota, Idaho, Alaska, 
along with Washington, D.C., allow taxpayers to claim a tax credit for 
their campaign contributions. Six states allow tax deductions. For 14 
years there was a federal income tax credit but that was repealed in 
1986. 
In surveying what states have done in response to money in politics 
concerns, several conclusions can be drawn: 
1. None of the largest states have undertaken programs for public 
funding. The largest so far has been Florida. 
2. Legislatures have been more willing to provide pubic funding, and 
the expenditure limits that come with it, for gubernatorial candi-
dates than for their own campaigns. 
3. Legislatures have been more willing to provide public funds for 
general as opposed to primary elections. 
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4. The number of states that have enacted programs designed to benefit \)G~,y 
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political parties is impressive, especially since some of these 
programs are in states which traditionally have been weak party 
states. Both check-off and add-on tax programs that distribute 
money to political parties tend to strengthen the two-party system, 
although several states do distribute small sums to minor parties. 
A presentation on party renewal will be made in tomorrow's Forum. 
5. Low expenditure limits tend to favor the better-known candidates. 
If spending limits are too low, or the public funding amounts are 
too small, some candidates may decide not to accept the money, 
preferring not to be held to the expenditure limits. This has 
occurred in both Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
Several cautionary points should be considered. First, election 
reform is not a panacea. Even the best designed law cannot contend with 
every problem inherent in political campaigns, or foresee and foreclose 
all efforts to circumvent the spirit of reform legislation. Experience 
with public funding and other restrictive election laws on both state and 
federal levels has shown that such laws -- as useful as they were in 
curbing campaign financing excesses -- also have unintended as well as 
intended consequences. And those consequences, in turn, bring with them 
new problems. 
Second, care should be taken in the design, implementation and 
enforcement of an election law to ensure both that high-caliber potential 
candidates are not discouraged from entering politics, and that creativ-
ity and imagination within the political system are not repressed. The 
means must not be permitted to subvert the ends. Access to public off ice 
by qualified candidates without personal financial means remains a key 
goal to achieve. 
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Third, it is important to avoid the rigidity that marred reform 
efforts in earlier eras -- when laws drawn too narrowly often caused as 
many problems as they solved; and to encourage flexibility in the elec-
toral system as well. The local political culture and historic, conven-
tional means of financing also need, therefore, to be given careful 
consideration. 
In his classic study of money and politics, Alexander Heard outlined 
three chief requirements of any campaign finance system for American 
elections. According to Heard, the philosophical presuppositions and 
operating necessities of our elections require: 
••• (1) that sufficient money be available to sustain the great 
debate that is politics, which means to assure the main con-
testants an opportunity to present themselves and their ideas 
to the electorate; (2) that the needed sums be obtained in 
ways that do not inordinately weight the processes of govern-
ment in favor of special interests; and (3) that the system 
command the confidence of the citizens whose government of-
ficials are chosen through it. 
Tomorrow another Forum will be held, when we will discuss in panels 
and presentations PACs, political parties, election agencies and local 
public financing. 
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As noted yesterday, states have become the laboratories of political 
finance reform. Apart from public funding programs, much of this activ-
ity has been directed at limiting campaign contributions and restricting 
political action committees. 
Currently, 23 states impose some sort of limits on campaign con-
tributions. These limits range as low as $250 and go as high as $5,000. 
Corporate campaign contributions are prohibited in 22 states and par-
tially prohibited in several more. Thirteen states limit what a corpo-
ration may give. Nine states ban direct labor union contributions, while 
17 states impose limits on union activity. . / 
Some 17 states limit PAC contributions and two -- Arizona and Mon-\ 
tana -- limit the aggregate amounts candidates can receive from all PACs. 
---------- ! 
Just how large a role PACs play at the state level has become an 
increasingly popular topic of debate. Given that their role in financing 
campaigns has no doubt increased, questions remain as to how to evaluate 
this phenomenon. 
On one hand, supporters of PACs claim that they are just another 
form of public expression and that they are one of the few avenues left 
for citizens to get involved in today's modern, hi-tech campaigns. 
Critics complain that many special interest PACs represent those who are 
already influential in state politics, and their generous campaign con-
tributions only weaken the representation of those who are already 
disenfranchised. 
Following my presentation there will be a panel on PACs with two 
political scientists -- Christopher Arterton and Larry Sabato dis-
cussing them. 
1 
Statistics from all over the country point to an aggressive role 
increasingly played by PACs in state electoral politics. 
According to Common Cause, special interest contributions to Florida 
state legislators nearly tripled between 1976 and 1982, increasing from 
$1.6 million to $5.4 million. During this time period, successful can-
didates for the state Senate depended upon special interest PACs for 
69 percent of their campaign funds. 
In Montana, PAC contributions to legislative candidates jumped 442 
percent during the same six year time period. And in Arizona, legisla-
tive candidates saw PAC contributions skyrocket 1,526 percent from 1978 
to 1982. 
Not only are the amounts of money given escalating, but the number 
of PAC participants is also on the rise. The state of New York has wit-
nessed a 400 percent increase in the number of PACs over the past six 
years. 
Perhaps one of the most distorting influences of PACs on elections 
is their impact on challengers. While some PACs no doubt still give 
because of partisan and ideological considerations, more PACs give mainly 
to incumbents for purposes of access. A 1984 Common Cause study in Cali-
fornia found that the Top Ten PACs gave 96 percent of their money to 
incumbents; however, some of that incumbents' money was transferred to 
challengers. In 1986, all incumbents running for re-election in Cali-
fornia won; challengers chances of winning were so dismal that they 
raised only half the funds that 1984 challengers could muster. 
One of the best case studies of PAC activity at the state level is 
Illinois. Ron Michaelson, executive director of the Illinois State Board 
of Elections, has discovered that since the Illinois Campaign Finance Act 
of 1974 was enacted, a 1,171 percent increase in the number of PACs has 
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occurred. By the end of 1986, Illinois had 445 active PACs. The number 
of PACs tripled since 1979 and doubled since 1981. 
To discover just how much impact PACs have had on elections and 
public policy, Michaelson studied six PACs which were among the top 
givers: the Illinois Association of Realtors PAC (RPAC), Illinois 
Education Association PAC (IPACE), Illinois State Medical Society PAC 
(ISMS), Legislative Interest Committee of Illinois Dentists PAC (ILCID), 
Illinois Trail Lawyers Association PAC (ITLA) and the Illinois Manu-
facturers' Association PAC (IMPAC). 
Michaelson studied all contributions from these six PACs to Illinois 
House and Senate candidates and related organizations over three election 
cycles: 1976, 1982 and 1986. (The only exception was the ITLA, which 
began operations in 1978). 
With the exception of the Illinois Realtors (RPAC), the other five 
PACs increased their contributions steadily over the three elections. In 
1986, the six PACs contributed a total of $1.5 million to legislative 
candidates, approximately three times the money these PACs gave a decade 
earlier. 
Michaelson's conclusions include the observations that campaign 
costs have escalated along with special interest participation. While he 
does not come to any firm correlation between these two developments, he 
reports that PAC participation has increased more rapidly than overall 
campaign costs. 
Because they prefer winners, PACs are making better use of their 
money. ·~oyalty," concludes Michaelson, is apparently the concept that 
drives Illinois PAC contributions. More PACs seem to be giving mainly to 
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their proven friends' campaigns, whether they be Republican or Democrat. 
PACs are pragmatists when it comes to spending their money. 
In Pennsylvania in 1976, PACs accounted for 18.5 percent of total 
receipts of legislative candidates, a figure that rose to 29.7 percent in 
1984. Ruth Jones has presented data for six states on comparable per-
centages of funds derived from PACs in 1980: Iowa, 34 percent; Missouri, 
30 percent; Nebraska, 24 percent; Washington, 37 percent; Wisconsin, 34 
percent; and California, 73 percent. In Colorado, combining 1982 and 
1984, Senate candidates received 48 percent, and House candidates, 52 
percent. In Michigan, percentages rose from 41.1 percent in 1978 to 56.1 
percent in 1984. 
A study by Jerry Brekke, a professor of government at Northwest 
Missouri State University, on Missouri state elections echoes many of 
Michaelson's conclusions. He adds that the debate over how large a role 
PACs should play in state politics is marked by concerns that since state 
legislatures are not subject to the same kind of public or media scrutiny 
as is the Congress, the potential for serious abuses could be greater at 
the state level. 
A run down of the latest developments on the state PAC front follows: 
In Arizona, a campaign finance reform initiative was enacted in 1986 
by a 2 to 1 margin. The unique feature of the new law is its emphasis on 
aggregate campaign contribution limits for PACs and other political com-
mittees. Candidates for statewide office can accept no more than $500 
from individuals and $2 ,500 from qualified political committees which 
include PACs, political party committees or other candidate committees. cJ.- , 
\ 
\/ g/\ 
The aggregate limit for a candidate to receive from all three types of 
qualified political committees is $50,000. 
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Candidates other than those running for statewide office in Arizona 
are limited to accepting $200 from individuals and $500 from the various 
types of political committees, including PACs. The contribution limits 
are waived if an opponent spends $100,000 or more of his or her own funds 
in a statewide race. In other contests, the contribution limits are 
voided if an opponent spends $10,000 of his or her own money. 
Other provisions of the Arizona law include prohibitions on inter-
candidate transfers of funds and on the practice of "bundling" campaign 
contributions. 
Another state with aggregate limits is Montana. Here, much stricter 
limits apply. A candidate running for the House is bound by a $600 ag-
gregate limit; a candidate running for the Senate must abide by a $1,000 
aggregate limit. 
In Ohio, Democrat Gov. Richard F. Celeste allowed a bill to become 
law although he did not sign it, enabling corporations to pay administra-
tive expenses for PACs out of their treasury funds. This development 
puts corporations on a par with labor unions, which have been able to 
subsidize their PACs for a number of years. 
Only two states -- Wisconsin and Massachusetts continue to 
prohibit the use of corporate treasury funds to create and maintain PACs. 
New Jersey is considering a PAC contribution limit of $2,500 per 
election. An additional requirement worth 
would require PACs to disclose which bills 
they want lawmakers to support. 
noting is that the proposal 
pending in the Legislature I 
In Minnesota, a bill is being considered that would ban the solici-
tation of campaign funds during the legislative session. 
PACs would have to declare their political interests in their titles 
in North Carolina if legislation introduced by Rep. Walter B. Jones, Jr. 
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(D) is passed. The bill also would require referendum committees --
groups established by citizens advocating enactment of specific referenda 
-- to disclose their economic and political interests. The legislation 
is modeled after similar legislation passed by the Montana Legislature in 
1985. 
The Tennessee Legislature is contemplating radical surgery on its 
campaign laws after record-breaking spending in the 1986 election. At 
present, there are no contribution limits. Among the plethora of reform 
measures is a proposal that would limit individual campaign contributions 
to the following limits: $1,700 to a gubernatorial candidate; $450 for a 
state Senate candidate; $250 for a state House candidate. PACs would be 
limited to giving ten times the amounts: $17,000 to a gubernatorial can-
didate, $4,500 to a state Senator, and $2,500 to a House member. 
PACs in Tennessee would also be required to provide the receiving 
candidate with the names and addresses of people who contributed more 
than $20 to the PAC. Patterned after similar provisions enacted in 
Michigan, the recipient candidate would then have to disclose these 
names to the Secretary of State's office. 
Record-breaking expenditures in California are once again heating 
reform debate. All legislative incumbents running for office were re-
elected in 1986 as spending increased by 30 percent from 1984 to reach 
$57.1 million. 
Since California legislators seem to be stuck in eternal gridlock on 
campaign reform, three campaign initiatives are trying to make the June 
1988 primary ballot. All include PAC limitations. One is a comprehen-
sive expenditure limit and public financing package. The other two 
specifically prohibit the use of public funds in campaigns. The most 
6 
novel approach is the initiative drafted by House Representative Bill 
Thomas (CA), which would require candidates to raise 50 percent of their~·~ 
treasuries from within their districts. / 
Yesterday, when I introduced the subject of public financing, I 
referred to a number of states with income tax check-offs or add-ons 
directing the funding to the political parties. John White will be on 
the program later today to discuss party renewal. Suffice it to say here 
that the political parties in New York State and City have had more than 
their share of problems, and that parties are indispensable to the 
exercise of free speech and free association in a democratic society. If 
the growth of PACs has been dramatic, one way of countering them is 
through stronger parties. 
I also want to mention that later today we will hear another speaker 
on the roles of election agencies, Frank Reiche. 
Along with discussion of state reforms aimed at regulating PACs and 
strengthening parties, there has been a notable increase in interest in 
developing local public funding programs. 
The first city to enact a public financing system was Seattle, whose 
city council passed the ordinance as an experiment in 1978. It was in 
effect for both the 1979 and 1981 elections before its sunset deadline 
terminated the program. 
After disturbing trends in contribution patterns emerged during the 
1983 election, the program was reinstated in 1984, effective for elec-
tions this year. Alan Miller, who is the Administrator of the Seattle 
program, is on the program later today. He will explain the law but I 
just want to point out that it is funded through tax dollars obtained 
through a voluntary checkoff that allows an individual to return a four 
dollar coupon with his or her electricity bill. 
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The city of Tucson, Arizona modeled its campaign reform ordinance 
after Seattle in 1985. The Charter Amendment passed by a slight 52 
percent plurality. Unlike Seattle, the program is funded with city 
treasury funds and private donations. An add-on on the city's water 
bills has been enacted and will be going into effect. 
The most recent local funding program to make the law books was 
Sacramento County's voter approved charter amendment. Nearly 62 percent 
of county voters endorsed the comprehensive plan in 1986, the first 
county program in the nation. 
The Tucson and Sacramento laws are very complex and they will be 
described following the Seattle presentation. 
Here in New York City, both the City Council and the Charter Re-
vision Commission of the City of New York are considering making 
recommendations that would provide public funding of campaigns for Mayor, 
Comptroller, President of the City Council, Members of the City Council, 
' 
and Borough Presidents. If adopted, the City program would by far exceed/ t--(~~ 
the public funding programs in most states and local jurisdictions. / · 
Signals to look out for in the immediate future are how the initia-
tive campaigns emerge in California, the development of laws beyond 
Arizona and Montana setting aggregate limits on contributions, and local 
reforms such as those being discussed for New York City campaigns. Also 
one might focus on the gathering strength of party assistance in numer-
ous states, with Ohio just added this year. 
There is need to consider whether legislation, when offered, should 
be comprehensive or piecemeal, whether by legislation or consitutional or 
charter amendment where possible, or by initiative where feasible. 
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In conclusion, there seems to be a resurgence of reform, or at least 
a new interest in it. The reform movement was popularized in the 
1970s, and later suffered a backlash. Now, a decade later, reforms seem 
to be gaining a new lease on life. Yet the battle between reform and 
status quo is an ongoing one. And once reform occurs, the pendulum may 
swing and counter-reform set in until a new wave of momentum results in 
further fine-tuning if not major change. 
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and, time permitting, the significance of selecting one "alter-
native" structure over another. 
I look forward to meeting the Commission members and the 
staff. If you have questions about the paper or suggestions for 
the oral presentation, please do not hesitate to call me at (602) 
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Public Campaign Financing: 
Arguments and Alternatives* 
It is testimony to the slow, incremental nature of policy-
making in the U.S. that it took more than seventy-five years to 
begin the implementation of significant public campaign financing 
programs. Compromise politics not withstanding, the use of 
public (tax) dollars to fund campaigns continues to provoke 
controversy. Over the years, some who initially advocated public 
funding have come to question its viability, while others who 
initially opposed using public dollars to fund campaigns have 
become advocates. For example, in testimony in 1931 before the 
Select Committee on Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, Louise 
Overacker testified that "it would be extremely difficult for the 
Government to take on the entire job of financing the campaign ••• 
many serious difficulties present themselves when one tries to 
draft such a proposal." 1 But in a 1973 interview, this long 
time observer and recognized expert on campaign finance reported 
that "I have come to the conclusion that direct public financing 
of the campaigns is probably the best [way to get big money in 
small sums]." 2 
All participants in the debate over campaign finance reform 
share common interests in protecting and enhancing the campaign 
and electoral process. Both sides seek to preserve basic proce-
dural and substantive goals long associated with democratic 
1 
Jones, R.S. 
elections. Thus, both seek ways to maintain the republican 
principle of representation, promote equality of opportunity, 
guarantee meaningful electoral choice, facilitate citizen 
participation, ensure political accountability and sustain an 
open and fair electoral system. 
These, of course, are not new goals. Concern about interest 
representation was at the heart of Madison's classic argument 
(Federalist #10) during the debate over ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution, and American politics has ever been plagued by 
the tension inherent in controlling the effects of factions. 
Guarantees of the opportunity to compete and to present altern-
ative ideas, policies and candidates through the electoral 
process underlie the meaning of democratic elections. Without 
the free flow of competing ideas, the electorate has no bases for 
making choices and the casting of ~ ballot becomes suspect if 
not meaningless. Not only is the campaign and election process 
the primary means whereby elected officials are held accountable, 
to the electorate -- a concept that goes to the heart of popular 
government -- it is the accepted vehicle for managing political 
change. 
Similarly, there is broad consensus that democratic systems 
must encourage informed political participation and foster a 
sense of efficacy and civic responsibility among the electorate 
if the electoral process is to be effective. These concerns 
2 
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encompass essential dimensions of an open political system which 
is not dominated by secret deals or procedures, where the rules 
are not arbitrarily written and enforced but consensually agreed 
upon and objectively applied, and where both those who seek 
election and those who elect them have confidence in the system 
and abide by its outcomes. 
Although widespread consensus exists on these fundamental 
"ideals", there is considerably less agreement on how such goals 
should be achieved. Concepts of equity, representation, and 
accountability have very different meanings and priorities for 
different people. Thus, for example, the single question of how 
best to achieve equity among candidates participating in the 
electoral process, or even how much equity is necessary or 
desirable, generates a wide range of answers. It is around such 
questions that the controversy over public funding flourishes. 
The debate continues to have a philosophical aura in that both 
proponents and opponents articulate their_positions in terms of 
fundamental democratic values. But with the winning of elections 
defining the reality of politics, the day to day debate focuses 
on very specific, real or perceived, advantages and imperfec-
tions in existing or proposed legislation. Although it is 
perhaps somewhat misleading, those who advocate public campaign 
finance are usually referred to as political reformers because 
they seek change, often major change, in the current system. 
3 
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Opponents of suggested changes are not as readily categorized 
by a single label and thus usually are referred to simply as 
opponents or "the opposition." 
Because public funding programs are products of a political 
marketplace in which bargaining, bartering and moderation 
dominate, it is not surprising that advocates of public funding 
are often as dissatisfied with enacted public funding 
legislation as are the opponents of the programs. Moreover, 
those who advocate and those who oppose are not always in 
agreement either among themselves or between the two camps as to 
the primary strengths and weaknesses or pros and cons of any 
given issue before them. Thus, not all advocates give equal 
weight to the various arguments made in favor of public funding 
and not all opponents are collectively in agreement as to the 
rank ordering of the host of negatives they associate with public 
financing of election campaigns. And the arguments of the 
advocates as well as the opponents are not mutually exclusive, 
for each public funding program is part of a larger, 
comprehensive effort to address broader issues of campaign 
financing. There-fore, detailed arguments over legislation 
designed to address a particular electoral situation or policy 
priority are not easily summarized and are best dealt with in 
discussions of specific programs. But, if we avoid assigning 
priorities to the arguments that have been advanced on either 
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side, and if we accept the fact that many of the arguments are 
interrelated and therefore hard to separate out, it is possible 
to identify the most prominent rationales used to attack and 
defend the abstract concept of public campaign funding. 
The Argument for Public Funding 
The general arguments in support of public funding are nine 
in number and include assertions that public funding would: 
Reduce real corruption and the appearance of impropriety. 
Because the costs of campaigns have sky rocketed and candidates 
appear to need increasingly large sums of money, campaign 
finance reformers fear that misuses or misappropriation of 
campaign funds and illegal activities similar to those that 
occurred during the 1972 Presidential campaign will become 
increasingly more common. "The huge sums involved create vast 
opportunities for abuse, influence peddling and other impro-
prieties. And they give rise to a substantial appearance of 
impropriety, a belief that large contributors receive a quid 
pro-guo from those they support." 3 If public funds are made 
available, the pressure to raise vast sums will be reduced at the 
same time that oversight of campaign financing will be increased. 
With less need and greater risk, the temptation to resort to 
questionable or illegal activities will be greatly diminished. 
Eliminate undue influence of special interests. Oyer the 
past decade, special interest money, primarily in the form of PAC 
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contributions, has increased markedly. By 1986, PAC contribu-
tions constituted more than 40% of all contributions to 
Congressional winners and often provided well over half of all 
funds to local or state policy maker's individual campaign 
budgets. As of 1986 the 100 members sitting in the U. S. Senate 
had, as a group, received more than $87 million in PAC 
contributions over the 14 years for which records of PAC 
contributions are available. 
Reformers fear that elected officials at all levels are 
becoming dependent on special interest contributions and that 
such dependence shapes response to policy issues. A correlate of 
this concern is the fact that not all interests (i.e., the rural 
poor, low-income consumers, hungry children) are organized and 
represented by effective PACs; and even among those with formal 
organizational representation, there· is great unevenness in 
access to financial resources. The dissimilarity of campaign 
organizations among political interests means that many inter-
ests cannot compete on an equal basis(9 assisting campaigns that 
are directly dependent on money provided by privileged interests. 
The use of tax dollars to help fund campaigns would eliminate 
the need for policy makers to establish unduly close ties with 
particular interests and thus subsequently would free them to 
make policy decisions in the public interest rather than on 
behalf of special interest campaign supporters. In upholding the 
6 
Jones, R.S. 
constitutionality of Seattle's public funding program, the 
Washington State Supreme Court stated: "The Seattle City Council 
intelligently and creatively passed an ordinance providing for a 
voluntary limit on spending and partial public financing of 
candidates so the average person would have some chance of equal 
representation in the city of Seattle ••• · ·There is ••• a tremendous 
benefit to the general public in a more representative govern-
ment by the City Council and Major of their city." 
Improve the quality of campaigns and governance. Advocates 
of public funding also argue that if a candidate, challenger or 
incumbent, does not have to woo special interests and go hat-
in-hand to those with money, the quality of campaigns (and 
therefore the electoral process) will be enhanced. Under the 
current system, candidates spend inordinate amounts of time 
raising money. The cost of the average U.S. Senate campaign ($3 
million in 1986) means that a Senator must raise $10 thousand a 
week for 52 weeks a yea~ every year of a six-year term in order 
to wage an "average" campaign. Fundraising activities reduce 
the amount of time candidates have to take their messages to the 
people, to debate the issues, and to present their ideas and 
proposals. By ensuring an adequate level of financial support, 
public funding will permit candidates to focus on the important 
issues of the campaign. 
It will also enable incumbents candidates to spend more 
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time being public officials taking care of public business and 
less time being candidates seeking funds for their next campaign. 
Said one elected official, "It would be a total relief to a 
fellow like me who would rather talk about the issues than be out 
beating my head in the ground trying to raise money to know my 
opponent and I would have the same amount of money." 
Contain the costs of elections. Proponents of public 
funding do not necessarily take the position that too much is 
spent on elections. In fact, most would argue that the electoral 
process is so central to the maintenance of democratic govern-
ment that it is impossible to arbitrarily set a dollar amount on 
the worth or acceptable "cost" of democratic elections. However, 
reformers see the ever increasing costs of elections as creating 
;a campaign and electoral process in which only the rich or those 
with ties to sources of wealth will be able to compete. Senator 
Barry Goldwater testified that "Unlimited campaign spending eats 
at the heart of the Democratic process .•• It creates an impression 
that every candidate is bought and sold by the biggest givers." 
To keep the system open, proponents argue that campaign expendi-
tures must be controlled. The Supreme Court has ruled that it 
is unconstitutional to put a limit on what candidates can spend 
on campaigns unless public funds are involved. Therefore, the 
only way to prevent uncontrolled and limitless spending· is to 
introduce public financing and the expenditure limits that may 
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legally accompany the use of public funds. By constraining the 
costs of elections, reformers anticipate that the need for funds 
will be reduced, the outer limits of spending will be clearly 
identified, and the public will not view campaign financing as 
the black hole of electoral politics. 
Encourage efficient use of funds. There is ample evidence 
that, beyond a certain point, the marginal product of campaign 
spending decreases and the law diminishing returns sets in. An 
expenditure ceiling would curtain marginal or wasteful spending. 
Similarly, if candidates have a limit on what they can spend or 
have a fixed amount of funds, they are more likely to develop 
campaign strategies that maximize the use of finite funds and 
incorporate greater reliance on nonmonetary resources. Indis-
criminate .or runaway spending for the sake of spending would be 
eliminated. 
Encourage more good candidates to run. Most 
candidates find large-scale fund raising as unpleasant as it is 
time consuming. Many have characterized seeking funds as a 
demeaning, tin-cup ordeal. Others view it as imposing on friends 
or making oneself vulnerable to unwanted influences. Reformers 
argue that each election cycle, many highly qualified, inter-
ested and willing citizens never become candidates for public 
office because they fear either that they cannot raise enough 
money to make a creditable race or that, to obtain the requisite 
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money involves compromises or negotiations they view as dis-
tasteful or unacceptable. Others begin the process only to 
withdraw because the prerequisite funding was not forthcoming. 
Under public financing, much of the onerous task of fundraising 
would be eliminated and thus a major barrier to recruiting 
additional quality candidates would be eliminated. In short, 
public funding can create a level playing field that interested 
citizens will view as less hostile and more receptive to new 
candidacies and campaigns. 
Increase electoral competition. Reformers argue that not 
only would more quality candidates run but the overall number of 
candidates would be increased as well. Increased numbers of 
qualified candidates would make elections more competitive. 
Similarly, if some form of minimal equity, oft~n called a 
"floor", for ·campaign expenditures is guarantee4 through 
i ' 
public funding, al 1 candidates wi 11 be guar.ante~d the oppor-
tunity to get their messages to the electorate. At present it 
is quite common for a quarter to a third of all state legislative 
races to be uncontested. Similarly, more 
of Representatives incumbents who run for 
than\.90% of 
\\ 
re-election 
\ 
U.S. House 
get 
elected. These incumbents are very well funded and posi~Joned to 
~ '\ 
dominate the campaign. Indeed, preemptive spending, whe1\~\ 
incumbents raise large sums and spend early, has become.a ~d~on 
\ 
element in election campaign strategy. 4 When it is succes~fu\ly 
\\ 
\ 
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used, it often scares away competition and leaves the incumbent 
unopposed in either the primary or the general elections. Public 
funding would provide greater equity in the funding of campaign~ 
thereby increasing the likelihood there will be a challengers 
with the ability to wage a meaningful campaign. The more 
balanced the financing of campaigns, the greater the likelihood 
of competitive elections. 
Enhance representation. If public monies provide minimum 
floors and expenditure ceilings, then interests in the society 
that currently are not effectively represented through the 
presentation of candidates and the debate of campaign issues 
will have an opportunity to make their positions know. It will 
still be up to the voters to accept or reject those interests, 
and equally up to the interests to abide by the electoral 
decision. However, with public funds, a fairer representation of 
social and economic diversity would be effectively built in to 
the electoral process. 
Increase citizen involvement and support. Even before 
Watergate and the subsequent publicity on the role of money in 
campaigns, reformers feared that citizen interest and 
willingness to become politically involved was declining 
because the campaign process was so heavily structured around 
raising large sums of money. The current PAC explosion has 
simply added to this fear. Hence, reformers see public funding, 
11 
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not only as a way to give more responsibility for financing 
elections to the electorate, but also as a means of removing a 
potential cause of citizen cynicism and estrangement. When 
expenditures are limited and dependence on special interest 
money is reduced, advocates argue that rank and file citizens 
will respond and will more readily and effectively take on 
financial responsibility for democratic elections. In proposing 
an optional public funding program, the New York State-City 
Commission on Government Integrity argued that change was 
necessary not only "because the current system is both 
inequitable and fraught with dangers of corruption, but also 
because the erosion of trust in our political process contributes 
to the general loss of faith in the integrity of government and 
creates a climate for other abuses." 5 
The Argument Against Public Funding 
The identifiable arguments against public funding of 
election campaigns are at least eight in number and emphasize 
opposition to public funding because it would involve: 
An inappropriate role for government. Opponents of public 
funding argue that campaign financing belongs in the free 
marketplace. The ability to raise money is an established 
"test" of candidate viability. The current system, consistent 
with the societal norm of individualism, has served the.country 
well for 200 years and government intervention into what 
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essentially has been a free enterprise system is inappropriate, 
"a totally alien idea to American democracy." Prior to the 
Buckley decision, opponents argued that public funding was 
obviously unconstitutional. After the high court affirmed the 
constitutionality of public funding, opponents shifted to more 
pragmatic grounds arguing that any program involving government 
funds necessarily means interference with the free flow of ideas 
through the creation of yet another governmental bureaucracy to 
impose more governmental regulation. Opponents view public 
funding as another unwarranted step in the direction of 
government control, with political control of the campaign 
process contrary to the very concept of an open electoral system 
based on free exchange of ideas. 
Misuse of tax dollars. Opponents also view public 
subvention of campaigns as a misuse of tax dollars, as a raid on 
the public treasury. With finite tax dollars, money allocated 
for campaigns cannot be used for more appropriate governmental 
programs such as veterans benefits, defense, health or other 
fundamental public programs. The experience of two hundred 
years suggests that political campaigns can operate successfully 
in the private sector whereas many other social and public 
programs cannot be self financing. Public campaign financing 
misdirects public funds. Political campaigns should remain 
self-sufficient and should not siphon off scarce public 
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resources for the purpose of advancing individual political 
careers. 
Violating voter choice. If tax dollars are used for the 
full range of qualified candidates, however defined other than 
by the market place, the tax payer runs the risk that his/her 
tax dollar will be used to support a candidate whose policy 
positions are personally repugnant. Like the electoral process, 
the campaign funding process should center around individual, 
private decisions not governmentality structured or imposed 
alternatives. If people want to contribute to a political 
party, action group or candidate, they obviously are free to do 
so and have many opportunities to provide such financial 
support. When the government defines who is or is not qualified 
to receive public funding, tax payers become simply the 
source of funds not the determiners of contributions. Under 
such a scheme, tax dollars will be allocated contrary to 
personal preferences of individual tax payers. 
A decrease in the competitiveness of elections. Unless the 
amount of public funds is unlimited, or at least extensive 
enough to reach the point of marginal productive return on 
dollars spent, any governmental policy that constrains what 
challengers spend actually makes for less competitive elections. 
Public funding legislation is frequently labeled an incum~ents' 
protectionist act. Incumbents enjoy many perks and privileges of 
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office holding (name recognition, news coverage, office, etc.) 
that are effective resources in re-election campaigns. For 
challengers to overcome these built-in advantages, it is often 
necessary to outspend the incumbent just to reach parity. 
Spending limits attached to public funding often work to the 
disadvantage of the challenger and thereby decrease rather than 
increase the competitiveness of elections. 
Waste and higher costs. Providing public funds for 
campaigns will open the flood gates for candidates--especially 
for marginal or fringe candidates. Public money will go to non 
competitive parties and candidates that use the campaign 
process as a forum for advancing their organization's cause but 
with little serious hope of electoral victory. 
Not only will non-serious candidates spend the maximum 
public money provided, but even serious candidates will be 
encouraged, simply by its presence, to spend whatever public 
money they have--regardless of how much they actually need. Thus, 
the presence of a public trough will encourage indulgence and 
excess, more expense and waste. 
A change in institutional balances. If government monies 
are made available to individual candidates, "personal" campaigns 
in which every candidate becomes an independent entrepreneur 
will flourish. Personal campaigns raise practical issuep of 
accountability and institutional stability. On the other hand, 
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if public funds go to political parties, the infusion of tax 
dollars is likely to change the nature of the American party 
system. The nationalization and centralization of parties will 
occur if money is channeled through the national party 
committees; £actualization and institutional independence will 
result if funds are distributed to state and local party units. 
If third parties are funded, public funds will be ,the vehicle for 
the development of a multi-party system; if third and minor 
parties are excluded, the means for institutionalizing opposition 
and managing peaceful change are diminished. Thus on a number 
of important dimensions the introduction of public funds is 
likely to change the current balance of forces in the campaign 
and election system in unknown ways with unpredictable conse-
quences. 
Depressing citizen involvement. If the government provides 
funds for campaigns, there is little incentive for individual 
citizens to contribute to their preferred party or candidates. 
Similarly, if candidates have government funding with which to 
organize and staff a campaign, the need for volunteer workers and 
the opportunities for direct citizen campaign participation is 
reduced. Hence, public subsidies work against the goals of 
participatory democracy that require the electorate to take an 
active and meaningful role in the campaign process. 
Ignoring public opinion. Opponents argue that public 
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funding is the brain child of certain special interests and 
small minorities who feel they are not able to compete success-
fully in the current electoral system. There is no ground 
swell of public opinion or widespread grass roots effort to 
implement public funding. In fact, opponents provide document-
ation of the absence of support for public funding among the 
mass electorate. Opponents reason that if public financing is as 
meritorious as proponents suggest, the public would express 
interest in and support for adopting such a program. Absent 
public support, public funding should not be enacted. 
The proponents of public funding couch their support in 
terms of intervention to enhance fundamental principles of 
democratic elections: greater equity among candidates, more 
1 inclusive representation of interests, enhanced quality and 
quantity of competitive campaigns, and greater citizen involve-
ment. They view protection of the integrity and viability of the 
electoral system as the lawful task of government. Opponents 
similarly argue in favor of these same principles but contend 
that public campaign financing reduces electoral competition, 
interest representation and citizen participation; diminishes the 
quality of campaigns; and inherently biases the system in favor 
of the status quo. In addition, they view public campaign 
financing as an inappropriate and inefficient use of ta~ dollars 
and a perversion of the traditional American electoral and 
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economic systems. 
These general arguments for and against public campaign 
financing are complemented by arguments that focus on specific 
legislative proposals and policies. The federal Presidential 
Campaign Fund has been the most visible U.S. program and, with 
fifteen year experience, it has·been instructive to state and 
local policy makers contemplating changes in campaign finance 
legislation. A few states have followed closely the federal 
model but most have developed distinct programs that further 
direct the attentions of proponents and opponents to the unique 
features of each particular program. 
Program Alternatives and Variations 
In formulating proposals and policies for public campaign 
funding, political policy makers, regardless of political level 
(federal, state or local), role (executive or legislator) or unit 
(partisan organizations, citizen groups) must confront basic 
questions about how best to structure a public funding program. 
Program differences result from the way key questions are 
answered: Which offices should be funded? Which elections? Who 
will receive the money? How do they qualify? How should money be 
allocated and under what conditions? Who will administer and 
enforce the law? How much money is involved and where will it 
come f rorn? These questions provide a useful focus with. which to 
begin a description of the U.S. experience with public campaign 
18 
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financing. Answers to these particular questions effectively 
determine both the framework of various public funding programs, 
and the impact these programs have on the campaign and election 
process. 
Which offices to fund? The decision to fund one office, a 
dozen, or all elected offices determines the scope of a public 
financing program, both in terms of how extensively it penetrates 
the electoral process and how comprehensive the funding can be. 
If only one office is funded, as with the Presidency on the 
nation level or the governor in Michigan and New Jersey, resour-
ces and attention are narrowly focused and funding can be 
reasonably comprehensive. On the other hand, a public funding 
program that extends to statewide candidates, as in Massachusetts 
and Montana, or encompasses the entire legislature, as in 
Minnesota or Wisconsin, may spread limited resources thinner and 
thus play a less central role in the financing process. A 
program such as Hawaii's which extends public funding to a wide 
range of elected offices (mayor, school board, tourist commis-
sion, etc.) in theory casts an all encompassing net, but in 
practice, it can at best be expected to have limited impact on 
altering existing patterns of campaign financing. Pragmatically, 
reformers must choose between providing more money to fewer races 
or less funding to many races. The reformers ideal has ·tended to 
be to fund as many elections as possible. Even though a case can 
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be made that limited coverage creates stronger programs, op-
ponents tend to seek to limit both the number and extent of 
funded campaigns. 
Which elections to fund? Whether public funding is concen-
trated on the general election or extends to primary elections 
also helps define the scope of the program. The theoretical 
argument for primary campaign funding is a powerful one: many 
elections are in fact decided in the primary. In one-party 
dominant areas, the only meaningful choice presented to the 
voters is within the party primary. If primaries were to be 
included in the comprehensive public funding program, in some ten 
percent of the Congressional elections and up to 25 or 30 percent 
of some state legislative races, where there currently is no 
competition, the expectation! is that new candidacies would emerge 
to create a more competitive campaign. 
If the arguments in favor of public funding have merit, then 
significant primaries would seem as worthy of funding as are 
meaningful general elections. Yet, the practical arguments 
against funding primaries are persuasive. Primary financing may 
more than double the "cost" to the public fund because each 
party may have several candidates vying for the same office. 
Politically, incumbents will have to enact legislation and few 
are secure enough, or altruistic enough, about their electoral 
future to encourage opposition--let alone opposition in their 
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own party primary. Political party officials generally resist 
efforts to fund primary elections because they see it as 
potentially divisive. If funds are available to encourage 
intra-party factions, public funding could inadvertently lead to 
greater party factionalism. These arguments not withstanding, 
the Presidential Election Campaign Fund provides money for both 
primary and general election candidates as do the New Jersey and 
Michigan gubernatorial programs and the Hawaii, Florida, and 
Massachusetts state-wide programs. It is noteworthy that the 
three local-level public financing programs (Sacramento County, 
Ca.; Seattle, Wa.; and Tucson, Az.) provide funding for both 
primary and general elections. The general rule, at the state 
level, however, is to allocate~ public funds for general 
election use only. 
Fund Parties or Candidates? Most experience with public 
campaign financing has been in Europe where the emphasis is on 
funding political parties. Although the U.S. has a long history 
of partisan elections, the American electoral system has gone 
through a period that has been largely candidate centered, with 
parties playing a diminished role in organizing individual 
campaigns. Whether or not the subsequent increase in party 
activity continues, debate over whether to fund parties or 
candidates turns on the perceived value and role of political 
parties. Those who feel political parties are essential to the 
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success of twentieth century participatory democracy view public 
funding as a way to revitalize party organizations and strengthen 
them as agents of representation and accountability vis-a-vis 
the presentation of candidates for public office. In contrast, 
others recall the long history of corrupt party machines and 
political bosses and resist any effort to increase the power of 
political parties in the electoral process. Nevertheless, to 
date, twelve states out of 23 with some public funding program 
have designed programs that allocate funds exclusively to party 
organizations. 
The alternative to party funding is candidate funding. In 
addition to satisfying the concerns of "weak parties" advocates, 
the funding of individual candidates is championed as a vehicle 
to enable "outsiders" to break in to the system. With public 
funding available to candidates, individuals do not have to work 
their way up through the party ranks, become aligned with parti-
cular powers within the party, or establish a dependence on or 
obligation to party leaders or other sources of special interest 
support in order to wage a successful campaign. Therefore, in-
dividual opportunity is enhanced and general interest representa-
tion can be maximized under individual candidate funding. 
However, when the individual candidate becomes the focus of 
election campaigning, institutional accountability and governmen-
tal coalition building may be jeopardized. Rather than identify-
22 
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ing with the programmatic concerns of a persistent party or-
ganization, individually funded candidates may become private 
entrepreneurs, free to pick and choose allies and policy 
positions at will. 
have opted to fund 
parties. 
These concerns notwithstanding, nine states~. 
individual candidates rather than politic~ 
With the exception of North Carolina and Oklahoma, states 
have opted to fund either parties or candidates' but have not 
funded both. Local governmental entities have chosen to fund 
candidates, not parties. Finally, the Federal presidential 
program strikes something of a balance in that primary and 
general election support goes directly to individual candidates 
but each major party is given funds ($8.9 million in 1988) to 
finance the national nominating conventions. 
Eligibility for Public Funds. Efficient use of public monies 
is a goal shared by both advocates and opponents of public 
funding. The specification of eligibility for public monies has 
become one way to guard against the capricious use of public 
funds. Establishing eligibility for use of campaign funds, 
however, requires a delicate balancing of goals. On the one hand, 
criteria must be established to protect the public funding 
program from unrealistic and excessive demands as well as from 
the onslaught of hordes of frivolous candidates. On the other 
hand, the desire for free exchange of ideas and meaningful 
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electoral choice requires that legitimate candidates and parties, 
even those with unpopular or unconventional messages, have a fair 
chance to compete. The more open the system (i.e., the easier it 
is to qualify) the greater the number of parties and candidates 
expected to call upon public funds and the more costly the 
program. Conversely, the more rigorous the qualification 
criteria, the more limited the number of groups and candidates 
eligible to receive public funding and the less likely the 
achievement of some stated goals. 
The presidential campaign fund has three well known sets of 
qualification requirements: one for primary candidates, one for 
political party convention funding and a third for general 
election funding. To qualify for funding in the primaries, 
candidates must formally declare their intent to contest the 
presidential nomination, and they then must raise $5,000 in 
twenty or more states in individual contributions that do not 
exceed $250. Once this initial $100,000 is raised, candidates 
remain eligible for public funds as long as they receive at 
least 10% of the primary vote in two consecutive primaries in 
which they run. 
Major political parties automatically qualify for public 
funding for national nominating conventions; minor and third 
parties receive convention subventions based on the proportion 
of votes their candidate received in the past election. 
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Finally, the nominees of the major political parties are, by 
definition, eligible to receive public funds for the general 
election campaign. Minor party candidates and independents 
receive a proportion of full funding based on past election 
returns or they may qualify for retroactive funding by obtain-
ing at least five percent of the vote in the current election. 
States that allocate public funds to political parties 
generally employ the standard statutory requirements for a 
"political party" to gain access to the ballot as the criterion 
r·····-. . 
/on ~or qualification for public funds. Thus, in Iowa, Maine, 
Idaho, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, state party organiza-
tions that qualify to field candidates on the state ballot and 
voluntarily agree to take public funds automatically receive 
public funding. In Utah, Kentucky and Oregon, county as well as 
state party organizations are qualified recipients of public 
funds. Unlike the federal criteria for national party accep-
tance of public funds, no state program ties acceptance of 
~·-·······~·······-· -~··-·-~·····~·-····~~·····-~-••... 
public financing to overall ceilings or limits on the amotlnt that 
parties may spend in the course of··~·;;··;].";;<;l:Tcnr campaign. 
States and lo;;~i~;:;;;t_~~.,.,Enat al locate funds to individual 
candidates follow the presidential primary funding model in that 
agreement to comply with mandated contribution and expenditure 
reporting or disclosure regulations must be a matter of .public 
record before funds may be obtained. Similarly, a specific 
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amount of money must be raised prior to receiving public funds. 
Ideally, this financial "threshold" is low enough to include all 
candidates whose campaigns will enhance the competitive nature 
of the electoral process but high enough to eliminate non-serious 
candidates lacking visible public support. For example, the 
Michigan and New Jersey programs require that gubernatorial 
candidates seeking public funds in the primary raise $50,000 
under specific guidelines similar to those of the presidential 
program before receiving any public money. Once the major 
parties' gubernatorial nominees in these two states are selected, 
they automatically qualify for public funds. Minnesota and 
Wisconsin legislative and statewide candidates also qualify for 
public funding once they are certified as the candidates of their 
respective parties for the general election and sign the 
appropriate agreement forms. Whether statutory definition, 
financial threshold or electoral status is used, every public 
funding state sets clear eligibility requirements as well as 
specific rules for public funding. Only Montana and Massachusetts 
do not tie individual candidates' receipt of state funds to 
direct campaign expenditure limits, and in each case, the total 
amount of "public" money involved is exceedingly small. 
Formula for Allocation. Once the qualification criteria are 
established, there must be some agreement on a formula for 
allocating money to all qualified applicants. Generally funds are 
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allocated to political parties at some predetermined flat rate 
as in the federal program, or based on a proportion of past 
votes (as in North Carolina and Rhode Island) or in accord with 
specific partisan designations indicated during the collection 
process (as in Iowa, Idaho, and Kentucky). 
The most popular options for funding individual candidates 
are the use of a "matching" formula or a flat grant of a pre-
determined sum. For example, the formula for Presidential 
primary candidate funding is a dollar-for-dollar match for 
individual contributions up to $250 per contributions, but the 
candidate's total share of public funds cannot exceed 50 percent 
of the national spending limit for the primary campaign ($ 22.2 
million in 1988). In the general election campaign, the 
Presidential candidates of the major parties receive a flat grant 
($ 44.5 million in 1988 based on the original formula of 20 
million plus COLA). 
The Michigan gubernatorial program is much like the presid-
ential program (dollar-for-dollar match in the primary and a flat 
grant in the general) whereas the New Jersey and Massachusetts 
programs specify public funding based on matching formulae in 
both the primary and general elections. Minnesota has a dual 
allocation system whereby qualified candidates automatically 
receive a pre-determined amount of public funds when th~y win 
their party's primary nomination. If they also receive at least 
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5% of the vote for a statewide office (or 10% for a state 
legislative) in the general election, a further public allocat-
ion is made. In Wisconsin, qualified candidates receive pro 
rated flat grants only for the general election campaign but 
they must agree to accept expenditure limits in both the primary 
and general election. The qualification and allocation proce-
dures are closely related and both have become sources for legal 
challenges and partisan conflict because each specific arrange-
ment carries potential if not actual bias in terms of how public 
funds may alter traditional funding patterns. 
Administration and Enforcement. With many features of 
public funding programs subject to interpretation, challenge and 
debate, legislative provisions for the administration and 
enforcement of new financing policies are central to the impact 
public financing has on campaigns and elections. ·Campaign 
finance reformers argue that unless the infrastructure for 
administration and enforcement is carefully designed and fully 
supported, the intent of new policies will be negated. Hence 
they argue for well funded, independent agencies with full 
administrative capacities, law enforcement powers, and strong 
leadership. Conversely, opponents of campaign finance reforms 
see the creation of a campaign finance bureaucracy as unnecessary 
and the designation of a campaign finance "czar" as dangerous. 
Opponents thus often suggest that established governmental 
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agencies are sufficient to insure that the laws are faithfully 
executed. At both the st~te and federal level, the physical 
control over and transfer of public campaign monies usually 
remains in the revenue or treasury department which allocates 
funds upon certification by the designated administrative agency. 
Hence controversies over administration/enforcement are shaped, 
not ·by concerns for fiscal management but rather by political 
and partisan goals and preferences. 
The two key policy decisions involve who will be in charge 
and what can they do. As a general rule, programs that allocate 
monies to candidates require more extensive administrative 
infrastructure than programs that allocate money to parties; and 
the broader the scope of the program, the greater the demands 
for administrative involvement. However, because public funding 
is usually but one aspect of a broader campaign finance package, 
the administrative responsibility for public funding is deter-
mined in the course of assigning institutional responsibility for 
the full array of campaign finance legislation. 
Policy makers generally select one of three popular models 
of campaign finance administration. The "reform model" involves 
the creation of a new, independent agency whose impetus and 
function is specifically related to campaign financing issues. 
For example, agencies such as the Federal Election Comm~ssion, 
the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, and the Iowa 
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Campaign Finance Disclosure Commission are independent units 
engaged almost exclusively in campaign finance reporting, dis-
closure, regulation and enforcement matters. A second model 
assigns administration of campaign financing to an already 
established, but independent generic unit such as the State 
Election Board (e.g., Wisconsin, North Carolina, Rhode 
Island and Virginia) where public funding matters are combined 
with other agency responsibilities related to elections. The 
third model assigns responsibilities to subordinate divisions 
within a traditional state agency--usually the Office of Elec-
tions or the Office of the Secretary of State--as in Michigan, 
Alabama, and Oregon. There may be more idiosyncratic arrange-
ments, such as those in Montana where the Commissioner of 
Political Practices isecharged with overseeing campaign finance 
matters or as in Utah where the assignment of campaign finance 
administration is lodged in the Office of the Lt. Governor. 
Political wisdom suggests that specialized independent 
boards tend to be populated by bipartisan political appointees 
who have set terms, operate under norms of objectivity and 
public regard, and are actively involved in implementing, 
monitoring and enforcing new campaign finance policies. When 
responsibility is assigned to generic independent boards, the 
norms of bipartisanship and objectivity prevail, but, because 
campaign financing is only one dimension added to a long list of 
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existing responsibilities, the approach to administration and 
policy implementation is generally routine and bureaucratic. 
When the administration of campaign funding falls within the 
purview of elected state officials with clear patronage powers 
and electoral interests, the general modis ~perandi is to 
maintain a low administrative profile and emphasize routine 
procedures rather than aggressive policy implementation. 
The location of institutional responsibility for administra-
tion combines with the resources allocated to the unit to 
influence the overall impact of campaign finance reform. Key 
resources include personnel and funds with which to administer 
as well as legislative authority to enforce the law with great 
rigor. In most instances where public campaign finance has been 
added to the duties of existing agencies, new staff and financial 
resource allocations have not been commensurate with the added 
tasks and responsibilities. When new Commissions or Agencies 
have been established, it is frequently (but not always) the case 
that more attention has been given to the administrative demands 
that accompany campaign finance reform. The obvious example is 
the FEC which in 1986 had a staff of 230 and a budget of $11.8 
million. No single state rivals the FEC, but the California Fair 
Practices Commission in 1986 had a staff of 55 and a budget of 
$3.4 million and the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commis-
sion had a staff of 30 and a budget of approximately $1 million. 
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More common are smaller agencies such as the Minnesota Ethical 
Practices Board with a staff of 6 and approximate budget of 
$211,000 or the Hawaiian 
Campaign Spending Commission with a staff of 4 and an $150,000 
budget. 
As v.o. Key pointed out in a 1956 discussion of administer-
ing state politics, not only "who is to do the administering 
[but] those factors that condition their work once they are 
chosen" is important for understanding state-level .politics. 6 
Enforcement activities depend on legislative authority as well as 
staff and budgetary support. Although most perceptions of 
campaign reform enforcement are shaped by publicity given to 
large fines and litigation that accompany sensational cases of 
corruption or financial misconduct, most enforcement activities 
involve far less glamorous, behind-the-scenes attention to detail 
and procedure quite distant from events that shape policy 
decisions. For example, only three-fourths of the public 
funding states give campaign finance agencies the power to grant 
even advisory opinions. Fewer than half of the agencies have 
the assistance of in-house legal council, and in only half a 
dozen public funding states do agencies have the authority to 
file independent court actions. Prosecution for violations of 
the campaign finance laws most often is the task of the.states' 
attorney generals or county prosecutors. 
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It is difficult to disentangle specific administrative and 
enforcement proscriptions and arrangements for public funding 
from the general administration and enforcement of other aspects 
of campaign finance regulations. Yet both the structure and 
authority provided to implement and monitor campaign financing is 
important for the role public financing plays in the overall 
campaign and electoral process. It is probably not coincidental 
that states with independent commissions to oversee public 
financing of individual candidates tend to have the greatest 
enforcement authority. 
Source of Funds. Ideally, once consensus is reached on the 
desirability of a public funding program, the goal becomes 
formulating the best possible program. In practice, however, 
what a program costs and how it will be funded are always basic 
dimensions in policy formulation. In fact, specific public 
funding programs are most often shaped, not by first answering 
fundamental questions about program scope, breadth, eligibility 
or administration, and then determining how much is needed to 
fund such a program but rather the process is reversed. First a 
funding mechanism is agreed upon, then an estimate of projected 
revenue is made and finally the policy is structured to fit 
within specified funding constraints. Advocates of public 
funding argue that public financing can be successful o~ly if it 
is adequately (read "well") funded. Candid opponents admit that 
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if they lose the initial battle over enacting public financing 
they can stil.l effectively win the war by keeping program funding 
at a minimum. Hence, campaign finance reformers seek full 
funding programs with independent institutionalized administra-
tion and rigorous enforcement, even if they must sacrifice the 
scope or breadth of public financing. Opponents, on the other 
hand, seek to keep the program at a minimal level, either through 
limiting how much money will be available 9r by specifying that 
it must be spread over a large number of off ices and campaigns 
thereby reducing the overall impact limited public resources 
might have. In addition, they often seek to limit funds for ad-
ministration and enforcement. Therefore, decisions on how to 
obtain funds for various programs are fraught with conflicts 
involving theoretical ideals, budgetary constraints, and politi~ 
cal considerations. 
The four recognized alternatives for funding public 
financing programs are the voucher system, direct legislative 
appropriation, voluntary tax add-ons and the income tax 
check-off. The voucher system is advocated by those who fear 
that alternative funding programs either will not provide enough 
money or will involve inherent biases that conflict with basic 
precepts of an open participatory electoral system. Voucher 
proposals vary considerably in detail but basically invplve tax 
payers earmarking a portion of their owed income tax for politi-
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cal campaign support. In return, the taxpayer receives a 
voucher statement or script that can be given to his or her 
preferred candidate or party. The candidate or party then 
redeems the voucher at its predetermined face value. 
One presumed benefit of a voucher plan is that, although it 
uses tax dollars, the decision about who to fund remains with 
the individual voter. It is also assumed that the opportunity 
to make a "free" contribution will serve as an incentive for 
voters to become more actively involved financing campaigns. A 
criticism of voucher plans is that an extensive administrative 
apparatus is required to verify a voucher request, issue the 
voucher and ultimately process it once the party or candidate 
cashes it in. One estimate was that it would cost $40 million to 
distribute $180 million under a federal voucher system. 7 More-
over, taxpayers may request a voucher but not follow through with 
allocating it thereby wasting the bureaucratic effort required to 
verify and issue the voucher. A second significant concern about 
vouchers is raised by critics who argue that the opportunity to 
obtain free-floating vouchers invites heavy-handed solicitations, 
vacuous appeals to unwary tax payers and even outright corruption 
and deceit in obtaining vouchers. 
The critics of voucher plans seemingly have been persuasive 
in presenting their arguments; no public campaign finan~e 
program currently is funded through vouchers. The state of 
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Alaska, however, has experimented with a reverse voucher plan. 
Under this program, taxpayers make independent, personal politi-
cal contributions and then declare the contribution for a refund 
when they file their tax returns. Taxpayers are eligible for a 
cash refund equal to the political contribution but not to exceed 
$100. Although it appears to be relatively straight forward, the 
program has not been without difficulties and no other state has 
adopted a comparable plan. 
Funds for public campaign financing can, of course, simply 
be appropriated directly by the Legislature as are funds for all 
other public programs. The attractive feature of direct appro-
priations funding is that the procedures are already in place 
and familiar to everyone; no additional bureaucracy or special 
education or publicity programs are needed. The drawback of the 
simple appropriation system is that it is highly political and 
makes the public funding program vulnerable to intense political 
pressures. Because campaign funding is viewed as central to 
personal as well as partisan electoral success, advocates of 
public campaign financing fear that programs dependent on 
legislative appropriations will be political footballs during 
each legislative appropriations battle. The uncertainty and 
continued politicalization this creates would threaten the in-
tegrity and stability of the program. Legislators, on the other 
hand, resist using the regular appropriations process to provide 
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funds for campaigns for personal political reasons. When 
pressures are great to fund established programs such as educa-
tion, health care and public safety, .casting legislative votes 
-~~ 
to allocate funds for campaigns appears at best self-serving. 
Only the state of Florida, the city of Tucson, Arizona and 
Sacramento County, California have programs that rely solely on 
direct legislative appropriations. The New Jersey statute 
stipulates that if the campaign fund is deficient, the legisla-
ture may appropriate funds equal to the shortfall. More common 
than provisions to make direct appropriations, however, are 
prohibitions, similar to those found in the federal legislation 
against direct legislative appropriation to supplement or enhance 
the campaign fund. 0 
In contrast to direct legislative appropriation is funding 
that involves no tax dollars but relies solely on voluntary "add-
on" contributions that are collected by the state at the time 
taxpayers file their income tax. In large part, programs that 
rely on taxpayers adding a political contribution when they 
write a check to cover their state tax liability are only 
marginally "public funding" programs. These "add-on" programs 
are more accurately categorized as indirect governmental 
assistance (rather than public funding) since the state simply 
permits the state tax process to be used as a vehicle for 
personal contributing and no tax dollars are involved. Because 
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add on programs depend on taxpayer's willingness to increase 
their tax liability or reduce their tax refund by $1, $2, $5, or 
more dollars, the amount of funds available to fund campaigns is 
always very limited. 
Add-on programs are included in discussions of public 
funding, however, because they frequently are the result of 
legislative stalemates over public funding. Opponents of public 
funding see add-on programs as a reasonable compromise: state 
resources are used to encourage private contributions but no tax 
dollars are involved. Advocates of public funding argue that to 
rely solely on voluntary tax add-ons as the source of funds is 
to engage in symbolic politics -- appearing to create a program 
that meets the goals associated with public funding while at the 
same time ensuring that the program will be ineffective because 
it is not adequately funded. Six states ( Alabama, California, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia) legislated add-on 
systems as the means by which to facilitate the financing 
of political campaigns, Iowa has included an add-on option to 
supplement the original income check-off system used to provide 
funds for campaigns and Montana and Oregon switched to an add-on 
after initial experiences with tax check off systems. 
The income tax check-off is by far the most popular means of 
providing money for public campaign financing. Unlike the 
add-on programs, the check-off provides a means by which tax 
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payers can earmark a small portion of their tax liability to be 
used for campaign purposes. The check-off has been used to 
secure funds for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund as well 
to finance the public funding programs of fourteen states. 
Proponents of the income check-off see it as a means through 
which public funds can be allocated for legitimate campaigning 
while at the same time enhancing the concept of individual and 
voluntary contributing. Critics resist the use of any tax 
monies, however collected, for campaign purposes but view the 
check-off as less repugnant than direct appropriations. Use of 
the check-off is voluntary and only the amount of money equal to 
citizen designations is transferred from the State's general 
fund. If a large number of taxpayers choose to use the check-
off, considerable amounts will be available for campaigns; if few 
taxpayers use the check-off, more tax dollars stay in the general 
fund. Check-off systems vary somewhat in actual implementation. 
Most permit each taxpayer to earmark a single do)lar. ~two ?n,a 
joint return) for campaign funding although Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Minnesota and Rhode Island permit a check-off designa-
tion of $2 per taxpayer ($4 on a joint return). Many of the 
states that fund political parties list all eligible parties and 
permit taxpayers to designate which one should receive their tax 
dollars; others have a general fund check-off that is allocated 
to the parties according to some per-vote or registration Jones, 
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formula. 
The tax check-off is the most popular means of raising money 
for campaign financing whereas the seemingly attractive voucher 
plans have been almost totally ignored. The political nature 
of direct legislative appropriations has diminished support for 
dependence on the appropriation process whereas add-on systems, 
generally viewed as unsatisfactory by both opponents and 
proponents of public funding, are primarily symbolic. Numerous 
alternative quasi-public funding programs have been suggested 
such as Indiana's kickback of county license fee profits to the 
party in power and an equal division to the two major parties of 
the revenues gained from the sale of vanity license plates or the 
practice in Florida where the political parties receive the 
profits from candidate's filing fees. However, these schemes 
generally have been viewed as remnants of machine, partisan 
politics rather than reforms of modern campaign financing. 
Specification of Constraints. No matter how }egislators 
resolve questions of structure and funding of campaign finance 
programs, all share a desire to specify the use and abuse of 
public funds. Obviously, the expectation is that public funds 
will be used in lawful ways for legitimate campaign purposes. 
Hence programs require strict accounting procedures, detailed 
record keeping and public disclosure. Parties or candidates 
accepting public funds must identify who is responsible for the 
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funds, designate bank accounts specifically for public funds 
and/or sign documents in which they agree to abide by all regula-
tions that accompany access to and use of public funds. No 
legislature issues a blank check with which to fund campaigns. 
This basic commonality not withstanding, there is variation 
in the specification of how funds are to be used. Some programs 
narrowly limit the acceptable uses for public monies. Rhode 
Island, for example, specifies that no public monies can be 
spent on political communication whereas the New Jersey program 
identifies spending on communication as the only legitimate use 
for public funds. The North Carolina program requires that a 
specific portion of the check-off money raised each year must be 
put aside for use during a Presidential election year whereas the 
'remainder is divided according to whether it is an off year or an 
election year. Kentucky parties must use check-off funds for 
maintaining party headquarters or supporting the parties' general 
election candidates but cannot make direct contribution to 
candidates whereas the North Carolina law specifies allocation to 
candidates for particular offices. Other programs follow the 
Federal model with a generic "qualified election expense " or 
"legitimate campaign purposes" proscription for the use of 
public funds. Although the particular constraints written in to 
each law are important for the impact that the public tunding 
program can have, for the purposes of an overview of programs, 
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they are primarily noteworthy as examples of the latitude policy 
makers have in shaping public funding programs. 
In spite of the range of alternatives available for 
structuring public funding programs, it remains true that the 
fundamental goal of campaign finance reformers is to establish 
programs that will enhance the participatory democratic system of 
competitive elections that is central to the maintenance, 
stability and success of American politics. 
Lessons From Experience 
We now have fifteen years experience with public funding in 
the U.S. It is reasonable for those contemplating campaign 
finance legislation to seek instruction and enlightenment from 
the diverse set of experiences at the federal, state and local 
level. What ,has been the impact of public funding? How success-
ful has it been? Which program is best? Which programs seemed 
to have worked? 
It is difficult to answer the question of which program is 
best because what is "best" depends on the goals and values of 
those asking the question. Similarly, how successful a program 
is judged to be is a function of what one hoped it would ac-
complish. The question of impact, on the other hand, is less 
dependent on prescriptive or normative judgments and more amena-
ble to empirical inquiry. 
Unfortunately, our research, individually and collectively, 
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has not reached the stage where we can provide concise, direct 
and comprehensive answers to questions of impact. In part, the 
constraint on our ability to respond satisfactorily to questions 
of impact is a mundane methodological fact: there.is no equi-
valent of the FEC at the state and local level to serve as a 
repository of campaign finance data. Thus the task of collecting 
basic data from 23 different states is one of enormous propor-
tions. Even more, there is no uniform system of reporting across 
those states, and the unique features of each state system make 
development of a database for comparative analysis impossible. 
It is also true that public funding programs are enacted along 
with a host of related campaign financing measures, and the 
interrelationships among the various dimensions of reform make it 
difficult to isolate any singular impact of public funding. And 
most significant for analyzing impact, we have little baseline 
data from which to measure change, and we cannot engage in social 
engineering to create controlled experiments as a substitute. 
Thus, we must be extremely cautious about inferring that change 
has occurred and about attributing it to the presence of public 
funding. The absence of a database that will permit extensive 
systematic comparison limits our ability to generalize about the 
desirability, success or impact of the programs we have observed 
and studied. 
Nevertheless, although we cannot at this time provide the 
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documentation we hope ultimately to provide, we are prepared to 
make a few general statements based on our observation and 
preliminary synthesis of the data we have assembled. 
The first is that public funding programs have been neither 
the cure of all evils the reformers promised nor the deathknell 
of free and competitive elections the opponents predicted. The 
reformers expected too much; the opponents did not recognize the 
core stability of our electoral processes and the incremental 
nature of institutional change. 
Second, the experience of each program have been somewhat 
different because the programs are sometimes very different or 
are implemented in particular political cultures and environment 
that are dissimilar. In every case, however, it is safe to say 
that not all intended change has occurred but some unintended 
change has. Similarly, it is possible to identify impacts that 
are a direct result of public funded and changes that are 
indirect results of the public funding program. For example, the 
original Oregon program funding state and country political 
parties. Democratic party leaders sought to use the funds, as 
intended, for party building activities. However, a handful of 
legislators wanted funds allocated to their individual campaigns. 
Although the intended result of strengthening party organization 
did occur, an unintended consequence was dissatisfaction among 
the legislative delegation. The indirect consequence was that 
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during a sunset review Democratic legislators helped kill the 
public funding program that Democratic leadership had fostered. 
Another general observation is that both the advocates and 
the critics of public funding frequently lose sight of the fact 
that public funding is generally part of a larger package of 
campaign finance reform. Credit or blame is often laid at the 
feet of the public funding program when it more appropriately 
should be assigned to the totality of the reform package or some 
specific dimension of the package other than public funding. For 
example, complaints about the "bureaucracy" created to administer 
public funding are largely complaints about the formal organiza-
tion, regulations and administrative activities accompanying 
campaign reporting and disclosure which exist in non-public 
funding states and locales as well. 
Demand for campaign finance reform has usually been trig-
gered by scandal and by exceedingly high election campaign costs. 
Public funding is proposed and often initially viewed as a 
radical experiment that represents a sharp break with traditional 
ways of doing things. Once implemented and permitted to operate 
for a reasonable period of time, candidates and rank and file 
citizens--even newspaper editors and citizen activists--come to 
terms with the program, and fine tuning to improve rather than 
attacking to destroy becomes the focus of critical poli~ical 
activity. States go through a maturation process vis-a-vis 
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public funding, but once the program has stood the test of time, 
the general rules of incremental policy making that characterize 
other public programs come into play. As public policy it is not 
nearly as dramatic or unique as feared. 
The post-Watergate rush toward public funding is over. Yet 
public financing continues to be a part of the game plan of many 
political activists and policy makers and remains, albeit not 
always at the top, on the agenda of a great many legislative 
bodies. Like other controversial policies, public funding is 
susceptible to the vagaries of political winds and its short-term 
fate is not always predictable. Sometimes, a legislative body 
will give serious consideration to public funding year after year 
without ever enacting a program. At the other extreme, a state 
that has little "serious" public funding history suddenly may 
pass effective legislation. 
The sense one gets is that neither proponents nor opponents 
have done a very good job of explaining public funding as concept 
A 
or as a political strategy to rank and file voters. Surveys 
have repeatedly shown that the majority of Americans are dis-
turbed about the sky-rocketing cost of elections at all levels, 
and by the appearance of "bought" elections. They would like to 
see some corrective measures put in place. Yet, for both 
philosophical and practical (economic) reasons, there is resis-
tance to funding politicians from tax dollars. One cannot expect 
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the average voter to understand how the Buckley decision shapes 
our choices for addressing these problems. And so public 
funding--as a concept and as a policy -- is a difficult one for 
rank and file citizens to place in the context of what they want 
done and what can be done. 
A few efforts have been made by different jurisdictions to 
send out press releases and to encourage support and involvement· 
by citizen groups such as the League of Women Voters or the 
Association of Tax Accountants, but these efforts have been too 
limited and too sporadic. The ethos of fairness and equity that 
public funding embodies lends itself to creating citizen expecta-
tions that candidates will play by the "rules" that make for the 
fairest game. When the public lacks information and understand-
ing, it is easier for candidates to ignore these norms because 
there is no visible set of citizen expectations that puts the 
candidate at risk if he or she ignores them. 
These fifteen years of experience have also identified 
loopholes and pit falls in different configurations of public 
funding programs. For example, we learned from the Minnesota 
experience that when the expenditure limits were set low and the 
amount of money available to gubernatorial candidates was 
modest, the public funding program was not attractive to the 
better-funded candidate and the lesser-funded candidate .was 
disadvantaged because there was no remedy or release mechanism 
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being but one--to address concerns about escalating cost of 
elections and the dominance of money in the campaign process. 
Perhaps the most interesting current activities are those at the 
state and local level. There governments have shown a willing-
ness to experiment; to back-off when things go amiss; to modify 
when change is in order, and, through fine-tuning. maintain 
policies that appear to be addressing satisfactorily the issues 
they were design to confront. It may well be, when historians 
review the changes in campaign financing that occurred in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, the most effective and 
long-lasting attempts to deal with the issues surrounding money 
in political campaigns will have occurred at the state and local, 
not the federal, level. The willingness and ability of state 
governments to tailor specific campaign finance policies to fit 
unique state needs is indeed testimony to the continued viability 
of our federal system of government. 
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Remarks of Robert M. Stern to the State of New York 
Commission on Government Integrity 
It is a pleasure to be able to share my ideas with you. Although I am 
most familiar with the campaign finance problems in California and the 
laws of 50 city and county jurisdictions which have adopted a variety of 
campaign reform laws, I believe that California's experiences are not 
unique. 
First, I will describe the problems as I see them, then I will discuss 
the potential solutions. Finally, I will suggest some remedies that should 
be used to enforce any campaign finance or ethics laws. 
Three basic problems need to be solved by any campaign reform 
proposal: excessive spending, incumbent advantage and the influence of 
money on the governmental or legislative process. 
First, excessive spending. I was unable to obtain spending figures 
for New York state races, out I assume that spending in New York 
parallels experiences elsewhere. For example, campaign expenditures for 
100 legislative races in California has risen from $1.4 million in 1958 to $57 
million in 1986, a 4000% increase. Even if inflation is factored in, the 
increase is nearly 1000%. And the California Commission on Campaign 
Financing predicts that if nothing is done to change this trend, the 1990 
legislative races will cost $100 million. Million dollar contests are now the 
norm in any competitive election for the California state legislature. In a 
recent special State Senatorial election in Los Angeles--a district of 600,000 
persons--almost $3 million was spent by the two competing candidates. 
You may not have had the same explosion in spending in New York. 
But I would predict that most people believe that too much money is being 
spent on both legislative races and statewide contests. 
1 
Why is so much money being spent? I think the main reason is fear: 
fear of being outspent and fear of losing the office or the party's position in 
the legislature. In addition, the legislative leadership of both parties fear 
the loss of their power. 
A former legislator told us why it costs so much money to run for 
office. He told us that it would cost him $500,000 to run for the legislature. 
When asked why, he responded: "Because that is how much my opponent 
would spend." When asked about the impact of an expenditure limit of 
$250,000, he expressed relief, saying that amount would be plenty of money 
to get his message out to the voters. 
Another factor affecting spending is that much of the money goes for 
expenses which never reach the voters. Campaign expenditures may not 
made for personal purposes, but the definition of personal use of campaign 
funds is very liberal. And I know that this is a problem in a number of 
states. 
Incumbents are using campaign funds for non-campaign purposes. 
Some examples include: payment for a vehicle, rent of apartments in the 
state capitol, gifts, tickets to football or basketball games, charitable 
donations, lavish dinners, travel to other states or foreign countries. Let 
me emphasize that none of this is illegal. But is it a proper use of campaign 
contributions which are given to candidates presumably for the purpose of 
convincing the voters to elect them? 
What are the consequences of excessive spending? The high cost of 
campaigning keeps talented newcomers from running for legislative office. 
The number of candidates running for office has declined, particularly the 
number of challengers. Furthermore, candidates are forced to spend more 
and more time raising money. Finally, there is the temptation to receive 
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huge contributions from those who have legislation pending, thus giving 
the impression that the legislative process is influenced by campaign 
money. 
The second problem with our system is incumbent advantage. 
Incumbents are now able to outspend their challengers by enormous ratios. 
In 1976, legislative incumbents in California outspent their opponents for 
State Assembly races by a ratio of 3 to 1. By 1986, this had increased ten fold 
to 30 to 1. And in the State Senate, the spread was 62 to 1. 
In addition, incumbents are raising enormous sums in the non-
election years. In 1985, California legislative incumbents raised $1 7 
million--even though some of them were retiring and others would not be 
faced with any meaningful opponents in 1986. One state senator wrote a 
letter to his contributors saying that he wanted $500 ,000 in his account by 
the end of the year (a non-election year) so that he could scare away any 
serious opponents in either the primary or the general election. In 1985, 
while incumbents were collecting their $1 7 million, all challengers raised 
less than $100,000. 
What are the consequences of this tremendous disparity between 
incumbents and challengers? In 1986, for the first time in 34 years,every 
single incumbent running for re-election in the California legislature won. 
Not a single challenger was able to oust an incumbent legislator. 
Finally, there is a widespread perception that campaign money buys 
legislative votes or at least legislative influence. One reporter stated: 
"Thoroughly institutionalized corruption permeates the current system of 
politics and government because of the skyrocketing costs of political 
campaigns." One legislator lamented: "We have widespread corr.uption. 
We have had the purchasing of votes with campaign contributions. I think 
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that's reprehensible." My colleague, Professor Jones has commented: 
"Saying the cascade of special interest contributions only buys access is a 
most charitable interpretation. No one that I know of give money, energy or 
time into the system without some kind of reward." 
Professor Dan Lowenstein at UCLA Law School argues that giving 
campaign money to influence legislation or even to gain access to a 
legislator's time is bribery. However, his theory has not been tested in court 
since no one has been charged with the crime of making campaign 
contributions in return for access or influencing legislation. 
Now let's turn to the possible solutions. There are three potential 
solutions. The easiest answer is to do nothing. Let campaign disclosure 
bring sunshine onto the situation. If the voters don't like what they see, 
they will vote against the candidates or the incumbents. That is what we 
have in California. Only the incumbents seem to be happy with that 
solution. 
In fact, one of the legislative leaders told me a few years ago, "This is 
a terrible campaign finance system, but we are the victors under this awful 
system. The reform you are suggesting is excellent, but under your 
proposal we may become the victim. Why should we vote for a change?" I 
assume that any change you suggest will be met with the same skepticism 
by those who are the ones who will vote for or against any proposal. 
However, in California and in many states, we can resort to the initiative 
process which serves as a way to obtain reform even without legislative 
approval. 
In the State of New York you limit contributions. But where only 
=-----------
contribution limits have been imposed, contributor influence over. -
government decisions has conti~. In Congress, where there are strict 
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limits, few would argue that the governmental process is not affected by 
campaign money. In San Diego, which has the strictest contribution limits 
in the country, the mayor has proposed additional reforms to cut down on 
the influence of development campaign money on the city council. 
A contribution only plan will not significantly affect the other two) 
problems: excessive campaign spending and incumbent advantage. In 
fact, incumbent advantage will probably be worse if they are adopted. 
We know, as a matter of fact, that contributions limits by themselves 
have very little impact on campaign spending. I can give you two examples 
in California. Last year we had the most expensive U.S. Senate race in 
California history: Alan Cranston and Ed Zschau, his Republican 
challenger, spent over $22 million despite the fact that both were limited in 
how much they could receive. In fact, the federal contribution limits are 
far more severe than contribution limits in New York. No corporate or 
labor contributions are permitted and contributors are limited to only $1000 
per person per election and $5000 per PAC per election. In San Francisco, 
which just lowered its contribution limits in half, from $1000 to $500, the 
first candidate in San Francisco history will spend more than $1 million. 
What is the solution? I believe that only a comprehensive measure 1s 
the answer. I would suggest the following Model Code: 
--limit expenditures in both the primary and the general elections 
--ban transfers (contributions from one candidate to another) 
--limit contributions to candidates 
--ban non election year fundraising 
--provides partial matching funds to serious candidates who are 
faced with serious opponents. 
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In my view expenditure limits are the most important part of this 
proposal. Many political scientists oppose expenditure limits because they ___ ......., 
fear that such limits will benefit incumbents and harm challengers. But if 
the limits are high enough, some political scientists do accept them. Thus, 
if you recommend limiting expenditures, don't make the limits too low. 
As you know, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that expenditure 
limitations are unconstitutional unless some form of public funds is offered 
to those candidates who voluntarily agree to limit their expenditures. But 
some people say that the partial public financing provisions will be the kiss 
of death to any proposal. I would respectfully disagree. The people 
overwhelmingly support expenditure limits and they also support 
comprehensive proposals which contain partial public financing. 
Sacramento County in California last year voted by a 61 % margin for such a 
plan, as have the voters in the city of Tucson and the state of Rhode Island. 
And I need not remind you that the Presidential system contains 
essentially the same provisions and has been in operation for 12 years. 
Only one Presidential candidate has declined the public money: John 
Connally who received one vote at the convention. Ronald Reagan, each of 
the three times he has run for office, has accepted taxpayers money. 
Our plan contains some innovative features that ensure that public 
money only goes to serious candidates. 
Only candidates who are serious and raise a certain threshold are 
eligible to receive funds. But in addition, they must be faced with a serious 
opponent before anyone can receive funds. Thus, candidates in non 
competitive districts probably will not receive any public funds because no 
one is going to seriously challenge them in either the primary or ~he 
general election. Finally, we encourage in district fundraising by giving a 
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higher match for those contributions raised from district residents. We do 
not penalize, rather we reward. 
Only money from a taxpayers checkoff can be used. If the taxpayers 
decide not to support the plan through the income tax checkoff, candidates 
get less money since the legislature may not appropriate any money from 
the general fund. 
One of the most important aspects of any reform concerns the 
question of how the plan will be enforced. It is my belief that criminal 
penalties rarely work if they are the only penalties available. Your 
experiences this year are rare because most district attorneys are reluctant 
to prosecute white collar crime. 
So, in addition to the necessary criminal penalties, I would suggest 
two additional enforcement remedies. First, I would recommend that 
citizens be permitted to file civil actions against persons who violate the 
laws. In California, after giving the enforcement authorities the 
opportunity to file such an action, a citizen can sue and collect up to half the 
penalty imposed by the court. 
Second, I would urge the establishment of an independent 
commission which can issue regulations and bring administrative 
enforcement actions. I have worked for both an elected Secretary of State 
and such an independent agency. Whenever the Secretary of State's office 
filed a suit, it was charged with ulterior motives since the Secretary of State 
had political ambitions. On the other hand, a bipartisan commission has 
more credibility with the public. But do not pattern the structure of such a 
commission after the Federal Election Commission. Congress deliberately 
ensured that the FEC be as weak as possible. It has a rotating 
7 
chairmanship and an even number of members so that it takes two thirds 
of the members to make any decision. 
Finally, I would like to suggest that any solution be as specific as 
possible. The great majority of candidates and public officials will comply 
with the laws as written if these laws are clear. But laws which are vague 
or difficult to understand may be evaded unintentionally. Further, it is 
extremely helpful to give a governmental agency the power to interpret 
these laws through regulation and opinion. Thus, those who attempting to 
comply with the rules can ask questions before they act or get into trouble. 
I can't guarantee that my solution or any answer is perfect. But my 
recommendation does attempt to address the problems which are affecting 
both the election and governmental processes. It is a comprehensive 
response to a complex set of problems which will only get worse if no 
solution is adopted. I would be pleased to answer any questions or 
comments you may have. 
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The first amendment analysis of campaign regulation is a very volatile 
field. The first amendment of course is nearly two hundred years old. The 
federal courts have been applying it to the states for better than half a 
century. Nevertheless at the time that Congress passed the Federal Election 
Campaign Act this field was almost barren by contemporary standards. Prior to 
the passage of the F.E.C.A., enormous regulation of p'Olitical parties had been 
accomplished virtually without first amendment analysis. (See my Rebuilding 
the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11 
Hofstra Law Review 191, 194-208, 223-237 (1982).) By the mid 1970s, text 
writers had begun to question whether parties were public rather than private 
entities. 
When the FECA was reviewed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the 
Court justified a complex body of law on the basis of what it might do to 
alleviate the appearance of corruption. The notion that the appearance of 
evil is sufficient to override first amendment protections is hardly 
consistent with belief that the amendment can carry teeth. 
In the decade since Buckley the Court has virtually reversed that 
neglect. Political parties have rights of association few could have dreamed 
of at the time of Buckley. Our understanding of campaign finance has been 
developing rapidly. A corporate right to election related speech has been 
expanded dramatically. Those developments make it difficult to peg any 
discussion of the first amendment treatment of election finance at the 
appropriate level. A descriptive treatment would make existing rules seem too 
eternal. A theoretical treatment might make them seem to insignificant. 
The material that follows is designed to begin with those fundamental 
propositions of first amendment analysis that appear reliable. Some of the 
consequences in which we can place some confidence follow. Following are 
materials that highlight some of the questions posed by the rapid developments 
in this area. 
The first amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes any law 
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government fora redress of 
grievances." As ratified in 1791 the amendment related only to the activities 
of the federal government. The fourteenth amendment, however, makes the 
provisions of the first amendment applicable to the activities of the states. 
Robust marketplace of ideas 
It is fundamental to the first amendment that there is no fixed innnutable 
truth, no one position that voters may be required to accept, no officially 
favored candidate or doctrine. The public must be free to reexamine 
continually its needs from the political system. Hence any legislation which 
constricts the speech process impoverishes public discourse. 
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Several fundamental conclusions follow from that proposition. 
First, one cannot limit campaign speech to the candidates themselves. To 
do so cuts off the expression of other viewpoints. Thus in FEC V. National 
Conservative Political Action Committee, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985), the Supreme 
Court held that a limitation on campaign spending by a group unaffiliated with 
either presidential candidate was unconstitutional. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976) the Court had reached the same conclusion for non-presidential 
federal campaigns. 
Second, more broadly, protection for a robust marketplace of ideas 
prohibits the exclusion of independent speech from political campaigns. In 
Buckley the Court struck provisions of the federal statute which would have 
prohibited all campaign expenditures by any person or group other than the 
candidate, the press and the parties. 424 U.S. 39-51. The federal statute 
was subsequently amended to define an "independent expenditure" as the 
spending of anything of value to aid the election or defeat of a candidate 
made "without cooperation or consultation with any candidate" or agent and not 
at their suggestion or "in concert" with a candidate. 2 U.S.C. 431 (17). 
Such expenditures are not limited by the Act. 
Third, one cannot subject speech to campaign regulations when that 
speech, while relevant to campaigns, is not explicitly for or against a 
candidate. All discussion of public issues is relevant to campaigns. The 
more controversial the issue, and the more public figures have taken 
positions, the greater the effect of commentary on the electoral chances of 
those who have taken positions or acted on those issues. But the Constitution 
as the Court has interpreted it does not permit us to impose the financial 
limitations and disclosure requirements, approved for campaign regulation, on 
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speech which touches on such issues as the Bork nomination or the wars in 
Central America. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79-80 (1976). See also id. at 
41-44; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 616, 623 
(1986); FEC v. Central Long Island T.R.I.M., 616 F. 2d 45 (2 Cir. 1980); ACLU 
v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973). 
The rejection of these provisions by the Court in Buckley and its progeny 
are firmly rooted in fundamental first amendment principles. 
The checking value in first amendment analysis 
A second fundamental proposition of first amendment law is that a major 
purpose of the first amendment is to prevent governmental restraint on speech 
in order to cover up or prevent criticism of government itself. Those in 
power cannot arrange the process of discussion to prevent their dismissal from 
office. See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 
1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 521. 
Equality/neutrality 
Both propositions -- that the first amendment protects a robust 
marketplace of ideas and that the first amendment condemns self-serving 
governmental regulation of speech -- produce a major corollary: government 
must treat speakers and political organizations neutrally; favoritism is 
forbidden. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The 
same result is achieved by the fourteenth amendment which prohibits the states 
from denying ''any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
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laws." Together the first and fourteenth amendments, intertwined in relation 
to campaign finance laws, reinforce the requirements of equality under each. 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980); 
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974); Police Department 
v. Mosely, 408, 92, 94-96 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 23, 30-31 (1968). 
A fundamental conclusion which follows from these propositions is that 
the major parties can not exclude minor parties from either the campaign or 
the election process. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Storer v. 
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974). The first amendment protects the public in 
the event that it should decide that the two major parties do not serve or 
address their needs. 
In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968), the Court wrote "There is, 
of course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the 
right to have people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and 
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral·· process and of the First 
Amendment freedoms." The Court reiterated that language in Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 71n (1976) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 802 (1983). 
(The preeminent example of the importance of third parties is the birth of the 
Republican party -- a third party born of the failure of the Whigs and 
Democrats to address slavery. The Progressives did not survive as a national 
third party but their impact on national politics was substantial.) 
Thus, campaign funding legislation must treat the parties in the same 
way. Funding roughly proportional to support for the parties without 
excluding third parties from the contest has been held to be acceptable. 
Commensurate treatment of candidates raises particular difficulties with 
respect to primaries. The impact of funding is exaggerated where 
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contributions -- even small ones -- are used as the basis for matching funds. 
Organizational independence 
These fundamental first amendment principles of robust debate, vigilance 
toward government and neutrality also support the independence of political 
associations, including political parties, from governmental interference. 
The Court has recognized that political associations promote first amendment 
objectives by allowing the public to pool resources, define, negotiate and 
promote common positions. See TashJian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 
107 S. Ct. 544 (1986); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex 
rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
Political organizations are entitled to strong first amendment protection from 
governmental intervention into their membership base, their organizational 
structure and their decisionmaking processes. 
The eventual impact of the line of cases from Cousins through Tashjian 
remains to be defined. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has recently found that political parties have the right to make pre-
primary endorsements. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee v. 
Eu, No. 84-1851, August 18, 1987. These decisions call into question the 
constitutionality of New York Election Law 2-126, which prohibits pre-primary 
expenditures on behalf of any primary candidate. 
The cases defining the right of association have concerned party 
nominations. The principles established raise questions about some aspects of 
campaign finance legislation as well. It is important to recognize that 
federal campaign finance legislation has had significant effects in 
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channelling public support among various organizations. That channeling is 
hard to square with the first amendment requirement of neutrality. See 
Gottlieb, Fleshing Out the Right of Association: The Problem of the 
Contribution Limits of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 49 Albany Law Review 
825 (1985). The federal election laws encourage people to treat different 
political organizations differently. Thus the laws steer funds among 
candidates, parties, and a variety of organizations including independent, 
coordinated, corporate, labor, industrial, trans-industrial, employee, and 
issue organizations. The proposed New York City plan most obviously steers / 
funds between candidates and parties. I have referred to this as the 
balkanization of the electorate. Campaign finance laws which encourage the 
electorate to fractionalize necessarily make it harder for the public to unify 
behind common goals. For those reasons such balkanization of the electorate 
limits the marketplace of ideas and conflicts with the first amendment. 
Thus the challenge in drafting constitutional election finance 
legislation is to augment and enhance the public discourse without 
governmental control over what the public hears. 
Limits on campaign costs 
There are two different levels at which we must evaluate campaign 
finance: relative and quantitative. The obligation of relative equality has 
been discussed earlier. Quantity is equally significant. Some restraints on 
campaign finance reduce the amount that can be raised and spent on 
campaigning. Other approaches increase the amount raised and spent on 
campaigning. There are many who would like to reduce the figure. The figure 
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is not incidental. Without enough dollars candidates will not be able to get 
their story to the voters, and may not even be able to achieve name 
recognition let alone a responsible evaluation by the public. Thus the amount 
of dollars may significantly affect who wins the contest. Because of that 
possibility all of the basic first amendment values are implicated. 
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US (1976), the United States Supreme Court 
approved expenditure limitations for those who accepted public funding and 
approved the contribution limitations imposed on all other candidates by 
federal election campaign law. Except as a condition on public funding, the 
Court held limits on expenditures unconstitutional as a major constriction of 
freedom of speech. The Court held that contributions could be limited because 
the statute treated all candidates and contributors alike. " . . [T ]he Act 
applies the same limitations on contributions to all candidates regardless of 
their present occupations, ideological views, or party affiliations." 424 U.S. 
at 31. Thus the first amendment requirement of neutrality toward speech was 
not offended. 
rr25e The Court then clarified the factual basis of its holding: "Absent record 
evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a court 
should generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its fact 
imposes evenhanded restrictions." Id. The Court found no evidence and 
"little indication" that the limitations on contributions to candidates or 
organizations would give incumbents an added advantage, id. at 32-33, and 
denied that the statute would disadvantage fledging parties in their search 
for seed money, id. at 34. 
The factual nature of the Buckley holding, however, suggests the 
possibility that contribution limitations may not survive. Since Buckley, 
8 
evidence has accumulated which indicates that the contribution limitations do 
alter the course of political campaigns. The crucial issue does not appear to 
be the relative financial means of competing candidates, but rather the 
ability of challengers to meet significant thresholds of public awareness. 
Jacobson, on the basis of an elaborate study, concluded that many candidates 
had been and would be, deprived of the opportunity to achieve adequate funding 
by the contribution limits of the Federal Election Campaign Act. G. Jacobson, 
Money in Congressional Elections, 157, 194 (1980). The Court has not 
confronted the significance of the research showing the importance of the 
level of funding and the tie between the levels and the limitations on 
contributions. (For a fuller treatment of Buckley v. Valeo and the first 
amendment status of contribution limits, see Gottlieb, Contribution Limits, 
above, 49 Albany Law Review 825). 
Even if the amount is adequate, however, we still have to determine 
whether the sums are apportioned equitably. Do they merely reinforce the 
impact of money? Of early contributors? Or do they reflect support 
independent of dollars? 
Justifications for Regulation 
As described above, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to accept 
regulation that constricts speech in what it considers significant ways. It 
has permitted what seem to it minor constrictions of speech: i.e., 
contribution limits if enacted for sufficiently good reasons, but not 
expenditure limits. The question, then, is whether there are sufficient 
justifications for campaign regulation. 
9 
In Buckley, the Court accepted the appearance of corruption as a 
rationale justifying that portion of the federal scheme as it held 
constitutional. I would hope that the courts would outgrow deference to 
appearances since it implies that the first amendment can be overruled by 
opinion polls. I would hope that we would come to demand that means/ends 
relationships be carefully thought through and substantiated and not merely 
believed. 
Buckley also recognized actual corruption as a justification for campaign 
regulation. Corruption defeats the expression of popular will through the 
election process and the obligation of the representative to serve the public. 
For reasons discussed above, campaign finance legislation may also implicate 
those same values by decreasing campaign funding, increasing the complexity of 
campaigning and thereby restricting entry into the campaign field, channeling 
of dollars among organizations and subjecting the entire process to 
administrative supervision. The question is whether we sacrifice more or less 
than we gain. 
That problem is cast in bold relief by the next justification the Court 
has used to justify some electoral regulation, the mitigation of factionalism. 
See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). Campaign finance legislation can 
significantly increase factionalism. 
Proposed public funding is directed at the candidates. By specifying 
candidate control over public funds, public funding increases factionalism. 
The problem is more difficult than merely shifting the locus of funding. Were 
we to give the funds to the parties, they might be (or become) inappropriate 
agents of largess by misusing the power given them. First amendment 
principles counsel letting the people determine whether to give their support 
10 
through the candidate, the party or other institutions. 
To the extent one analyzes New York City politics as undermined by 
factionalism, campaign finance reform is unhelpful at best. The problem of 
factionalism is compounded by primaries. Primaries are important in one party 
cities, but they also encourage splintering and discourage unity. The line of 
cases from Cousins to Tashjian supports considerable party control over its 
nominating procedures. (On conventions see Gottlieb, Convention, above, 11 
Hofstra Law Review 191.) Whether it will support a party decision to nominate 
for local or state offices by convention is not yet clear. The answer to that 
question may depend on progress in our understanding of the benefits of 
primaries in allowing voters control over nominations and the weaknesses of 
primaries in encouraging factionalism and making it difficult for voters to 
unite. The current exclusive dependence on primaries creates an additional 
problem about which political scientists have been quite concerned: the lack 
of political responsibility has meant that party governance is relatively 
unconstrained. 
A nonpartisan petition nominating system, if it remained coupled with the 
existing constraints on parties in the pre-primary campaign, or a system of 
proportional representation, would also encourage factionalism. The problem 
with respect to factionalism is the dominance of incentives for competitive 
over cooperative strategies. 
Interparty competition is an important goal of election reform. See 
Tashjian v. Republican Party, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 544 (1986). General 
election finance could be designed to aid the minority party e.g., the 
Republican Party in New York City. The notion of aiding the minority party is 
a responsible one. Martin Van Buren, the father of the two party system in 
11 
this country, argued that the Democratic Party needed organized and 
institutionalized opposition to maintain its purity and purpose. If everyone 
was a Democrat, then, in a sense, no one was. See J. Ceaser, Presidential 
Selection, 126, 131-32 (1979). 
Proposed contribution limitations might accomplish that objective in the 
following way. If the Republican Party receives the bulk of its funds from 
people who donate from one to three thousand dollars and the Democrats receive 
the bulk of its funds from people whose contributions are at the extremes, 
then contribution limits will benefit the Republican Party at the expense of 
the Democratic Party even if the Republican Party is the party of the wealthy. 
This effect is compounded by the expense of fundraising. If solicitations 
cost a dollar, which is common, but only one percent of those solicited 
respond, which is also common, then donations less than one hundred dollars 
actually cost the campaign money. Thus if this state of affairs turned out to 
reflect reality, then the Democratic Party would lose its givers at the high 
end and would not be able to benefit substantially from its donors at the low 
end. 
Two problems, however, may frustrate the objective. It is not clear that 
people would accept the partisan impliations of such a proposal. And finance 
legislation might well accentuate majority party dominance in New York City by 
diminishing the funds available for challengers' campaigns. 
Providing the public with better information about the political process 
is certainly supported in the caselaw. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
395 U.S. 367 (1969) (approving the fairness doctrine) and CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 
367 (1981) (holding that the networks were obligated by the reasonable access 
provision to air the Carter/Mondale announcement of candidacy). 
12 
• 
So long as campaigns are grounded only on money and brief debates, 
however, the public will continue to receive a very incomplete picture of the 
candidates. Public funding and financial regulation will not solve that 
problem. If such measures reduce financial support for campaigns they lessen 
the discussion. If they add financial support the results may nevertheless 
prove an unsatisfactory extension of existing practices. 
It would be possible, consistent with the first amendment, for a city or 
state to buy air time or to air debates on public stations. It would be 
consistent with the first amendment to ask Congress either to abolish the 
equal time restrictions on private broadcasters or to alter the equal time 
provision so that it would be satisfied by an offer to all candidates of time 
to participate in a debate scheduled months in advance, regardless of who 
appeared. 
A public opportunity not only to debate but for something akin to 
hearings at which each candidate could be questioned at length might be a more 
fundamental improvement. 
Does campaign finance legislation matter? 
The recent revelations of financial abuses by public officials may be an 
indication not of the failure but of the success of the current system. 
Abuses are being located and dealt with. We could celebrate instead of 
wringing our hands. 
When we consider the efficacy of election finance legislation, it is 
important to ask the question what else is there? In New York State we have 
by statute all but eliminated the party nominating convention, NY Elect. L., 
13 
Art. 6, and then have prohibited the parties from any and all spending in the 
primaries on behalf of any nominee, NY Elect. L. sec. 2-126. Thus, outside of 
contributors and spenders, one wonders what other resources exist with which 
to get one's record, image or stand to the public. 
That in turn leads to a bootstrap question. Do the legal restraints that 
we have already placed on the political parties justify further manipulation 
of the electoral process? Is the first amendment sensitive to an argument 
about going too far? Or do the problems with prior tinkering justify more? 
It may be that the courts would currently accept the kind of campaign 
finance legislation proposed. No parts of that package however are on firm 
constitutional ground. The developments in first amendment jurisprudence 
suggest that the costs of government control over the spending of campaign 
funds may be too great in substituting official rules for public will and in 
denying the public the opportunity to join behind the banner of common 
interest. 
14 
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FECA, among other things, limits campaign contributions and ex-
penditures. The statute was first challenged in Buckley v. Valeo. 3 In 
Buckley and its progeny, the Court has perceived the right of associa-
tion as a right of individuals;' and the first amendment as a guaran-
tee that individuals may pool their political resources without gov-
ernmental interference. 11 When the Court focuses on individual 
citizens as the only relevant political actors, however, it overlooks the 
distinctive contributions made by various kinds of political associa-
tions. 6 A closer look at the operations of these political associations 
and the consequences of federal campaign funding restrictions would 
lead to a better understanding of associational rights. Armed with 
such an understanding, the Court would be far less sanguine about 
the constitutionality of the provisions of the FECA.7 Due to its lim-
closure by candidates for federal office of contributions to and expenditures by their campaigns. 
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 600 (1982); 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315 (1982)). 
Following Watergate, Congress revised the Act by establishing contribution and spending limi-
tations, creating the Federal Election Commission to enforce the Act, and providing for public 
financing of presidential campaigns. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441, 451-455 (1982); 
26 U.S.C. §§ 9002-9012, 9031-9042 (1982)). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme 
Court invalidated certain provisions of the FECA, and the statute was again amended. See 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified 
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-432, 434, 437a-447j, 455j (1982); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9002-9004, 9006-
9009, 9012, 9029, 9032-9035 (1982)). The most recent amendments were added in 1979. See 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-433, 435-441j (1982)). 
• 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
• See Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a 
Test Case, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 203-08 (1982). 
• Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 16-23 . 
• For the role of political parties, see J. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION (1979); and for the 
role of media based organizations, see L. SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS 24-34, 
274-97 (1981). 
7 For demonstrations of the Court's support of the Act, see FEC v. National Right to Work 
Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (sustaining limitation of solicitation to members), and Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-38 (sustaining the Act's contribution limitations). In addition, the Court 
has rejected challenges to the limitations of the FECA either summarily or without discussion 
of the associational issue. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577 (1982) (re-
jecting on procedural grounds a challenge to limitations on solicitations by trade associations); 
International Ass'n of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092, 1105 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (sustaining 
diverse rules for separate segregated funds under 2 U.S.C. § 441b), aff'd without opinion, 459 
U.S. 983 (1982); Republican Nat'! Comm. v. FEC, 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.) (sustaining limitations 
on contributions to publicly funded presidential campaigns), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980); 
Martin Tractor Co. v. FEC, 460 F. Supp. 1017 (D.D.C. 1978) (dismissing as nonjusticiable in its 
current posture a challenge to limitations on corporate solicitation), aff'd, 627 F.2d 375 (D.C. 
Cir 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1981). But see FEC v. National Conservative Political 
Action Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985) (holding unconstitutional the limitation of 26 U.S.C. § 
9012(0 (1976) on independent expenditures in presidential campaigns); Co~mon Cause v. 
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ited perspective on political association, the Court has failed to iden-
tify the FECA's infringement on the right of association and has ig-
nored the Act's unintended restructuring of the American political 
landscape. 
This Article develops a more complete exposition of the dimen-
sions of the right of association by exploring the effect of the cam-
paign funding laws on political participation. The first section ex-
plores the background of the disputes concerning the FECA. The 
second section develops the function of the right of association in 
terms of first amendment theory. 8 The Article then examines the 
provisions of the Act as construed by the courts, beginning with 
Buckley. It demonstrates that the application of these provisions has 
divided voters within and among political associations, has shaped 
the structure of those associations, and has altered political expres-
sion in ways which have led to a "balkanization" of the American 
electorate. The final section examines the justifications for the regu-
lation of campaign contributions and considers whether the end fos-
tered by such regulation outweighs the burdens placed on the exer-
cise of the right of association. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Federal Election Campaign Act was passed in 1971 and was 
later amended and enlarged to reduce the potential for corruption of 
political candidates by large campaign contributions. 9 The Act was 
also designed to curtail the disproportionate political influence of 
wealthy citizens10 and to curb the rapidly increasing rate of campaign 
Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (same), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 
129 (1982). 
• See Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 194-221 (identifying values of political association as defined 
by purposes of first amendment); D. Dodson, The Federal Courts and American Political Par-
ties: Legal Constraints on the Development of a Responsible Party System (paper presented at 
the 1984 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (Apr. 
11-15, 1984)) (unpublished manuscript). 
• See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976); SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. 
REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 563-77 (1974); S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1773, 1801 (supplemental views of Mr. 
Hart); Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments: The Shortcomings 
of Good Intentions, 1975 DUKE L.J. 851, 852; see also T. SCHWARZ & A. STRAUS, FEDERAL REGU-
LATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY 1-34 n.144 (1982). 
'
0 S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-23 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 1773, 1774-75; see S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE 
CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 5587, 5591 (discussing public funding); see aiso Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 
. I 
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spending. 11 To accomplish these goals, the FECA severely restricted 
the amount of money an individual or organization could contribute 
to, or otherwise spend on, candidates for federal elective office. In 
addition, aggregate "ceiling" limitations were placed on the amounts 
which could be spent on election campaigns. 
The constitutionality of the FECA was challenged on first amend-
ment and equal protection grounds in Buckley v. Valeo. 12 In Buckley, 
the Supreme Court overturned the ceilings on candidate spending13 
and struck down the limitations on independent expenditures.14 The 
FECA's contribution limits were sustained,111 however, and the Court 
rejected the appellants' objections concerning the unequal impact of 
the statute's provisions on different classes of political organiza-
tions.16 This section explains the reliance of the Court in Buckley on 
certain factual assumptions, and argues that the factual underpin-
nings of these assumptions are crumbling. 
The FECA that has emerged after Buckley includes important dis-
tinctions among different political actors. The Act now favors politi-
cal organization along industrial lines by permitting corporations and 
unions to provide unlimited funding for the administrative expenses 
of their political action committees (PACs),17 but denies a similar 
privilege to any other organization. This same provision of the Act 
encourages divisions among citizens who work for different corpora-
tions or belong to different unions. The statute promotes the prolifer-
ation of large, ad hoc organizations controlled by individual candi-
dates, but limits the political activities of virtually all other 
organizations, including political parties. Groups willing to forgo the 
benefit of consultation or coordination with a candidate are allowed 
to make unlimited expenditures on that candidate's behalf while 
other organizations are not. 18 The activities of, and contributions to, 
such groups, however, are severely restricted by the statute. 
The Buckley Court's conclusion that the FECA treats all contribu-
tors alike was central to its decision to sustain the statute's contribu-
821, 837-38 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
11 Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 837 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976). 
11 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
13 Id. at 51-59; see also 2 U.S.C. § 44la (1982). 
u 424 U.S. at 39-51. 
1
• Id. at 23-38. 
1
• Id. at 30-36. 
17 See 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)(2)(C) (1982). 
18 See id. §§ 431(8)(A), (17), (18), 44la(a)(l)-(3), (a)(7)(B)(i). 
., 
• 
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tion limitations.19 On the basis of this conclusion, the Court rejected 
appellants' claims that the limitations discriminated among candi-
dates, parties, and political committees. 20 The Court correctly noted 
that no constitutional principle requires that all political committees 
or organizations receive the same amount of support from the pub-
lic, 21 and therefore looked to the treatment of the individual voter as 
the proper standard of equality for equal protection analysis.22 
While the choice of this standard may make sense in principle, the 
Court's conclusions do not necessarily follow from application of this 
standard. The FECA's contribution limits not only affect the overall 
level of political campaign funding, but also interact with the eco-
nomic system in ways which create and perpetuate inequalities 
among groups. Whether that fosters individual equality among voters 
is a relatively complex matter. Similarly, the standard of individual 
equality does not justify provisions which determine not only who 
may give how much, but to whom, and under what circumstances.28 
Some PACs may solicit funds only from members, corporate share-
holders, or administrative personnel;24 some committees may make 
larger contributions to candidates than others;u and some commit-
tees may spend without limit while others may not. 26 Such results, 
created by the FECA constraints, are not logically required by impo-
sition of equal contribution limitations on individual voters. 
The Court's interpretation of the first amendment in Buckley was 
based on the Court's misunderstanding of the relevant political sci-
ence. The Court in Buckley held that the FECA provisions which 
channel contributors into different types of organizations are consis-
tent with first amendment guarantees.27 Logically that position had 
to rest on the conclusion that these provisions have no practical ef-
fect in the political arena, that the differences which may result are 
10 See 424 U.S. at 31. The Court stated that "the Act applies the same limitations on contri-
butions to all candidates regardless of their present occupations, ideological views, or party 
affiliations. Absent record evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a 
court should generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its face imposes even-
handed restrictions." Id. 
•• Id. at 30-36. 
21 Id. at 48-49. 
11 See id. at 28-29. 
•• See J. Gora, Money and Politics: A Response 5-9 (paper prepared for Biennial Conference 
of the ACLU, at Mount Vernon College, Washington, D.C. (June 19-21, 1983)) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
•• See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4) (1982). 
20 See id. § 441a(a). 
•• See id. §§ 431(17), 441a(a)(l)-(3), (7)(B), 441a(d). 
27 See 424 U.S. at 23-39 . 
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830 Albany Law Review [Vol. 49 
constitutionally irrelevant, or that the infringement on the exercise of 
first amendment rights is insignificant as compared to the benefits of 
campaign regulation. In sustaining portions of the FECA, the Court 
explicitly endorsed two of these positions-that the statute creates 
no practical difficulties, and that any difficulties would be balanced 
by benefits.28 To the extent that the Court used a balancing test, its 
evaluation was necessarily affected by its underestimation of the 
practical difficulties involved. 
Appellants introduced evidence showing that popular political 
movements depend on large financial contributions and that opposi-
tion candidates depend on significant contributions made early in the 
campaign. 29 The appellants charged that the FECA makes it more 
difficult for opposition candidates to succeed when challenging in-
cumbents by limiting the funds that may be contributed to a candi-
date. While the Court was aware of the financial advantages of in-
cumbents, 30 it nevertheless found no evidence31 and "little 
indication"32 that the limitations on contributions to candidates or 
2
• Id. at 28-29 (finding an insignificant burden on first amendment interests). The Court 
addressed the question of balancing by stating: "[T]he weighty interests served by restricting 
the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited 
effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling." Id. at 29. 
•• See Brief for Appellant at 116-39, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
30 See 424 U.S. at 31 n.33. Incumbents enjoy several advantages over challengers which en-
able them to convey their campaign messages to the public more easily. First, incumbents re-
ceive a franking privilege, which allows members of Congress to mail without charge any corre-
spondence pertaining to the "official business, activities and duties of the Congress." 39 U.S.C. 
§ 3210(a)(l) (1982). A federal court has held the franking privilege to be constitutional. Com-
mon Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1982) (the court denied challengers' first 
amendment and equal protection claims and recognized that legitimate interests furthered by 
franking privilege justified slight infringement on challengers' rights), aff'd, 461 U.S. 911 (1983). 
Second, incumbents have better access to the media by virtue of their office. See 47 U.S.C. § 
315(a) (1982) (all "legally qualified" candidates must receive equal opportunities to use broad-
casting stations, but excepts from the definition of equal opportunities a candidate's appear-
ance in any "bona fide newscast ... interview ... documentary ... or ... news events"). 
Both Houses of Congress provide broadcasting studios for the use of their members. 2 U.S.C. § 
123b (1982); see also SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE 
STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1979) (Rule 40.6). Third, incumbents 
may use the services of their full office staff. 18 U.S.C. § 607(b); W. BROWN, JEFFERSON'S MAN-
UAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 635, 
653-54 (1981) (Rules 43(8), 45); SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., supra at 68-69, 72-74 
(Rules 38, 41). Incumbents must finance and report all campaign related travel out of campaign 
funds, but travel between Washington, D.C., and the incumbent's home state need not be 
treated as campaign travel. 11 C.F.R. § 106.3(d) (1985); see Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 
133 (D.C. Cir.) (dismissing for lack of standing challenge by political opponent to outlays for 
office staff and travel), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). 
31 424 U.S. at 32. 
31 Id. at 33 n.38. 
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organizations would give incumbents an added advantage. The Court 
also failed to accept the assertion that fledgling third parties would 
be disadvantaged in their search for seed money. 33 
The factual nature of the Buckley holding, however, suggests the 
possibility of a stronger attack in future cases. The question of the 
overall imbalance between challenger and incumbent has been 
presented to the Court since Buckley only in the context of the 1980 
presidential election campaign, which was hardly an auspicious con-
text in which to raise the issue. In Republican National Committee 
u. FEC, 34 the Republican National Committee argued that it should 
be allowed to contribute to the presidential campaign despite public 
funding, lest their candidate, a challenger in 1980, be placed at a dis-
advantage. 35 The Second Circuit disagreed, 36 and the Supreme Court 
declined to hear argument on the issue. 37 Whether the Supreme 
Court will continue to treat the issue as a factual question subject to 
the acquisition of pertinent evidence is not clear from that result. 
Since Buckley, evidence has accumulated which indicates that the 
contribution limitations do alter the course of political campaigns. 
The crucial issue does not appear to be the relative financial means 
of competing candidates,36 but rather the ability of challengers to 
meet significant thresholds of public awareness. Jacobson, on the ba-
sis of an elaborate mathematical model, concluded that many candi-
dates will be deprived of the opportunity to achieve adequate fund-
ing by the contribution limits of the FECA. 39 Their chances of 
election will therefore be substantially weakened. 40 Such evidence ap-
pears to undermine the opinion in Buckley. Jacobson's evidence also 
suggests the need for a closer look at the ways the FECA may affect 
•• Id. at 34 n.40. 
•• 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980). 
•• Brief for Plaintiff at 23-29, 42-45, Republican Nat'! Comm. v. FEC, 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), 
aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980). 
•• 616 F.2d at 2; see also Republican Nat'! Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(stating that "[a]s long as it has a legitimate public purpose a public campaign funding law 
should not be required to remedy pre-existing inequalities between candidates"), aff'd, U.S. 955 
(1980). 
•• See Republican Nat'! Comm. v. FEC, 445 U.S. 965 (1980) (denying certiorari before judg-
ment); id. at 955 (affirming the lower court decision). 
38 Passage of 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982) has not stilled the substantial pressures toward dispro-
portionate support of incumbents. K. Brown, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Vot-
ing 7-18 (paper presented at the 1983 annual meeting of the American Political Science Associ-
ation, Chicago, Illinois, (September 1-4, 1983)) (unpublished manuscript). 
39 G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 157, 194 (1980). 
'
0 Id.; see also Parker, Incumbent Popularity and Electoral Success, in CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS§ 249, at 269-74 (L. Maisel & J. Cooper eds. 1981) (describing advantages enjoyed by 
incumbents). 
• 
. 
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the level of funding of many varieties of campaign positions. 
In practice, the campaign contribution limits of the FECA have 
had an important impact on the formation and functioning of politi-
cal associations. In fact, they have contributed to the balkanization of 
the American electorate. 41 Interests and perspectives that reflect the 
industrial landscape are reinforced and promoted, but interests and 
perspectives which cross the industrial context are hindered. Any 
given number of voters sharing a point of view among themselves, 
but not sharing that view with top management in their profession, 
may find it more difficult to express themselves politically.•2 Any 
given number of voters, no matter how small a percentage of the pub-
lic, who nevertheless share a view with others in their own profession, 
will find it relatively easy, vis-a-vis another group of the same size 
not joined by industrial ties, to express their point and pursue their 
objectives. 
Voters who view their interests as defined more broadly than the 
support of a given candidate or issue will find it relatively difficult to 
pursue their objectives because of the restrictions on political parties. 
Voters are encouraged to put their energies into candidates, not 
parties, and to concentrate on issues, not offices. Any effort to focus 
on the broad spectrum of issues is discouraged by the special interest 
view of politics entrenched by the cases and the FECA. To some ex-
tent, those results would occur even in the absence of the FECA, but 
the effects are clearly compounded by the operation of the financial 
restrictions. 
Although this Article criticizes the balkanization of the American 
electorate, it does not endorse a particular shape for the political 
landscape. The people have the right to divide their political loyalties 
in any manner they choose. The right of association guaranteed by 
the Constitution protects the right of the people to adopt a desired 
form of political association. It does not grant government the au-
thority to impose on the people a specific form of political associa-
tion. It is not balkanization per se that is criticized here, but the stat-
utorily required balkanization engendered by the FECA that denies 
the freedom of association protected by the Constitution. 
" See infra notes 63-119 and accompanying text. 
0 See Gottlieb, supra note 4, in which the author discusses the difficulty voters face in work-
ing through candidates and parties under current primary laws. The ability of candidates to 
contribute to public debate is affected by the milieu encouraged by the FECj\ . 
• 
. 
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II. THE FUNCTION OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 
It is impossible to determine what is important for first amend-
ment decision-making without determining what the first amend-
ment requires. The Court, however, has not articulated a clear theory 
of the first amendment as it applies to associations. 
The Court has traditionally interpreted the first amendment as a 
guarantee that the government may not discourage or favor speech 
because of the content of its message.43 The Court's use of this con-
tent-neutral theory has not included any clear statement defining its 
relevance to the rights of associations.44 Nevertheless, the content-
•• See Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977) (developing the 
theory as growing out of protection for the press); Redish, The Content Distinction in First 
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (advocating abandoning the content distinc-
tion as defined by the Court); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (examining the limitations and merits of the analysis used by the 
Court to determine the constitutionality of content-based and content-neutral restrictions) . 
.. Some of the cases dealt only with commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980) (applied to corporate commercial 
speech); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-35 (1980) (applied 
to inserts in utility bills). In Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972), the 
Court employed the content-neutral theory in finding a statute unconstitutional, but did not 
discuss the impact on the right of association. The case involved a city ordinance which prohib-
ited nonlabor picketing at primary or secondary school buildings. Id. at 92-93. While Justice 
Marshall treated analysis under the first amendment and the equal protection clause as thor-
oughly "intertwined," id. at 95, he formally based his decision on an equal protection analysis. 
The Court also recognized distinctions based on the function of government property in Perry 
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry, the Court upheld a 
provision in a collective bargaining agreement between a teachers' union and a school board 
that allowed the designated union representative access to the interschool mail system and the 
teachers' mail boxes, but excluded access to rival unions. Id. at 39-41. The Court found that the 
state has the right to restrict the use of public property, even if that use involves first amend-
ment rights, "as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress 
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 46. The Court dealt 
with discrimination among associations in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 
540 (1983), but it treated the neutrality obligation as irrelevant to the tax advantages. Id. at 
545-46. In Regan, a nonprofit organization, Taxation With Representation (TWR), was denied 
the use of tax-deductible contributions to finance lobbying activities, a privilege enjoyed only 
by veterans organizations. Id. at 541-47. The Court held this did not violate TWR's first 
amendment rights since TWR could still finance its lobbying activities with nondeductible con-
tributions. Id. at 545. The Court distinguished benefits from burdens and held that benefits for 
favored groups, in this instance veterans organizations, were permissible so long as the legisla-
tion did not distinguish on the basis of the content of the speech. Id. at 548. Insofar as Regan 
rests on the distinction between benefits and burdens, it plainly does not govern the legitimacy 
of the restrictions embedded in the federal election laws. Insofar as Regan rests on the distinc-
tion between neutrality among ideas and neutrality among groups, it would appear relevant. 
The Court added a factual observation in a manner reminiscent of Buckley: "We find no indi-
cation that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has had 
that effect." Id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 32, 33 n.38 (1976). Regan, like Buckley, 
would therefore appear vulnerable to contrary evidence. The id~ological or substantive implica-
I . 
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neutral theory does suggest a viable theory of political association. 
Because each kind of political association has a different impact on 
public debate, neutrality would condemn government interference 
with the public's choice among different messages. 
The Court has not required strict scrutiny where there is neither a 
substantial impact on public discussion, nor manifest bias in the 
terms or demonstrable intent of the challenged rule.411 In the absence 
of bias, the Court46 and many commentators47 have frequently in-
sisted that the proper way to accommodate all legitimate interests is 
to balance the injury to interests protected by the first amendment 
against asserted governmental interests.48 Balancing, however, is not 
a theory, but an invitation to identify important factors on some 
other basis.49 The Court's concept of neutrality has inconsistently 
disapproved of distortion of public debate, and neutrality should at 
least be considered in this balancing context.110 Beyond that, the iden-
tification of relevant factors requires consideration of the purposes of 
the first amendment. 
Several commentators have explored the purposes of the first 
amendment. 111 Blasi summarized the basic objectives as preserving in-
tions of the distinctions in the FECA then become significant. It is difficult to understand how 
the Court could have believed that such discrimination would have no impact on the content of 
ideas. Lobbies are well-known in Washington. It is usually possible to anticipate their positions, 
and the veterans organizations discussed in Regan were well established as lobbying organiza-
tions. The Court's position may therefore camouflage a firmer reluctance to bar Congress from 
such favoritism. This plainly was not the understanding on which the neutrality position was 
based. Despite Regan, the Court has treated discrimination among groups as a violation of the 
obligation of neutrality. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Court noted that "[i]t is 
clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which expressions of view will 
be permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or 
groups either by use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, 
as in this case, the equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad 
prohibitory statute." Id. at 557-58. Cox illustrates the close connection between neutrality 
among ideas and discrimination among groups, for ideas can be inhibited by barring designated 
speakers as well as by direct censorship of the positions involved. The conventional wisdom 
that benefits and burdens are in fact indistinguishable would render the Court's rationale in 
Regan a rejection of the neutrality idea itself. That approach to the first amendment would 
require the abandonment of substantial controls on government action, or a return to a focus 
on the nature of expression and its associated freedom. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION 173, 432-33, 684-96 (1970). 
0 See Stone, supra note 43, at 221-23. 
'" Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). 
47 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 581-83 (1978) (citing articles). 
•• Id. at 581-82. 
•• T. EMERSON, supra note 44, at 16; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
•• See Stone, supra note 43, at 198, 217-27. 
•• See T. EMERSON, supra note 44, at 14-20; F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL IN-
I . . 
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dividual autonomy, maintaining a marketplace of competing ideas, 
ensuring self-government, and enhancing public scrutiny of the ex-
cesses of public officeholders (the "checking value").52 Any under-
standing of the first amendment requires an examination of the ac-
tivities of associations needed to realize these objectives. 
Of the values cited by Blasi, autonomy best explains the Court's 
decisions concerning the Federal Election Campaign Act. The object 
of autonomy is individual, not associational, behavior. Individual 
freedom is satisfied if each person can contribute to the party, group, 
or candidate of his choice. The treatment in Buckley v. Valeo53 of 
contributions as largely symbolic gestures of political speech54 flows 
naturally from this perspective. If the focus of the first amendment's 
concern is with the values that associations can serve in achieving a 
political system which serves the people in more than a symbolic 
manner, however, preserving autonomy is not sufficient. To under-
stand the full impact of the first amendment, it becomes necessary to 
explore not merely the freedom of people to join associations, but 
also the impact of the Court's interpretation of the first amendment 
on the way associations affect the political process. 
The other values underlying the first amendment impose more 
stringent requirements on the interpretation of the first amendment 
in this context. Self-government is, by definition, hostile to the dis-
tortion or self-perpetuation of thought by government. Achieving a 
healthy marketplace of ideas requires contributions from associa-
tions. Application of checking value theory would also bring into 
question the regulation of political financing by the FECA because 
the government's choice of means of financial support is too likely to 
confirm and entrench existing power relationships, instead of permit-
ting these relationships to vary. A good argument can be made that 
the FECA recognized changes in the political landscape that had al-
ready taken place. Having recognized those changes, however, the 
FECA further encrusts them on the electoral future. Checking value 
theory, therefore, would require greater respect for the impact that 
QUIRY (1982); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
RESEARCH J. 521. 
•• Blasi, supra note 51, at 529-67. 
•• 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
"' Id. at 21. The Court stated: 
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign 
organization thus involves little direct restraint on his poli~ical communication, for it 
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in 
any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. 
Id. . 
I 
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the FECA has on different types of associations. 
The Court has identified the importance of a healthy marketplace 
of ideas, 611 self-government,116 and the checking value, or a critical re-
view of the exercise of governmental power,117 as preeminent func-
tions of the rights of speech and press. Nevertheless, the Court has 
not developed the relationship of those ideas to the right of associa-
tion. Nor has the Court examined the functions of associations except 
to recognize the extent to which some pooling of resources is needed 
to achieve the level of publicity essential to sustain a political 
campaign. 118 
A functional approach is derived from the inquiry into the pur-
poses of the first amendment. It is necessary to work out the role 
associations can or must play if goals such as self-government and 
the checking value are to be achieved. While this inquiry may con-
cern a question of fact, it is central to the realization of constitutional 
purposes.119 
Associations do more than pool financial resources. They also pool 
memories, reputations, and opportunities for sharing, collaborating, 
and negotiating. As a result, associations can contribute to the public 
discussion of ideas in ways individuals cannot. Associations make im-
portant contributions to the creation, refinement, and promotion of 
ideas and provide a vehicle for aggregating the diverse perspectives of 
the electorate. In addition, associations facilitate public choice in the 
electoral process through familiarity with well-known political orga-
nizations, and representation of the public by the parties in the nom-
•• Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (the Court upheld govern-
mental restraints on speech of radio broadcasters "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas . . . rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
Government itself or a private licensee"). 
•• Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14. 
01 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (finding that major purpose of first amend-
ment is protecting "the free discussion of governmental affairs"); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (recognizing that "[t]he right of free public discussion of the 
stewardship of public officials [is] ... a fundamental principle of the American form of govern-
ment" (footnote omitted)); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 
(1971) (Black, J., concurring) (role of the press in censoring government was recognized by 
allowing two newspapers to print Pentagon Papers). 
•• See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 19-21. 
•• This involves a fundamental shift of first amendment perspectives. A functional approach 
does not define protected speech by reference to the nature of governmeq.t action thought to 
abridge it, as does the neutrality approach, which protects speech if government has observed 
certain rules of restriction. Rather, a functional approach focuses on the nature of protected 
expression, and defines abridgement by reference to what is protected. This is the approach of 
jurists such as Justices Black and Douglas and commentators such as Emerson. See T. EMER· 
SON, supra note 44. 
• 
. 
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inating process. 60 Since the major purposes of the first amendment 
focus on the effectiveness of speech in achieving the objectives of 
self-government, marketplace or individual choice, and governmental 
oversight or the checking value, restrictions on associations which di-
minish their contribution to public debate must be interpreted as re-
strictions on the freedom of speech. 
As the succeeding section demonstrates, the provisions of the 
FECA which divide contributors and political action committees into 
separate islands of influence affect all of the contributions that as-
sociations make to public debate: the creative, aggregative, recogni-
tive, and representative functions of parties and other political as-
sociations. They interfere with the creative functions of political 
associations by making association in groups organized around broad, 
newly emerging or non-occupational bases more difficult to achieve 
than it was before, and more difficult to achieve in relation to other 
forms of organization supported by the Act. Groups which find it 
more difficult to identify common interests and to arrange to pool 
resources will be less able to work out appropriate public presenta-
tions of their positions. 
The FECA interferes for many of the same reasons with the aggre-
gative functions of political associations. It is not enough for a system 
of discussion to generate ideas. It is necessary for the public to have 
some means of winnowing those ideas. It is more difficult under the 
Act for individuals to band together in associations which broaden 
and compromise the perspectives of their members than it is for indi-
viduals to organize in distinct enclaves with narrower foci. The bar-
gaining that occurs naturally among people with diverse interests is 
thwarted by the organizational demands of more narrowly focused 
groups. Thus, the discussion of ideas which compromise and tran-
scend different interests becomes more chaotic. 
The purpose of the creative function of association is to develop 
positions for presentation to the public. The role of the aggregative 
function is to compromise and transcend individual interests for 
eventual presentation of a joint position to the public. Parties per-
form additional functions for the public. People rely in some degree 
on the reputation of associations in making their political decisions. 
"" Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 208-21. The Democratic Party recently challenged Wisconsin's 
open primary system, arguing that it had a right to screen " 'out those whose affiliation is ... 
slight, tenuous, or fleeting,' and that such screening is essential to build a more effective and 
responsible Party." Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 
U.S. 107, 123 (1981). The Court held that neither a state nor a court could "constitutionally 
substitute its own judgment [on that issue] for that of the Pa.rty." Id. at 123-24 . 
• 
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Yet it is more difficult under the Act for associations to function as 
agents of choice, since it is more difficult for people to coalesce into 
organizations that present a full agenda and reflect a fair cross sec-
tion of the public. Broader political structures not only permit the 
development and presentation of combined arguments, they also per-
mit identification of combined choices. Under existing rules, the par-
ties have largely been denied the freedom to act as deliberative bod-
ies by the primary laws. 61 The FECA compounds that loss. 
Associations are also expected to represent the wishes, desires, and 
views of their constituents. It is, however, more difficult for the pub-
lic to obtain the representation it seeks from political associations be-
cause of the encrustation by the FECA of a specific parochial view-
point in the organization of PACs.62 This analysis does not disparage 
divisions that the public finds efficient, but does condemn the statu-
tory encrustation of those divisions on what could otherwise be more 
fluid politics. 
III. THE FECA AND THE BALKANIZATION OF THE ELECTORATE 
As the discussion of the cases below will illustrate, the Federal 
Election Campaign Act has contributed to a balkanization of the 
American electorate which is in direct conflict with the first amend-
ment principles previously reviewed. Such balkanization threatens to 
change the political landscape and affect the aggregate results of the 
political process. 
•
1 See Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 232-33 n.248. 
•• The argument that this is acceptable as a form of permissible government speech is totally 
misplaced. First, for a critique of the proposition that government has a right to speak, see M. 
YuooF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 42-50 (1983). Second, subsidies for favored speakers are 
coupled with restrictions on disfavored speakers. Whether or not benefits and penalties can be 
philosophically distinguished, such an approach would extinguish the first amendment as a re-
striction on government. See supra note 42. Third, this does not reflect government speech. 
Others say what they wish; the government merely chooses the speakers. Fourth, the FECA 
would reflect too comprehensive a definition of governmental speech rights under either a bal-
ancing or absolutist approach. Given a balancing model of defining permissible government 
restraints and protected speech, and whatever the justification may be for government speech, 
it cannot extend to means which reorganize the marketplace of ideas and minimize the check-
ing value of discussion. While government speech may be justified by its contribution to public 
discussion, see M. YuooF, supra, at 241, any extension of that privilege into the rules of behav-
ior for potential opponents undermines the reason for the governmental privilege. Assuming 
instead a more categorical approach, the FECA interferes with the rights of association previ-
ously discussed . 
• 
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A. Buckley: Individual Candidates Favored Over Political Parties 
The FECA restricts the size of both contributions to, and expendi-
tures by, political parties.63 The FECA which the Court reviewed in 
Buckley v. Valeo64 also restricted the expenditures which could be 
made by candidates and independent organizations. 65 In addition, the 
statute requires that each candidate authorize his own separate elec-
tion committees, and channel campaign expenditures through those 
committees.66 Similarly, the public funding provisions are designed to 
support the campaigns of individual presidential candidates in the 
primary and general elections. 67 
In Buckley, the Court upheld limitations on the contributions and 
expenditures that could be made by political parties,68 but struck 
down similar limitations on candidate committees, holding that they 
could spend funds without limit. 69 The Court's holding is now re-
flected in the FECA. 70 The result has been to channel funds through 
the separate campaign organizations of the candidates and away from 
the joint campaign efforts of the parties.71 Admittedly, the tendency 
•• See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a), (d) (1982) . 
.,. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
•• Id. at 39-59; infra note 137; see also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action 
Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), 
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982). In both National Conservative Political 
Action Committee and Schmitt, the courts invalidated an expenditure limitation of the Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund Act, and held that the governmental interest in discouraging 
electoral corruption did not justify an infringement on the contributor's political speech. 
88 The requirements for authorized committees are delineated in 2 U.S.C. § 432(e) (1982). 
Attempts to channel funds through a political party may run afoul of the statute. Expenditures 
on behalf of a candidate which are coordinated with that candidate are considered to be contri-
butions. See id. § 431(17). Parties in any event have not been considered capable of making 
independent expenditures, 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(a)(5), (b)(4) (1985), and are subject to specific 
dollar limitations for expenditures made on behalf of federal candidates. Sections 431(8) & (9) 
define contributions and expenditures, and section 441a sets the contribution and expenditure 
limitations. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)-(9), 441a (1982). Any effort to raise funds for a candidate 
would require that the fund be channeled to his or her authorized committees, or they would 
implicate the contribution and expenditure limitations. Moreover, political clubs which are not 
willing to change their names to incorporate the name of the candidate, and to restrict all of 
their club's activities to the single-minded support of that one candidate, cannot be authorized 
committees of that candidate for campaign purposes. Thus, at every level that funds might go 
through organizational channels, they are routed to the candidates' personal campaigns or inde-
pendent committees by the structure of the FECA. 
87 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003, 9004, 9006, 9032-9034 (1982). 
•• 424 U.S. at 14-51. 
•• Id. at 54-59. 
70 See 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)-(d) (1982). 
71 See INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF Gov'T, HARVARD UNIV., FOR THE 
COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., 96TH CONG., lST SESS., AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL 
ELECTION CAMPAIGN AcT 1972-1978, at 12-13 (Comm. Print 1919) . 
• 
. 
. 
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toward the personal organization of politics dates at least to the insti-
tution of primaries. 72 Direct mail solicitations and the growth of the 
regional and national mass media have contributed to the shift to-
ward candidate control.73 Nevertheless, the FECA has strengthened 
the financial barrier to a significant role for political parties. The pro-
visions of the Act thus contribute to the balkanization of the political 
process. 
Whether the public is represented by political parties, or by a di-
verse congery of "proxy" speakers, affects the quality and direction of 
the way the public is represented. It is a question of whether the 
people will be able to consider, evaluate, and take advantage of the 
positions of organizations which blend and compromise a broad spec-
trum of views to achieve common positions and select candidates, or 
whether the public must be limited to the benefits of a public debate 
dominated by specialized PACs.74 It is not just a question of whether 
the contributor is allowed to donate to a mouthpiece. It matters very 
much which one. 
B. Independent Expenditures Favored over Coordinated Ones 
The Court in Buckley held unconstitutional the limitations on 
spending by candidates and independent organizations in political 
campaigns. In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Com-
mittee,71'> the Court voided a related prohibition in the Presidential 
Election Campaign Fund Act76 which prohibited expenditures over 
$1000, except by candidates, if the candidates favored by those ex-
penditures elected to receive public funding. In addition to the ef-
fects of these decisions, the FECA permits contributions to indepen-
dent committees five times larger than contributions to committees 
authorized by candidates for political office.77 
Though the Act was originally designed to steer funds through the 
candidates, these rulings and provisions encourage donors to channel 
their funds elsewhere, perhaps to special interest groups. The FECA 
72 See generally V. 0. KEY, AMERICAN STATE POLITICS 169-96 (1956); Gottlieb, supra note 4, 
at 230-37. 
,. See J. KIRKPATRICK, DISMANTLING THE PARTIES 13-14 (1979). 
74 Public dependence on PACs is a feature of the expense of speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. at 19-20. The Court wrote that "virtually every means of communicating ideas in 
today's mass society requires the expenditure of money." Id. at 19. 
1
• 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985). 
70 See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1982). 
77 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982) . 
• 
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therefore sets up a hierarchy. Candidates and independent commit-
tees can spend more than the parties, but the independent commit-
tees can accept more than the candidates. Once again, the effort to 
present a coordinated perspective is frustrated by existing law. 
C. CALPAC: Corporate and Labor Organizations Favored Over 
Unincorporated Associations and General Public Organizations 
Political Action Committees (PACs)s are not permitted to accept 
more than $5000 from any donor.78 Corporations and unions are not 
permitted to spend for, or contribute to, political campaigns.79 They 
may, however, establish PACs, known as separate segregated funds, 
which may solicit, as appropriate, the stockholders, officers, and 
members of the parent corporation or union.80 In turn, the parent 
corporations and unions may pay the entire cost of the administra-
tion and solicitation of their separate segregated funds. 81 Those funds 
and their parent sponsors, therefore, are the only donors and PACs 
permitted to receive or give more than $5000. In contrast, unincorpo-
rated associations are not permitted to pay the administrative or so-
licitation costs of any PAC, including a separate segregated fund. 82 
The California Medical Association, an unincorporated association, 
sued the Federal Election Commission to gain exemption from the 
prohibition against full funding of its political action committee, 
CALPAC.83 The Supreme Court, in California Medical Association 
v. FEC,84 denied relief and concluded that the California Medical As-
sociation had not suffered any denial of equal protection vis-a-vis 
corporations and unions. 811 The Court reasoned that the Medical As-
sociation could solicit from the general public and make contribu-
tions to political committees, while corporations and unions could so-
licit only from their own shareholders or members.86 
For the Medical Association to take advantage of its right to spend 
or contribute directly, however, it would subject its entire financial 
dealings to the reporting provisions of the FECA,87 and would have 
78 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(C) (1982). 
1
• Id. § 44lb(a). 
80 Id. § 44lb(b)(4). 
81 Id. § 44lb(b)(2)(C). 
81 Id. § 44la. 
8
' California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 182 (1981). 
84 453 U.S. 182 (1981). 
•• Id. at 200-01. 
•• Id. at 201. 
87 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(4), 434 (1982) . 
. 
• 
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to fund its political activities out of contributions subject to the 
$5000 maximum.ss Having established instead a separate PAC, CAL-
PAC's costs per contributor will be greater than a comparable corpo-
rate or labor separate segregated fund.s9 That will prove true both 
with respect to solicitations of its own membership and of the general 
public. 
The inability of CALPAC to fund the solicitation costs of its sepa-
rate segregated fund was mitigated somewhat by the Act's provision 
which permits a membership organization to communicate with its 
members concerning any subject, without restriction under the Act, 
except for the reporting of expenses.90 The principal differential, 
therefore, may be the expense of administering the segregated fund 
itself. To the extent that the reporting obligation discourages politi-
cal communications, and to the extent that the administration of the 
separate segregated fund is expensive, the provisions of the Act make 
solicitation of preexisting corporate or union membership more pro-
ductive than solicitation of association membership. A larger propor-
tion of every dollar received by corporate and union PA Cs can be 
turned to political advantage. Moreover, the association PAC would 
have to use a significant part of the contributions it receives in order 
to finance the solicitations necessary for its own growth. The FECA, 
therefore, makes it more difficult and more time consuming for the 
association PAC to reach the membership of its unincorporated 
parent. . . 
Neither an association PAC, such as CALPAC, nor a corporation 
may solicit contributions from the general public on the same terms 
under which they solicit internally pursuant to the FECA. If CAL-
P AC seeks to communicate to any given segment of the public, there-
fore, it must do so through advertisements, direct mail, and similar 
mechanisms. By contrast, either a corporation or an unincorporated 
association acting on behalf of its separate segregated fund can use 
certain preexisting internal channels of communication for some of 
its solicitation. 91 Since adding information to preexisting channels of 
communication, such as a newsletter, is less expensive than establish-
•• See id. § 441a . 
.. ·See E. Epstein, PA Cs and the Modern Political Process 58-59 (paper presented at the 
Conference on the Impact of the Modern Corporation, sponsored by the Center for Law and 
Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law, The Henry Chauncey Conference 
Center, Princeton, New Jersey (November 12-13, 1982)) (unpublished manuscript). Epstein at-
tributes some of the corporate advantage to efficiency. 
00 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (1982). 
11 Id. § 441b(b)(2)(C), (4)(A)(i) . 
• 
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ing a separate and independent means of communication, corpora-
tions and unincorporated associations, acting on behalf of their sepa-
rate segregated funds, enjoy a distinct advantage in this area. The 
FECA compounds this advantage by subjecting independent commu-
nications to the full burden of compliance,92 while exempting internal 
communications.93 The additional expenses of compliance are added, 
therefore, only to the more expensive form of communication. In ad-
dition, for internal solicitation, the corporate sponsor of the separate 
segregated fund is permitted to pay the administrative expenses of 
the PAC, unrestricted by the contribution limits.9" Yet, no PAC solic-
iting the general public can take advantage of any such donor. Ad-
ministrative and all other expenses of such PA Cs, excluding only 
compliance costs, must be paid out of restricted funds. The FECA, 
therefore, encourages the PA Cs established by both corporations and 
unincorporated associations to solicit internally. At the same time, 
the Act makes it more expensive for the association PAC to solicit 
contributions than it does for the corporate PAC. 
The additional expense will engender increased difficulties when 
organizing potential voters and contributors by way of independent 
PACs rather than separate segregated funds. Amassing a large trea-
sury is likely to be more difficult for comparable independent P ACs 
than for separate segregated funds. Although it is possible for an in-
dependent fund to solicit from more people, separate segregated 
funds can coordinate resources along industry, trade, or union lines. 
The advantages the Court suggested, therefore, may not materialize. 
Each separate PAC, moreover, acquires a separate contribution limit. 
Hence, a number of small PA Cs linked by a common communication 
system within an industry could make a much larger impact than the 
single fund. Either way, any given number of voters will find it less 
expensh;·e and less difficult to associate along industrial lines than 
across industrial lines. That encouragement of special interest repre-
sentation is the heart of the problem: the balkanization of the voting 
public by the FECA.911 
•• Id. § 431(9)(A) (defining a political expenditure as "anything of value"). This invokes pro-
visions relating to independence, id. § 431(17), content, id. § 431(18), disclosure, id. § 434, and 
contributions, id. § 441a(a)(l)-(3), (7)(B); see FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 
197 (1982) (holding that provision of FECA requiring that a corporation without capital stock 
solicit contributions only from its members, executive and administrative personnel, and their 
families is constitutional because corporations' associational rights are overborne by congres-
sional intent to deter corruption). 
•• 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(3), 441(b)(2)(A) (1982). 
•• Id. §§ 431(9)(B)(v), 441b(b)(2)(C). 
•• These conclusions are somewhat ironic in view of the Court's conclusion that special re-
IR 
.. 
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The same difficulty infects the Court's first amendment analysis in 
CALPAC. Although the Court split on the free speech issue, neither 
opinion dealing with that issue found more at stake than "speech by 
proxy" of each individual voter.96 Neither opinion treated the limita-
tions as a significant burden on that right. The unstated assumption 
seems to have been that any voter barred from contributing to CAL-
P AC, whether by law or by CALPAC's lack of resources to solicit the 
voter, could simply contribute els~where. If that were not true, the 
burden on individual contributors would have been great. A corollary 
of that idea is the assumption that it makes little difference whether 
the potential contributor finds and works through CALPAC or some 
other organization. Yet, as we have explored, there is a significant 
difference in the cost per solicitation through independent PA Cs, and 
the cost of solicitation through separate segregated funds. Such a dif-
ference in cost affects the coalition of voters each committee reflects 
and consequently affects the committee's position. 
D. BREADPAC: Industrial Associations Favored Over Trans-
Industrial Associations 
The facts in Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC97 posed the 
problem of balkanization within industries. Plaintiffs were the sepa-
rate segregated funds of trade associations with corporate and indi-
vidual members which sought to solicit contributions from the share-
holders and top management of member corporations.98 Subsequent 
to the passage of the FECA, however, many of the member corpora-
tions refused to permit such solicitation, despite the fact that solici-
tation was a right given to the member corporations under the Act.99 
Indeed, no corporation was permitted to authorize more than one 
trade association to solicit its shareholders and employees.100 Al-
though the trade associations could have solicited individual mem-
bers, they could not have mentioned the PAC in the context of that 
solicitation. 101 Prevented from soliciting their most likely supporters, 
strictions of corporate power are justified. See FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 
197, 208 (1982) . 
.. 453 U.S. at 196; id. at 202-03 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
17 635 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980) (en bane), rev'd, 455 U.S. 577 (1982). 
•• See id. at 623-24. 
" Id. at 639 (Pell, J., dissenting). 
100 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)(4)(D) (1982). 
1
•
1 635 F.2d at 639 (Pell, J., dissenting). 
, 
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plaintiff PA Cs dwindled. 102 They sued the Federal Election Com-
misssion, seeking to overturn the prohibition. 
The Seventh Circuit justified the restrictions as necessary "to pre-
vent a proliferation of trade associations and solicitations which 
would in turn undermine the very purpose of the Act's restrictions on 
the use of corporate treasuries in federal elections."103 It must be 
noted, however, that trade association PACs soliciting within the 
same member corporation would share a common limit on the contri-
butions they could make to candidates or other political commit-
tees.104 The court of appeals dismissed as "tenuous"1011 a claim by the 
PA Cs that the statutory right of the corporate members to prohibit 
solicitation by the trade associations represented a governmental 
prior restraint in violation of the first amendment. It also dismissed 
an equal protection challenge on the ground that the trade associa-
tions were inherently different from the corporations and unions to 
which they tried to compare themselves. 106 
The Supreme Court did not reach the merits, but reversed on the 
ground that the trade associations had employed an expedited proce-
dure under the FECA that was not available to them.107 Neither the 
court of appeals nor the Supreme Court discussed the implications of 
the statute in dividing potential supporters among a variety of politi-
cal committees which are statutorily required to remain separate 
from one another. 108 The result, however, is that except for trade as-
sociation PA Cs which have the unanimous support of the corpora-
tions in their industry, supporters of a given position will be split 
among a variety of political committees or excluded from participat-
ing by barriers to identifying and locating like-minded PACs which 
they could support. 
E. International Association of Machinists: Corporate 
Shareholders and Management-Divided From Employees 
The FECA permits separate segregated funds established by corpo-
rations to solicit shareholders and management extensively, and al-
10
• Id. at 637. 
10
• Id. at 628. 
1 
.. Id. at 642 (Pell, J., dissenting); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.8(g)(l) (1985). Independent ex-
penditures, however, are not limited. 
10
• 635 F.2d at 629. 
100 Id. at 629-31. 
101 Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 585 (1982). 
10
• See 2 U.S.C. §§ 44la(a)(5), 441b(b)(4)(D) (1982) . 
. 
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lows funds established by unions to solicit from their members.109 
The International Association of Machinists became concerned about 
the potential growth of corporate funds compared with the more lim-
ited potential for growth of union funds, and sued to require a more 
balanced rule. Unlike corporate PACs, union PACs were not author-
ized to solicit from non-member management of their parent union. 
Nevertheless, the Machinists' attack was not leveled against that cat-
egorical difference, but rather against the actual and potential imbal-
ance in resources.110 
The court of appeals identified the problem as the evenhandedness 
of the treatment of corporate and labor funds. m The court reasoned 
that the Act treated similarly situated people in the union and corpo-
rate context in commensurate ways. It sought to measure equality of 
treatment by examining the similarity between the categories of peo-
ple union and corporate funds were permitted to solicit. In the 
court's view, the community of interests among corporate sharehold-
ers and upper management approximated the community of interests 
among union members. 112 On that basis, the court of appeals sus-
tained the challenged provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court af-
firmed without opinion. 113 
Neither court, however, considered the balkanization of the electo-
rate by these categories. Both corporate and labor funds share a simi-
lar restriction insofar as they are limited to soliciting largely from 
their own membership. In that respect, the statute encourages both 
corporations and unions to focus on internal perspectives, rather than 
to structure their own messages to appeal to a broader segment of the 
public. The statute encourages a narrowing of perspective in a two-
fold sense: first, a narrowing of focus to the industry; and second, a 
narrowing of focus to the particular labor or management component 
of that industry. Stockholders, officers, directors, and employees are 
encouraged to "give at the office" rather than give to organizations 
seeking a broader perspective which cuts across industrial or union 
lines. In these respects, they share a disability. This disability is com-
pensated for by the advantages the separate segregated funds gain in 
funding. That compensation is inadequate, however, because all the 
advantages and disadvantages reinforce a single overarching disad-
10
• Id. § 441b(b)(4)(A). 
110 International Ass'n of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092, 1105 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), aff'd 
mem., 459 U.S. 983 (1982). 
111 Id. at 1106-09. 
111 Id. at 1107-08 . 
.,. International Ass'n of Machinists v. FEC, 459 U.S. 983 (1982) . 
• 
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vantage. That is, the rules make it more difficult to develop a broad 
and inclusive appeal than a narrow and parochial one. That does not 
cure the injury; rather, it aggravates it. 
F. Citizens Against Rent Control: Issues Favored Over Candidates 
Although the facts in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of 
Berkeley1u did not specifically involve the FECA, the case reflects 
the same difficulty. The Supreme Court held that contributions to 
causes other than the election of candidates for office could not be 
subjected to the restriction of contribution and expenditure limita-
tions. m The Court's conclusion was based on the expectation that 
large contributions to causes and ballot issues would not create the 
type of harm that the Court feared would emanate from large contri-
butions to candidates. 116 
The Court's decision, however, may have changed the proportion of 
funds spent on the discussion of issues and candidates, and the pro-
portion of time and space made available to discuss those issues.117 
The specific funds, of course, may not have been eligible for contribu-
tion to candidates if the donor had reached the contribution limits of 
section 441a of the FECA.118 The combination of the prohibition 
against contributing funds in one area, with the opportunity to make 
those contributions in another, tends to rechannel money in the per-
mitted direction. 
There is obviously nothing wrong with a full discussion of ballot 
proposals. Moreover, one can easily make the argument that election 
campaigns in this country are considerably underfunded. But the 
problem is that, in comparison to the campaigns over ballot issues, 
the candidates and parties labor under substantial disabilities. Time 
or space that might otherwise have been directed through the repre-
sentative process may now be channeled through a competing pro-
cess-a process that contributes to the balkanization of the political 
landscape. 
The same result was inherent in the Court's decision in Buckley, in 
that the statute's restriction of expenditures "relative to" a candidate 
must be construed narrowly to avoid squelching all political 
114 454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
110 Id. at 297-98. 
110 See id. at 296-97. 
117 See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 595-96, in which the author argues that money flows 
where it can make a difference among well financed and poorly financed issue campaigns. 
11
• 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982) . 
• 
. 
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speech. 119 To have ruled otherwise would have assimilated virtually 
all political speech to campaign rhetoric, and would have required 
that all political speech meet the criteria of the FECA. Having made 
the distinction, however, the Court encouraged people to avoid 
"politics," that is, avoid supporting or opposing candidates. Instead, 
the Court encouraged people to stick to "statecraft," that is, stick to 
the issues. 
IV. BALANCING BENEFITS OF CAMPAIGN REGULATION AGAINST 
BURDENS ON FREE AssocIATIONS 
The preceding analysis implies either that the Court, in this line of 
cases, was unaware of the practical effects of the FECA or that it 
determined that those effects do not matter. If the Court's analysis 
was based on the conclusion that the practical effects were of no sig-
nificance with respect to the first amendment, the Court runs head-
long into the first amendment purposes previously discussed. First 
amendment considerations make the practical issues the Court 
slighted quite significant. If one were an absolutist, one could derive 
a rule from the foregoing premise: legislation which interferes with 
the legitimate functions of political associations, or discriminates 
among the legitimate functions of competing political associations, 
should be proscribed. In Buckley v. Valeo,1 20 however, the Court em-
ployed a balancing test. Thus, there is another side to the considera-
tion of the campaign finance law: whether the burdens of the FECA 
on the exercise of the right of association can be justified by suffi-
ciently important governmental interests. 
The federal campaign finance laws were designed to limit corrup-
tion, 121 halt the spiraling costs of campaigning, 122 lessen the distrac-
tions of campaign fund raising,123 and equalize the political con-
test.124 Congress was concerned about the impact of large campaign 
contributions on the independence of elected officials1211 and the bur-
m 424 U.S. at 40-44, 76-82. 
11
• 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
111 See supra note 9. 
111 Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976). 
111 Id. at 838; 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1773, 1774-75. But see S. REP. No. 689, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5587, 5591 (low 
contribution limits alone would compound problem for challengers). 
114 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
111 Id . 
• 
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geoning expense of election campaigns.126 The cost of campaigning 
had made it increasingly difficult for incumbents to concentrate on 
the crucial task of governing,127 and had apparently made it more 
difficult for a challenger to raise sufficient funds to take on an 
incumbent. 128 
It now seems that the time lag involved in raising large campaign 
chests from small contributions has increased, rather than decreased, 
the distractions of fund raising.129 The limitations on the amount of 
contributions that may be solicited may have made it more, not less, 
difficult to def eat an incumbent.130 The statute can not be defended 
as an equalizing measure partly for that reason, and partly because 
equalization would not explain the statutory differentiations among 
donors and recipients. In any case, the Court has refused to treat 
equalization of political resources as a valid goal.131 The Court's ap-
proach in Buckley was based entirely on the risk of corruption, un-
due influence and the appearance of corruption.132 
The Court's willingness to base a major restriction on the market-
place of ideas on the appearance of corruption is puzzling. The 
Court's rationale appears to sanction restrictions based on rumor and 
common misconceptions. Corruption, of course, is a serious problem. 
It dilutes the effectiveness of the public election decision by permit-
ting office holders to make decisions which directly or implicitly con-
tradict the public will or damage the public interest.133 Measures 
countering corruption, therefore, implement compelling constitu-
tional purposes. 134 
ue 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1774-75. 
117 See M. FIORINA, CONGRESS - KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 39-50 (1977). 
12
• See G. JACOBSON, supra note 39, at 195 . 
... Id. at 70; see also INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, supra note 71, at 52, 53-60. 
"
0 G. JACOBSON, supra note 39, at 157, 194. Congress may have intentionally provided that 
the FECA limit funds to be raised by the challenger so as to make it more difficult for the 
challenger to defeat the incumbent. Id. at 183-90. When the Supreme Court reviewed the stat-
ute in Buckley, it declined to base its rationale on the difficulty or inequality of fundraising. 
See 424 U.S. at 48-49 . 
... See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
"
1 Id. at 26-27. 
ua See Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 
587, 587-88 (1975) (defining corruption as agent's knowing sacrifice of principal's interests to 
agent's). 
u• The existence of a right to vote which is diluted by corruption was denied by the Court in 
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78, 34-36 (1973) (stating that 
"the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right"). But the Court has consist-
ently treated the right to vote as a fundamental interest requiring the strictest scrutiny of any 
abridgement. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (stating 
that " 'any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote .must be carefully and meticu-
., 
.. 
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Nevertheless, the struggle against corruption cannot be infinitely 
valued. 1311 If the FECA's purpose is to protect the integrity of the 
vote and the political process, it makes no sense to combat corrup-
tion by diluting the vote or distorting the electoral process in other 
ways. This is particularly true if the Act has little impact in forestall-
ing corruption. 
As Congress had constructed the FECA before it was brought to 
the Court in Buckley, campaign funds were carefully channeled 
through the authorized campaign committees of the candidates, and 
their expenditures were restricted.136 Only the candidates and their 
parties were permitted to spend more than nominal sums in the cam-
paign.137 Even under that original version of the FECA, some signifi-
cant influence was still possible. Contribution limits were set low 
enough to bar multimillionaires from single-handedly funding elec-
tion campaigns, but still high enough to be out of reach of the ordi-
nary citizen.138 The limits applied to each family member, so that 
those disposed to exceed the $1000 limitation on contributions to a 
single candidate, or $25,000 to a party, could arrange to contribute 
through spouses and children. The combined limit could still yield a 
substantial sum. Moreover, the likelihood that wealthy candidates 
had wealthy friends increased the probability that these candidates 
could arrange for much larger contributions.139 The statute permitted 
significant communications between management and employees, un-
ions or other organizations and their members by way of internal 
lously scrutinized" (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964))); Harper v. Virginia 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664-70 (1966) (holding unconstitutional a poll tax as violating 
equal protection clause despite rational but not compelling grounds); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 116-25 (1980). 
130 Banfield, supra note 133, at 589-91. 
, .. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § lOl(a), 
88 Stat. 1263, 1264-65, reprinted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 190-94 app., § 608(c)-(e), 
repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a), 
90 Stat. 475, 496. 
m See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 203(a), 86 Stat. 3, 9 
(1972) and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § lOl(a), 
(b), 88 Stat. 1263, 1263-66, reprinted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 187-95 app., repealed by 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 
475, 496. 
, .. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § lOl(b), 
88 Stat. 1263, 1263-64, reprinted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 189-90 app., repealed by 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 
475, 496. 
u• See Smith, Federal Election Law Part/: Ways Around the $1,000 Ceiling, 3 CAMPAIGNS 
AND ELECTIONS, Summer 1982, at 16; Smith, Federal Election Law Part II: What You Can Get 
Away With!, 3 CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS, Fall 1982, at 10 . 
• 
. 
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channels of communication. 140 Newspapers and broadcasters were 
also permitted to editorialize without restriction by the FECA.141 Fi-
nally, and most importantly, the FECA pierced the limitation on 
campaign advocacy by corporations and unions directed to a public 
beyond their respective employees and members.142 These political 
action committees (PACs) have become a significant part of political 
life since the passage of the FECA. 143 
The Supreme Court added significantly to the possibilities for con-
tinued influence under the FECA by striking down the limitations on 
expenditures for candidates and independent organizations.144 The 
Court increased the opportunity for influence by defining contribu-
tions and expenditures to exclude a large part of political speech. 1411 
Only express advocacy of a clearly identified candidate would invoke 
the limitations. The Court recognized that the liberty to participate 
in the political debate was dependent on the ability to pool funds. 146 
The Court, therefore, promptly exposed the inherent contradiction 
between combating corruption by placing limitations on campaign fi-
nancing on the one hand, and the constitutional and democratic im-
perative of freedom of speech on the other. Under the FECA as re-
structured following Buckley, therefore, independent organizations 
can play a significant role in the campaign without limitation on their 
expenditures. 147 These include citizen organizations, corporate and 
union PACs, lobbies, trade associations, and other special interest 
groups. 
In addition to the constitutional barriers to a more comprehensive 
statute, there are structural barriers as well. The existence of great 
wealth and the fluidity of money make restriction quite difficult. Af-
ter Buckley, political scientists promptly sought to identify and cata-
logue the new paths which money would follow in approaching 
140 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codi-
fied as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(iii), 441b(b)(2)(A) (1982)). 
141 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982). 
"
1 See id. § 441b(b)(2)(C); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (corpo-
rate right to speak). 
143 U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMIT-
TEES: THEIR EVOLUTION AND GROWTH AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 55-56, 
83-87 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE). 
144 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 39-59. 
14
• Id. at 40-44, 76-82 .. 
14
• Id. at 19-20, 22; see also California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Black-
mun, J., concurring). 
m PACs may not, however, increase the percentage of special interest money in all aspects of 
politics. See Malbin, The Problem of PAC-Journalism, Pusuc OPINION, Dec./Jan. 1983, at 15-
16 . 
• 
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trivial interests. 
When alternative means are considered, the FECA becomes even 
less defensible. The use of disclosure to control corruption in the po-
litical process was never tested on a full presidential election cam-
paign, and only briefly implemented during a congressional election, 
before it was combined with an extensive panoply of restrictions on 
contributions and expenditures. m Proposals were developed in Con-
gress for tax incentives to encourage more people to contribute more 
money to campaigns in an effort to limit from the opposite direction 
the impact of particularly large donations.166 Such proposals would 
have increased the potential competitiveness of challengers as against 
incumbents. 166 Finally, proposals to alter the equal time provisions of 
, .. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 became effective in April 1972, and thus was 
already within the 1972 election cycle. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 
92-255, § 406, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972); 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 23 (providing that Act be 
effective sixty days after date of enactment, February 7, 1972, thus making Act effective April 
8, 1972). The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 became effective on January 
1, 1975. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 410(a), 88 
Stat. 1263, 1304; 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1486. The 1976 amendments became effec-
tive upon approval on May 11, 1976, thus completing the change before the 1976 elections. 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 502 . 
... See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 143, at 206-07. For a discussion of the 
variety of plans introduced in Congress, see id. at 185-220. 
, .. Increasing the amount of the tax deduction, as opposed to its accessibility, may impose 
substantial expense in proportion to the new money generated. Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 
603. One commentator maintains that tax incentives have had a de minimus effect. See Jacob-
son, supra note 39, at 199-200. Political consultants might not have a difficult time devising a 
system more fully utilized than this tax deductible system which separates the writing of the 
contribution check, the keeping of records, the tax accounting, and the eventual repayment. 
See L. SABATO, supra note 6; Comment, The Federal Election Campaign Act and Presidential 
Election Campaign Fund Act: Problems in Defining and Regulating Independent Expendi-
tures, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 977, 1003-05 (proposing vouchers). 
A completely different approach advocated by a substantial number of political scientists is 
to abandon the weak party approach, which has dominated legal thinking since the Progressive 
era, and to permit stronger parties to deal with the importunities of the moneyed. See AMER!· 
CAN POLITICAL SCIENCE Ass'N, COMM. ON POLITICAL PARTIES, TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE Two-
PARTY SYSTEM (1951). Contra E. GRIFFITH & F. VALEO, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 157 
(1975); C. ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 182 (1975); Turner, Responsible Parties: 
A Dissent from the Floor, 45 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 143, 143-52 (1951). Under the weak party 
approach, the parties are unable to maintain cohesive positions and are unable to require their 
office-holding members to adhere to party position. For more recent work espousing the strong 
party thesis, see D. Thelen, Two Traditions of Progressive Reform, Political Parties and Amer-
ican Democracy and E. Ladd, Jr., Party "Reform" Since 1968: A Case Study in Intellectual 
Failure, in THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM UNDER STRONG AND WEAK PARTIES 37-59, 81-
93 ( F. Bonomi, J. Burns & A. Ranney eds. 1981). See also J. CEASER, supra note 6, at 339-53; J. 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 73. The strong party thesis advocates that parties can maintain cohe-
sive positions and can require members who held office to adhere to such positions. For the 
argument that the weak party rules departed from constitutional requirements, see Gottlieb, 
supra note 4, at 196-208 . 
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the communications law1117 would significantly increase the flexibility 
of the campaign without restraining the activities of public political 
organization.1118 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has been sensitive to fears concerning the im-
pact of political groups, but has failed to explore the functions of 
political associations in any systematic way. A Court which reflects 
only popular prejudice does a disservice to our political system. The 
FECA has severely restricted the roles parties and other political 
groups perform in the electoral process. It is not many years ago that 
such interference in the functions of private political associations 
would have seemed unthinkable.1119 Now that it has become thinka-
ble, a reconsideration is in order. 
m See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982). 
1118 See Gottlieb, The Role of Law in the Broadcast of Political Debate, 37 FED. B.J. 1, 13-23 
(1978). 
'"" Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to National Political Con-
ventions, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 148, 152-53 (1970). But see Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 196-200 
(examining the limits of that perspective). 
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Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to make a presentation before 
this Commission as it studies the issue of government integrity and 
makes recommendations for the improvement of the system and image of 
New York. 
I am currently an Assistant Staff Director of the U.S. Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) in Washington, D.C. I am in charge of a division 
which has the responsibility to disclose to the public federal campaign 
finance reports from candidates for the offices of President, U.S. 
Senator, and U.S. Representative, as well as their supporting political 
committees. We also make public the personal financial statements of 
the presidential candidates. This afternoon however, I will be pre-
sentin~ my own personal views on the roles of election agencies. These 
views are not official statements of the FEC and have not been reviewed 
or discussed with them. 
I have worked directly in the field of money in politics since March 
1972, one month before the implementation of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act. During these last fifteen years I have seen many new 
laws passed in the area of campaign finance, ethics, and lobbying. 
I have seen many new types and forms of federal and state commissions 
established. I have assisted many reporters writing of new avenues 
of political money being created and built. I have heard individuals 
cry of un~ntended consequences of the new laws. I have read countless 
arguments about the constitutionality of various systems. I have 
heard candidates, political party officials and other regulated persons 
screRm for a level financial playing field. No doubt you will hear 
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recounted much of the same history from your staff and other witnesses. 
I would like to concentrate this afternoon on only one major area of conern 
Disclosure. This area has been the one constant continuing success 
throughout the many federal and state efforts to improve the integrity of 
government. It also has provided the necessary documentation of the 
movement of money in politics to make additonal improvements and amend-
ments in campaign finance, ethics, and lobby laws. 
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has periodically emphasized the basic need for 
this type of disclosure. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court reminded us 
that 
"informed public opinion is the most potent of all 
restraints upon mis-government." 
As this study commission looks at the causes of mis-government in New Yolk 
I hope it will also heed a second reminder from the same Supreme Court 
case. 
"disclosure increases the quality of information 
reaching the body politic and furthers the first 
amendment goal of producing an informed public 
capable of conducting its own affairs." 
In highlighting the topic of disclosure this afternoon maybe a few new 
ideas or suggestions will be brought out and adopted by this study 
commission and then passed in laws which will increase the quality of 
information reaching the New York body politic - especially the voters. 
The voters need to be informed about money in politics in order to solve 
the government integrity problem in New York. Even with the passage 
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of this year's ethics law there still appears to be only token efforts 
advanced to improve the public's cynical view of government. Some 
even say New York government integrity is a contradiction in terms. 
It appears that the legislative efforts assume that the public does 
not need to see all the financial disclosures. It appears that 
government, or advisory bodies it appoints, will take care of it for 
the poor uneducated public. 
My strongest recommendation to this panel is to go far beyond the 
ethics law recently passed and far beyond earlier campaign finance 
and lobby laws and require full disclosure of money in politics. 
This disclosure should be to the voters and the public. It is not 
only an attitude or administrative procedure. It is a duty that 
cannot be left to the whim or decision of governments or their appointed 
individuals. The obligation and duty of full disclosure must be 
weaved into every section of the campaign finance, ethics and lobby 
laws. If it is not, the disclosure dreams that once were thought to be 
mandated will be slowly but surely watered down by regulations, advisory 
opinions, lack of enforcement, and budgetary concerns. 
In my presentation I would like to outline ten major roles which an 
overall combined state disclosure agency should be mandated to carry 
out. Each of these are disclosure efforts and would drastically improve 
the integrity of government in New York. 
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EDUCATION OF THE PUBLIC 
The first major role I would suggest is to educate the public about 
money in politics. Now this may seem like a rather mundane basic step 
but I will explain how it is a deep and involved topic one that is 
usually left out of legislation in favor of other policy changes such 
as public financing, contributions limits, outside income, etc. 
However, disclosure and education do provide a basic foundation for 
all these other changes. Without that foundation your efforts in the 
more interesting "hot" topics will fail. 
When I say 'educate the public' I am considering the public to include 
the general public, the press, the legislators, the judges, the execu-
tive and civil servants, the issue groups, lobbyists, corporations, 
unions, and others. And the phrase 'money in politics' is meant to be 
a broad one covering all areas of money in politics - campaign finance, 
ethics, lobbying, political party activity, personal financial data, etc. 
This broad approach is much more realistic than just talking of campaign 
finance or lobbying expenditures. When one looks at one of these 
pockets of money it is only because previous legislative efforts or 
scandals occurred in that one area. Examples include the Federal 
Election Campaign Act which passed the House of Representatives on the 
day Nixon resigned; and the federal Ethics In Government Act which was 
passed a~ter numerous Congressional scandals involving outside income 
and gifts. To look at only one area is an arbitrary limitation. 
And in some ways forces a person to miss other pockets of money. 
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If one goes out and talks to an official or someone who is trying to 
influence public officials in New York they will probably laugh at your 
interest in just one area of concern. Even after passing an ethics 
law for personal financial income, the officials and lobbyists are 
still unconcerned. For each of them has many more pockets from 
which to pull out funds or into which to put funds. They are the ones 
who know which pocket the money is coming from and through which 
account it is moving. 
If you regulate campaign funds in one pocket, they simply shift to 
using honoraria funds from another pocket. If you regulate that, they 
shift to lobby expenditures from another pocket. If you regulate that, 
they shift to using extra party funds from another pocket. If you 
regulate that, they shift to providing additional outside income from 
another JDCket. If you regulate that, they shift to spending on ballot 
issues or non-profit organization activity from another pocket. If that 
is regulated, they shift to hiring a family member of a legislator, 
paying for a free trip or holiday, paying unearned legal fees to a 
I legislators law firm, or giving the official a financial stake in a 
business deal from another pocket. 
After awhile the loopholes are widely known and the movement of funds 
in and out of other pockets becomes almost blatant. The most recent 
federal example is the $1 million gift from Joan Kroc to the Democratic 
National Committee - when the contribution limit to political parties 
is currently only $20,000. So $20,000 goes into the DNC's pocket for 
their regulated federal account and $980,000 goes into various other 
unregulated pockets. 
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The education of the public, especially the voter, to what is in the 
pockets of candidates, officials, or organizations as well as who put 
it there or where it came from may tell them more about who they are 
or who they represent. · However, it is almost impossible to educate 
someone on the role of money in politics by looking only at the 
campaign finance reports at the Board of Elections, or lobbyist 
reports at the Temporary Commission on Lobbying, or at personal 
financial disclosure statement at an ethics office. Each office only 
discloses one pocket of funds. No one sees the whole candidate, 
lobbyist or organization - with all of its pockets of money. 
I would suggest the creation of a single combined disclosure commission, 
possibly with your same name - Comr.iission on Government Integrity. In 
a way it would follow your lead by looking into all areas of money in 
politics. You have the power to look into all the pockets. It should 
also. You are trying to educate with these forums and it should also. 
This new Commission ought to receive and disclose, at one central 
location, the following types of documents: 
1. The Commission should disclose personal financial reports of 
legislators, executive office holders, state employees, 
judicial members, and candidates for these offices. This 
would include the spouse's income as well. ALL parts of the 
report and all income and wealth should be made public 
including values of funds. To hold something back and say 
the person doesn't feel it's of interest is to still leave 
the impression that something is hidden. Even if you have an 
advisory committee view the document and decide if it should 
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Documents disclosed by new Commission (continued) 
be public you still leave the impression that his/her political 
friends have ~elped their pal and kept it hidden. If the 
person claims it has no relevance than it should be the first 
and easiest thing disclosed. 
At the federal level it is all disclosed. From President to 
U.S. Senator to U.S. Representative. If you look at a New 
York presidential candidate's recent presidential filing it 
covers a wide range of financial data and is easily accessible 
to review or copy in our store front disclosure office in 
Washington, D.C. To see it you don't have to ask for the 
public part and fight for the private part, or force a legi-
slative meeting to see the whole thing. If you want to see any 
of the New York Senators' reports they are available. If you 
want to see any of the reports from the New York House dele-
gation you can look them up in this public document. All of 
their reports are diclosed. No parts are hidden. 
2. The Commission should disclose lobby activity. 
Many of the states have done a better job than the federal govern-
ment in this area. These states have general reports of employers 
and lobbyists employed for certain efforts. If legislators, the 
p~ess or the public want to see who someone is working for,a call 
to these offices can find the answer. Some of the states have 
even computerized their records and provide numerous cross 
references. The states of Washington, Massachusetts, California, 
Florida, and New York are good examples. Some have also published 
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Documents disclosed by new Commission (continued) 
data. A publication of the Secretary of State of California even 
includes photos of the lobbyists. It is interesting to note that 
a match up of the names of lobbyists and clients with the unknown 
political committees filing campaign finance reports often provide; 
solid clues to why the committee registered. If one had access 
to a political contributor list it may help explain why a certain 
lobbyist works well with certain legislators. It is this cross 
indexing with other types of information which should be the next 
step for New Yorl<.•. If these lobby records were in the same office 
as other records the comparisons would be easier. 
3. The Commission should disclose both state and federal campaign finance 
reports. 
The candidates for executive, legislative, judicial offices, political 
parties, and other interest groups should be filing reports. But to 
simply make the reports available in file cabinets doesn't do much 
for disclosure or education. The new combined Commission must turn 
these reports around and make them understandable to the general publi:. 
It should help people cut through the mountains of paper showing 
endless transactions and find the key data requested. This should be 
a mandated duty not an administrative desire. To illustrate some 
ways to disclose and educate about money in politics I have brought 
with me several examples of computerized cross referencing and 
indexing which we use at the FEC. 
One type of printout indexes all the records available which mention 
a candidate's name. The computer searches through every report 
8 
Documents disclosed by new Commission (continued) 
received from every filer and searches for references to that candidate. 
Here are printouts for both the current U.S. Senators. These printouts 
shows their receipts, expenditures, all their PAC money, party money, 
and several other areas of spending reported by others involved with 
their elections. 
Another type of printout deals with all the PAC or political committee 
money which is given out by a single corporation, or·union's PAC. 
This printout shows all the funds they have given out and identifies 
each candidate who received it along with the aggregate amount received. 
Another printout dea!s with individual contributions and indicates to 
whom contributions were given, the amount, and the date, This 
printout lists in alphabetical order each contribution of $500 or more 
given by persons with New York state addresses to any federal candidate, 
PAC, party committee, or other entity. You can easily look up your rich 
uncle or the person who was indicted last week for some activity. You 
can look up a contractor or someone recently appointed to a political 
position. 
We also provide summary volumes of data so that one can see where their 
candidate or committee fits into the larger picture. This volume 
provides statistical campaign finance data on House and Senate campaigns 
in 1984. We even issue press releases indicating the top candidates and 
committees in various categories such as receipt, expenditures, cash on 
hand and PAC money. 
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Many states have also broadened the public knowledge of campaign money 
by regularly publishing their own statistical information. The states of 
Missouri, Washington, California, Oregon, Hawaii, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
and Idaho are good examples. 
These are the things that New York could be doing right now. I realize 
New York is starting to enter into its computer certain base line items 
from campaign reports but there is much left to do. Twelve years ago 
the state Board of Elections developed the software program for a 
statewide contributor list similar to the federal list I just showed you. 
The knowledge is there but more support is necessary. Mandating these 
responsibilities in the law would be a start. 
This disclosure of state campaign finance reports should also be comple-
mented with the disclosure of copies of the federal reports of political 
committees moving funds into New York State. More and more party funds 
at the federal and state level are being comingled and washed so that 
it is almost impossible to tell where the funds came from or whom they 
will benefit. By disclosing them at the same location, it may be 
easier to cross index and trace transfers and money movements. 
My last comment on the campaign finance reports is that the law should 
require the reporting and disclosure of the adminstrative costs of 
operating the political committee or corporate or union political fund. 
These cos~s should be known and understood by the public and legislators. 
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4. The new Commission should disclose all political party activity. 
And here I define political party to be broader than just the one 
of two reportin& accounts to the state or federal government. We 
are starting to see more and more subaccounts which do not 
report but yet are directed by or controlled by the staff of the 
political party. All of these funds should be disclosed. This 
should cover accounts for redistricting (which will be growing 
in the next two years), get out the vote activity, voter registra-
tion efforts, building funds, litigation and legal services, 
recount efforts, ballot security or voting programs, and all other 
accounts under the direct or indirect control of the political 
party. 
I would also like to make a brief comment on the recent news 
stories about New York State employees and facilities being used 
for political purposes. I strongly encourage this Conunission to 
recommend an instant and complete break of political activities 
from government payrolls and facilities. Judges who state it is 
too commonplace an infraction to warrant punishment or prosecutors 
who fail to carry out their responsibilities to halt this very 
blatant mis-use of taxpayers funds, should be brought before a 
legal standards panel. Why public officials or citizens aren't 
filing law suits to recover state funds I don't know. It may be a 
sign of how bad the New York system really is - and how apathetic 
its guardians of justice appear to be. It certainly indicates how 
big a task is in front of this study Commission. 
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5. The new Commission should disclose all legislative or leadership 
accounts. More and more legislators, especially those in 
leadership positions or who are seeking leadership positions, 
are setting up their own political committees or legislative 
accounts. These accounts should be abolished or fully report 
to the new Commission. On the federal level they are a way 
around the contribution limits of PACs and individuals. Rules 
on group affiliations and contribution limits should be tightly 
written so that lobbyists , other interest groups, and those 
in leadership positions do not make a mockery of the law. 
6. The Commission should disclose the payrolls of the legislature, 
the executive offices, the judiciary, and the regulatory agencies. 
All of these should be made public at the new Commission. One 
should not have to subpoena records just to see who is on what 
payroll with government funds. At the federal level the Congress 
prints a public document listing those on the legislative payroll. 
If one wanted to look up the salary or name of any staff member 
belonging to the New York delegation in Congress, open up this 
book. Even reimbursed expenses to individuals are listed. 
7. The new Commission should disclose spending on referenda and 
ballot issues. Here is another area where the same company which 
has a paid lobbyist, or gives out honoraria, or campaign contri-
butions, may also be spending thousands of dollars to send mailings 
or advertising to New York constituents supporting or opposing a 
ballot issue. This is a public policy area and the voters ought to 
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know who is backing which proposal. It is another pocket of 
money in politics. 
8. The new Commission should disclose certain summary figures from 
fundraisers and tax-exempt institutions. Hore and more states are 
moving into the area of regulation of professional fundraisers and 
the reporting of the activities of non-profit organizations 
operating within their state. In the case of fundraisers there is 
a growing concern over the level of administrative costs associated 
with the services provided when only a fraction of the income is 
left after expenses. Fraudulent fundraising schemes often deter 
potential givers from contributing to real charities and turn them 
off from political giving. 
In tax-exe~pt areas more and more questions are being raised over 
the political and quasi-political activity of these groups. Some-
times it may only be the timing or coordination of those groups' 
activities with the political goals of others, or it may be in the 
use of tax subsidized postal rates. A U.S. Postal Rate Commission 
study released two weeks ago indicated that more than 20% of the 
10.9 billion pieces of third class mail sent last year carried 
some political message. 
It is, however, a quagmire to legislate in. The federal government 
keeps trying to define lobby activity and fails. There is even a 
Congressional subcommittee now looking into political activity of 
foundations and religious organizations. I don't think one can 
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legislate too deeply in this area, but one can call for 
reportirig of certain summary financial figures which after 
numerous years may show some kind of pattern that will call 
for legislative action. Without base information however, 
nothing is known of this pocket of money. A small step 
may be the disclosure on the federal level of a tax-exempt 
organization's full IRS Form 990, only part of which is now 
available under the Freedom of Information Act. On the 
state level, a step might be to simply require a copy of that 
full Form 990 to be filed and disclosed in the state where 
it has activities. This full financial form would be disclosed 
at the new Commission. 
9. The new Commission should disclose additional cross-referencing 
of funds as they are developed with other documents or agencies. 
During a recent visit to the District of Columbia Off ice of 
Campaign Finance I saw a good attempt to develop new comparisons. 
The off ice had obtained from another city agency a list of every 
city contractor and vendor. Their plan is to cross check this 
list with ~hose appointed to .clty boards. and .. commissions. 
Each of these nine areas represent pockets of political money. They must 
be disclosed at one location so that a person can easily see the whole 
picture - all of the pockets. Mandated cross-referencing and indexing 
should prove invaluable to understanding the movement of money in· 
politics. Audits, investigations, or inquiries of one type of fund in 
one organization should be vital to the next audit, investigation, or 
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inquiry into another type of fund in the same organization. Over time 
experience builds up and questionable activity of an organization can be 
reviewed more quickly and more completel~. Questions about related funds 
and other pockets of money will be thorough and enlightening. , 
At present several states have a central conunission to consolidate some of 
these basic types of information. Although some are small in size their 
operations and coordination give them an excellent chance for success. 
These state conunissions are the California Fair Political Practices 
Connnission, the District of Columbia Office of Campaign Finance, the 
Oklahoma Ethics Commission, and the Washington Public Disclosure 
Commission. Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
and New Jersey have commissions which .combine most of the core data as well. 
In several other states some of these doucments may be located in the 
office of the Secretary of State. These offices usually have many 
varied duties. However, it can generally be stated that efforts, funds, 
and interest are usually first put into other areas such as registering 
corporations and election adminstration. These offices are usually 
quite underfunded and understaffed. 
Still other states have some of these documents filed with an agency 
which also has election administration responsibilities, such as a 
state Board of Elections • In general, these offices consider their 
election administration duties to be paramount to their smaller efforts 
and budgets for campaign finance or other disclosures. 
The new Commission should pull together as many types of disclosure 
documents as possible under new combined commission. 
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ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION 
The second major role of a new combined disclosure Commission should be 
to analyze the information on money in politics. Just as this study 
Commission is trying to find out the trends and costs involved in the 
election process, the new Commission ought to do this on a continuing 
basis. Then as public demand grows for alterations and amendments 
people will have the data in front of therJ. to make the proper decisions. 
It is a disappointment that New York information is not available now. 
If one is concerned about the high costs of campaigns we ought to 
know what has been spent by candidates. If one is talking of limits 
for individuals contributions we ought to know how many and how big 
contributions have been made. If one is talking about expenditure 
limits on campaigns we ought to know the rising areas of costs that 
are in campaigns - high TV, high mail, high consultants, or even 
poor spending habits of candidates. 
In the recent debate in the U.S. Senate over changes to the Federal 
Election Campaign Act we finally saw the development of regular 
comparisons and trend analysis on federal races. At the beginning of 
the debate various Senators were using all sorts of figures, some 
stated correctly, some mangled beyond belief. But halfway through 
the debate the Library of Congress came out with several reports 
which laid out a whole series of basic statistical data for all to use. 
They prodUced comparison figures in almost every imaginable way. 
Therefor these neutral factual figures could be used by any side if 
they felt they proved their case. It was a tremendous improvement 
in the quality of the debate. 
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Hopefully, this type of longitudinal data can be updated after each 
election cycle and ready for instant use whenever campaign finance 
legislation is brought up again. As examples of this data, here are 
several reports from t~e Library of Congress and some from other states. 
Of particular interest might be the study on developing an index of 
campaign costs in the state of Washington, a trend analysis from a 
combination of groups in West Virginia, and the massive report from 
Bob Stern's study commission in California. 
On the federal level there have been many other studies which utilize 
basic data from the FEC. All of these studies can be produced because 
the raw data is available to the public on an easily accessible basis 
from the FEC. I would hope that this study Commission would recommend 
this same accessibility for New York data. The resulting analysis 
could be very helpful to the public, the legislature, and others. 
All it takes is a true desire for disclosure to make it available in 
forms that can be utlized. To simply open the doors of a records office 
and say here it is certainly is not enough. It must be a mandated duty 
of a central disclosure cor.nnission. 
Earlier I mentioned the various computer printouts and listings that the 
FEC provides, but there are several other methods that should be 
mentioned regarding analysis of data. For example, the FEC makes its 
entire disclosure data base available to the public through direct 
communications between a person's or organization's own computer and 
the FEC's computer. This material can be transmitted in the formatted 
printouts I showed you earlier or in unformatted streams of data into 
one's own storage equipment. The FEC also makes the formatted data 
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available free to each state in the office of the Secretary of State,or 
state Board of Elections, or other disclosure commission. We now have 
eleven states tapping our data and then providing it to their constitu-
ents and public in their state. Fourteen more states are in various 
stages of hooking up their equipment and training their staff. As of 
today New York State is not one of those states which has requested or 
showed interest in this effort to provide federal campaign finance data 
more quickly and convienently to the voters, the public, or the press. 
The FEC also makes computer tapes available to the general public. 
If someone has a large computer facility or access to one, tapes can 
sometimes be more economical to obtain data and thus analyze vast amounts 
of data. 
DISCLOSURE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
The third role of a new central disclosure Commission should be to set 
an example of disclosure in its own policies and procedures. I think 
the FEC does a good job in this area and I would encourage this study 
Connnission to mandate the same for the new disclosure Commission. 
-Hold open public hearings before writing regulations 
-Hold normal open meetings with all agenda documents and material 
public prior to the meeting. 
-Make available tapes or transcripts of the meetings, as well as 
meetings involving completed compliance cases. 
-Hake requests for advisory opinions public, as well as the resulting 
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advisory opinion. 
-Make public all audits and compliance actions when completed. 
-Release the names of completed compliance cases on a regular basis. 
-Make court actions and other agency litigation material public at 
the Commission at the same time it is filed in court. 
-Make public a topical index of compliance actions and opinions. 
All of these steps help to insure those on all sides of issues that 
there is a level playing field and that actions are not being taken 
in secret. They help to produce an attitude of trust and fairness. 
I certainly understand that individual enforcement cases would be 
confidential until completed, but the general policy, regulation, 
and procedural activities of the Connnission ought to be public. How 
it has set up its priorities, how it has divided its budget, discussions 
or needs of internal improvements, all should be on the public record. 
On the federal level, the public's ability to see the products and 
procedures of the Commission have been very beneficial. 
ASSISTANCE TO THE PUBLIC AND PRESS 
The fourth major role for the new Commission should be to set an 
example of disclosure in its assistance to the public and press. 
In general, most candidates, reporters, and voters don't know what 
the rules and regulations state. This new Commission must take 
very aggressive>positive steps to inform the public and press. 
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These might include educational pamphlets, brochures, training 
courses, guidebooks, and even videos. At a recent meeting of the 
Council on Governmental Ethics Laws, the participating representatives 
from campaign finance, ·ethics, and lobby commissions throughout the 
country saw a video produced by the Ontario Commission on Election 
Contributions and Expenses. It was prepared with the help of the 
legislature's TV and Recording Studio. It was an excellent show 
on the duties and steps which a campaign treasurer should follow 
to comply with their law. It had to have been excellent to make 
that topic interesting. These are the kinds of new ideas a new 
Commission should be developing or seeking out - and yet no one 
from New York's agencies was at this group's annual conference. 
This last year the FEC came out with a new citizen's quide to the 
federal law on campaign financing. It is meant to reach out much 
farther that ever before - to persons on the periphery of campaigns 
and elections - hopefully enlightening them on permissible activities 
for them to particpate in during next year's election. 
The FEC also has a toll free phone line which is available to anyone 
if they want to get information or materials from the agency. This 
can be used by a potential candidate, a treasurer, a party leader, 
a press person, a student, or anyone. They do not have to identify 
themselves. In this way we really are trying to assist people in 
getting ~t right the first time. If they fully understand the rules, 
they will fill out more accurate reports, write correct press 
stories, and help avoid false acqusations based on a poor or mistaken 
understanding of the law. 
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The FEC also provides a large research area for the public to view 
reports and enough copiers to obtain quick copies. Although we use 
the computer for indexine,the printouts utilize English for a lang-
uage not computereeze. We fill requests which we receive in the 
mail and over the phone from around the country. The types of 
requesters include the press, candidates, party researchers, staff 
of political action committees, acadereics and political scientists, 
and many others. Over 10,000 requests are received and filled each 
year. As a result thousands of persons are looking at each others 
reports. 
Another simple yet very important element of the FEC Public Records 
operation is that we do not force people to identify who they are 
or which reports they are looking at. The Commission has found that 
there is nothing more harmful to the free flow of inf orrnation than 
the intrusion of government into the freedom to look and read what is 
on the public record. There is no need for such identification. 
New York has such an identification requirement and I strongly 
encourage you to have the legislature repeal it. The only reason I 
can see for such a statement is one left over from years past when 
the records were kept by political lackies of the incumbents in power. 
These so called public officials would then forward copies of these 
forms back to the legislators to show them who was looking at their 
records and might be doing research or a news story about them. The 
record keeper would score points with the legislator and the leg!slator 
would have advance word on the resarch. So much for neutral impartial 
> 
public record keepers. 
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The question to ask in this age is,MWhy is this provision still in 
•• effect? My suggestion to persons who don't want to change is to say, 
"Assume everyone in the world is looking at your records." It could 
be your opponent, the press, your worst enemy, or anyone. Kno~ing 
that they are looking should not change anything on the forms unless 
they weren't complete or accurate in the first place. 
COOPERATiml 
The new Comnission should fully cooperate with other agencies in 
disclosing info!'l':'lation. I am constantly amazed at the number of 
federal and state agencies which contact the FEC for information and 
don't understand that, of course, we provide it and that we make it 
public every day of the week in Washinf:ton, D.C. 
Many of these agencies, departments, or government investigative units 
do not really have a background or expertise in the doucnents availa-
ble or the nany avenues of money in politics. What they do have, 
however, is a lead to follow up or acqusations which might involve 
money in politics and their own area of interest or jurisdiction. 
I think they have tended to follow those leads further and more 
thoroughly when they can get soQe basic assistance or advice from a 
good disclosure cor:nnission. 
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At the federal level requests for copies of reports cone from a 
wide variety of governmental bodies such as the following: 
-Department of Justice (Criminal Division, Organized Crime 
Strike Force, Public Integrity Section) 
-Various U. S. Attorneys 
-Chicago Strike Force, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section 
-FBI, U.S. Secret Service, Watergate Special Prosecution Force 
-IRS, SEC, FTC 
-Inspector Generals of the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, 
HEW, HUD, GSA, SBA, and U.S. Postal Service 
-Off ice of Government Ethics 
-Merit Systems Protection Board 
-General Accounting Office 
-u. s. House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
-u.s. Senate Committee on Government Affairs 
-U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret }~ilitary Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. 
-Various state election boards, ethics agencies, and campaign 
finance commissions 
-New York examples: U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York 
U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York 
State of New York, Commission on Investigation 
State of New York, Deputy Attorney General 
for Medicaid Fraud Control 
State of New York, Department of Labor 
City of New York, Department of Investigation 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 
Various District Attorneys 
23 
ENFORCEMENT OF DISCLOSURE 
The sixth major role of the new Commission should be to set the 
example of disclosure bv its solid enforcement of the basic disclosure 
rules and regulations. The new Commission should have the following: 
-Set mandatory fines for late filers of reports. 
-Random audits of political comr.iittees to insure that they are 
disclosing all they should. 
-Require campaigns and political committees to have an annual audit 
prepared by a Certified Public Accountant and filed with the 
Commission. The government would reimburse the committee for 
soMe part of the costs. These audits would be like the ones 
required by this years NYS Governmental Accountability, Audit, 
and Internal Control Act. 
-Use of Administrative Law Judges in disputes over disclosure 
matters. 
-Impose civil fines high enough for violations that they create 
a detenent for others. If fines are too low they simply 
become a cost of doing business. Fines should be equal to the 
amount of funds in question. There should also be a token 
fine for the recepient of illegal funds or undisclosed funds. 
Although the dollars won't create a detenent,the possible use 
of the candidate's name in the next campaign may encourage 
·recepients to take stronger steps to insure compliance with 
the disclosure provisions. 
-Knowing· and willful violations should have criminal penalties 
above the misdemeanor level. 
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-Funds or contributions from individuals who, are not completely 
identified should he returned and prohibited from campaign 
accounts •. Now here is an exaMple of what appears to be a small 
matter yet it goes to the core of knowing about money in politics. 
The federal law requires the full identification of contributors 
with the name, address, occupation or principal place of business, 
if any. The FEC rules simply call for a committee to make 
'best efforts'. It has now developed that 'best efforts' could 
be as little as once for the information. This token effort may 
also be done with a wink or in a joking manner. As a result, 
more and more disclosure reports are being filed with very 
little identifying data. All you have to do is look at some of 
the recent filings of the presidential campaigns to see how 
badly they disclose the identification of contributors. My 
suggestion to this commission is to force conmittees to get 
and disclose the information or not accept the funds. 
-The candidate ought to be required to sign the campaign finance 
report of his/her political coTTll!littee. At the federal level 
we have let this slip a hit by siMply having the candidate 
designate a treasurer who then files reports. With the candidate 
signing the actual reports I think you will have a better chance 
to hold the candidate responsible for the actions of the treasure~ 
The candidate will think twice about putting his/her name on the 
report. 
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INDEPENDENCE AND NON-PARTISANSHIP 
The seventh major role of the new Commission should be to be viewed as 
a separate independent non-partisan agenc:.Y_. I would hope that your 
recommendations for action include the establishment of this new 
Commission. It must be new, not tainted with earlier history or 
mistakes. It must be viewed as covering all problems of the judicial, 
legislative and executive branches. Sadly enough the first impressions 
of su~h an agency will be set by the selection of the first Commissioners 
It is important to put into the legislation some solid descriptions 
of the types of persons who you want to fill those Commission positions. 
Although the Governor may make the appointments, the legislature should 
agree to them. The Commission should not be viewed as the arm of any one 
branch of government. 
The new Commission should not have to send its rules, regulations, or 
forms to the legislature for approval. Care ahould also be taken to 
prohibit the behind the scenes agreements to forward drafts of certain 
Commission opinions, compliance actions, or policies to any particular 
branch of government. 
The new Commission should be mandated to do random audits of all 
three branches political accounts. The FEC and most other agencies 
feel this is a standard way to seek compliance with the laws and 
provide a deterent to others. However, when the FEC tried this it 
was forced to stop by Congress. As a result it is the chief example 
brought up when discussing the Commission's independence. Had it been 
mandated the FEC might have been viewed as more independent. 
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I would also suggest that if you have a six or seven member commission 
you try and have not more than two from each of the two major parties, 
and two or three others which are somewhat neutral and agreed upon by 
both parties. The non-partisan members might have backgrounds in the 
judiciary, minor parties, the press, or other civic activities. The 
non-partisan nature of the Commission is essential when dealing with 
public funding questions, investigations of party committees, or 
issues of first amendment rights such as freedom of speech. 
DEMOCRACY FUND 
07· 
The eighth major role for a new disclosure commission should be \t.Q .. 
to establish a base line budget figure which would be free from 
legislative control. This budget figure should be set by a calculation 
of the voting age population times some dollar amount. This dollar 
figure would be the base cost of maintaining a system of democratic 
fair elections of public officials with integrity. ihe overall 
budget would include the operations of the current state Board of 
Elections, the new Ethics Agency, the Temporary Commission on Lobbying, 
and various other sub-units of agencies auditing, insuring voting 
rights, and prosecuting government integrity violations. It may come 
down to .only $1 per voting age person but it would establish a basic 
democracy fund for the people. 
This fund or budget would be increased automatically by a cost of living 
factor and would be untouchable by the executive or legislature •. No 
matter who or what group was in power the funds would be there to do 
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The idea of a budget which could not be reduced came from the state of 
California where their commission was created by a referendum and their 
constitution was amended to incorporate the budget insulated from the 
two branches. 
At the federal level the FEC must continually seek funds from the 
same legislators we are supposed to regulate. 
FINANCIAL PLANNING 
The ninth major role I would suggest for a new disclosure commission 
is to encourage private industry, especially those in family financial 
planning services, to assist in improving the integrity of government. 
To require certain disclosures and create agencies to enforce disclosure 
laws means that tremendous new pressures will be placed upon persons 
thinking of running for office or working in government. There will 
be some who choose not to place themselves or their finances in such an 
open position. For those who do I think it is a reasonable and necessary 
requirement. However, I also feel that the government which imposes the~ 
rules must also provide the educational assistance needed to those who 
wish to comply. This means extra assistance, more than has ever been 
provided before. I have already outlined some of the ways a Commission 
can prov~de this assistance. However, there are some personal freedoms 
within the mind which preclude an individual from relating every dream 
and family financial desire to some government agency. These plans are 
often very personal and emotional when it comes to money. 
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I would suggest the new Commission actively encourage private family 
financial planning services to enter the world of money in politics. 
These groups could provide various financial services and trust type 
assistance to those in the executive, legislative or judicial branches. 
The Commission might coordinate training programs on the various laws 
relating to campaign finance, personal financial income, and all the 
various pockets of money in politics. These groups might help persons 
fill out disclosure forms, set up blind trusts, or explain how to 
sell conflicting stocks or bonds. These groups may assist persons 
burdened with financial debts, family needs for college funds, or 
other expenses. Such an effort would provide a confidential place 
to go and talk to someone about their financial problems or plans. 
These might include the financial realities of surviving with a 
government salary or the government retirement or health plans. 
Post government employment could also be reviewed. 
It is my guess that most persons who come into government, especially 
the legislature, have just come off an incredible roller coaster 
type of life. When they take their seat in the legislature they 
are still recovering. Needless to say they are inunediately off on 
another roller coaster life. They do not make time to think about 
their financial plan for the next years or how they might have to 
change their types or sources of income. They hardly have time to 
get their laundry done. They also do not have the advisors they 
need to force them to think about their finances. Their close advisors 
have been campaign aides, volunteer workers or law partners who have 
done double duty during the months of campaigning. 
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Of course, the spouse or family is not in a mood or condition to 
think about proper financial planning. They are the ones who have 
had their lives turned upside down with that roller coaster ride. 
They are still dizzy. They need professional guidance on finance& 
Again, by fostering groups to provide financial planning services 
to candidates, officials, and other regulated persons, the new 
Commission would be reducing the chances of an official being forced 
into income enhancing schemes outside the law or in apparent conflict 
of interests. This type of assistance should make it easier and 
less of a burden to comply with the disclosure and other laws. 
It should be this vast majority of honest officials who bring the 
slow steady pressure on others by stating how easy it was to comply 
and since they have complied everyone should comply. 
DECENT REWARDS 
The tenth and last major role for the new Conunission should be to 
routinely review and report on the proper compensation for the officials 
regulated. There may be some minimal level of income below which it 
is unreasonable to assume that one can survive without being beholden 
to others or compromising one's office. The Commission should balance 
the income restrictions on public officials with a decent reward in 
compensation for the services provided. The Commission may even want 
to consider full time legislators and full time salaries. 
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CORRUPI'ICN AND PSEUOO = CORRUPI'ICN 
IN AMERICAN CAMPAIGN_ FINANCINJ 
Larry Sabato 
university of virginia 
The disturbing statistics and the horror stories about campaign finance at 
the national arrl the state levels seem to flow like a swollen river, week after 
week, year in and year out. outrage exterrls across the ideological spectrum, 
and in more and more recent congressional and state campaicps, political action 
committees have teen portrayed as the central corrupting evil in American 
politics. Candidates from Maine to California have scored p:>ints by forswearing 
the aca:!ptance Of PAC gifts earlier and more fervently than their OJ:PC>nents. 
PAC-bashing is undeniably a :i;x>pular campaign sp:>rt, but the "big PAC 
attcck" is an opiate that pleasantly obscures the more vital corx::ems and 
problems in campaign finan<l:!. PAC excesses are merely a symptom Of other 
serious maladies in the area of p::>litical money, and the near-obsessive focus by 
public :interest groups and the news media on the purported evils of PACs has 
diverted attention away from these fundamental matters. This essay will first ... 
, 
briefly sketch the dimensions of the PAC controversy and rev-iew the dlarges most • 
frequently made against :i;x:>litical action committees: The balance Of the essay 
will rev-iew and evalwte a numter Of reforms in campaign financing, pro:i;x:>sing an 
agerrla of dlange for states and nation that targets real, not pseuCb, 
corruption. 1 
State and Local PACs: "New Federalism" In 
Campaign Finance 
While a g:>od number of PACs of all p:>litical persuasions existerl prior to 
the 1970's, it was during this decade - the decad= of campaign reform - that the 
modem PAC era l:egan. Spawned by the Watergate-inspired re.risions of the 
campaign finan<l:! laws, fed:!ral PACs grew in numl:er from 113 in 1972 to 4,157 by 
1 
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the erx:1 of 1986, and their contributions to congressional candidates multiplied 
more than fifteen-fold, from $8.5 million in 1972 to $130.3 million by 1986. 
But American politics, :p=rhaps even more than American government, is 
derentralized, and the PAC canmunity reflects fully this fecerated arrangement. 
The growth of PACs at the national level has been matched, and in some cases 
exreeded, by the increase in PAC numter and size recorded in states and 
localities across the country. Almost a third (32 percent) of all 
multicandidate PACs have associated state-level committees; most PACs have one 
or two, but the large trade associations usually have PACs in most or all of the 
fifty states. Labor PACs have traditionally teen the most active in the state 
arena, and 42 :p=rcent have at least one separately registeroo PAC at the state 
level. 
There is little question that PACs contribute a growing pro:r;ortion of 
campai91 money in states and localties, i;:articularly in races for the state 
legislature.2 In Washington state there were 114 PACs with receipts of $2 
million in 1978; just two years later, 200 PACs raising a total of $4.3 million 
were on the scene. In Illinois the number of PACs registeroo with the state 
board of elections grew quickly from 54 in 1974 to 372 in 1982, with a record 
number of new entrants in the latter year.3 In Michigan the number of active 
state PACs rose from 325 in 1978 to 478 in 1982; six local Chamter of Commerce 
PACs were in existence in 1980, and fifty-four two years later. In california, 
state PACs accounted for 45 :p=rrent of all over $100 contributions in 1980 
candidates for the state legislature, and by 1982 eight different PACs were 
pouring more than $200,000 apiece into races for the state House and senate.4 
The growth of state-level committees is only p:irt of the "new federalism" 
of PACs. More than four in ten of the federal multicandidate PACs also 
contributed to state and local candidates in 1980-1982. During that.:p=riod an 
average of 12 :p=rcent of all PAC funds was devoted to state candid:ltes, and 
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another 6 p:!rcent went to local candid3.tes. Once again labor PACs were 
especially likely to contribute to state and local candidates. Moreoe.rer, in 
toose states where it is legal to do so, 63 :percent of the µi.rent unions of 
lal:x>r PACs and 31 percent of the parent companies of corporate P.ACs made 
contributions to state and local candicbtes arrl µirties directly from union or 
corporate treasuries. 
State P.ACs, like the national variety, are not a completely new fhenanenon. 
Labor unions have had active state PACs for decades, and a numl:t:!r Of trade 
associations Op:!rated state P.ACs before their national PAC was formed. 
Organizations like the California Public Health League (predecessor Of the 
California Medical Association's CALP.AC) along with an activist group of 
physicians in oreg:m "were what really g:>t the American Medical ASsociation 
going" at the federal level, according to AMP.AC's executive director, Peter 
Lauer. Much PAC development has moved from the national to the state level, 
however. The major political decision for most companies and trade associations 
' 
seems to have teen the one to form a national PAC. once that threshold was 
crossed, it was relatively easy to expand the terrain; additional costs were not 
great, the legal research had teen done, and the accounting mechanisms were in 
place. Many grou:t:S recognized that state legislatures were playing an 
increasingly important regulatory role, p:i.rticularly in the late 1970s and 1980s 
when the federal government was attempting to trim its sails. Even if the U.S. 
congress were still the center of a group's attention, it had g::>od reason to 
look to the state capitals: most recent congressnen first ser.ved as state 
legislators, and a contribution made early in their careers was likely to be 
well renemtered. In addition, Watergate caused many states to pass laws similar 
to the Feceral Election Campaign Act, and just as FEC'A stimulated the growth of 
P.ACs at the national level, so too did the state statutes encourage PAC 
formation at the state level. 
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Many state POCs are not connected in any way to a national PAC or group, 
and are completely based in a single state or even a single locality. Unless 
they contribute to federal candidates or transfer furrls to a federal PAC, they 
are not re:Juired to register with the Fed=ral Election Canmission. other state 
PACs are tied in sane fashion to a national PAC, but the strength of the 
affiliation varies. In some cases the PACs fit a "i;:arent/dlild model," and the 
state PACs are mere creatures of the national PAC, smjugatoo to it with little 
indep:nd=nt decision-making authority on candid:lte selection (though they can 
recommerrl errlorsements to the national committee). The parent PAC files all 
reports for its affiliated dlildren. In other cases state PACs are more like 
"indeperrlent adults." they may share fundraising and solicitations with the 
national, but they retain much authority to contribute to candid:ltes of their 
own choice without prior approval from aoove.5 
Whatever the models of state-fed=ral relationships, most state PACs have a 
numter of tasic characteristics in common with the national PAC community. 
' 
state as well as national PACs have grown disproportionately in the corporate 
and trade categories, and have given business interests the localized political 
network available before just to labor. state PACs, like their national 
counterparts, have focused their activity primarily on legislative rather than 
executive offices, arrl they most often favor incumtents and legislative lead::?rs, 
not challengers or freshmen. New directions among state PACs parallel tlx:>se at 
the fed=ral level: µirticip:ltion in primary elections, extensive involvement in 
ballot refererrla campaigns, more expansive and innwative fundraising 
techniques, and the use of in-kind exp:mditures (though so far not to the same 
extent as the more sofhisticated federal PACs). Business and trade PACs in many 
states are also developing coordinating and informational umbrella groups 
similar to toose in Washington. Examples of this kind of state PAC have 
included United for California, United for Washington, Maryland Business for 
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Responsive Government, Montanans for Effective Government (MEGPAC), 
Pennsylvanians for Effective Government, Texas Businessmen Are Concerned 
(BACPAC), and the Louisiana Business PAC. 
'!he dangers of overgeneralization are great on the subject of state PACs. 
Each state's political action committees are somewhat distinct because election 
laws - which d:termine the character of a state's PACs - vary dramatically from 
Maine to Iowa to California. '!he states also differ greatly about who can be 
soliciata:J for PAC funds, how much PACs can give individtal candidates, to what 
extent and how often PACs must disclose their sp;mding and list their 
contributors, and whether corporate, union, and association treasuries can P=iY 
the administrative exp;:nses of their PACs. States even disagree about what 
groups can form PACs. 
PAC growth at the state and loeal level will al most certainly be sustained 
in the near future, and it may even outstrip the expansion rate of national 
PACs, which has begun to level off. At the same time there are limitations that 
will keep state and local expansion somewhat in check. The complicated 
variations in law and regulation from state to state undoubtedly will deter some 
national groups. In some states, too, PACs are not a necessity for politically 
active groups, since corporations and unions can donate money to candidates 
directly from their treasuries. 
The PAC Era: Controversies and Charges 
'.Ibis rapid rise Of PACs has inevitably proven controversial, yet many of 
the charges made against political action committees are exaggerated and 
dUbious. It is said that PACs are dangerously novel and have flooded the 
political system with money, mainly from business. While the widesp:-ead use of 
the PAC structure is new, the fact remains that special-interest mof1:ey of all 
types has always found its way into politics, and before the 1970s it did so in 
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less traceable and far more disturbing and unsavory ways. And yes, in absolute 
terms PACs contribute a massive sum to candidates, but it is not clear that 
there is prooortionately more interest-group money in the system than before. 
As political scientist Midlael Malbin has argued, we will never know the truth 
because the earlier record is so incomplete.6 '!he pror:ortion of campaig1 furrls 
provided by PACs has certainly increased since the early 1970s, but individuals, 
most of whom are unaffiliatoo with P.OCs, still supply most of the money raised 
by fed=ral and state candidates. So while the im{X)rtance of PAC sp:nding has 
grown, PACs clearly remain secorrlary to individuals as a source of election 
funding. PACs seem rather less awesome when consirered within the entire 
s:pectrum of campaign finance. 
Apart from the argument over the relative weight of PN:. furrls, PN:. critics 
claim that political action canmittees are making it more expensive to run for 
office. There is SQlle validity to this assertion. Money provided to one side 
funds the purchase of campaign tools which the other sioo must then match in 
order to stay comp:titive. In the aggregate, American campaign experrlitures 
seem huge. Will Rog=rs's 1931 remark has never reen more true: "Politics has 
got so expensive that it takes lots of money to even get reat with." Yet our 
aggreg::tte campaign sp:nding is far less than the annual advertising budg=ts of 
many individual commercial enterprises. 'I.hese days it is expensive to 
canmunicate, whether the message is political or commercial. Television time, 
polling costs, consultants' fees, direct-mail investment, and other standard 
campaign expenditures have J:een soaring in price, over and above inflation.7 
.. 
PACs have re en fueling the use of new campaign techniques, but a reasonable case 
can be mad: that such expenses are necessary, and that more, and retter, 
communication is rEqui red J:etween candidates and an electorate that often 
appears woefully uninformed about politics. PACs therefore may 1:e m.aking a 
positive contribution by providing the means to increase the flow of information 
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during elections (though one can legitimately -question whether 30-second "IV 
s:i;ots have the potential. to enlighten anyone.) 
PACs are also called incumrent biased, and except for the id?ological ones, 
PACs do display a clear bias for incumrents. But the same bias is apµirent in 
O)ntributions from individuals. Facing all contributors is a rational., perhaps 
decisive, economic question: Why waste money on nonincumrents if incumrent$ 
almost always win? Q1 the other hand, the best challen~rs -- those F€rceived 
as having fair to cpcd chances to win -- are generously furrled by PACs. rt is 
true that PACs limit the numrer of strong challengers by giving so much early 
money to incumrents, money that helps to deter potential o:pponents from 
declaring their candidacies. But the money that PACs channel to com~titive 
challengers late in the election season may then increase the turnwer of 
officeholders on election day. PAC money also rertainly increases the level of 
competitiveness in open-seat races -- races without an incumrent candidate. 
Ole line of attack on PACs is more justified. 'Ihese important components 
of a lar~ly democratic political system seem themselves to be urilemocratic in 
some respects. '!he undemocratic character of some PACs' candidate-selection 
process completely severs the connecting link between contributor and candidate. 
AS political scientist David Adamany has noted, this unhealthy condition is most 
api;arent in many of the ideological nonconnected PACs, whose lack of a p;irent 
body and whose free-style organization makes them accountable to no one and · 
res:i;onsive mainly to their own whims.a 
Leaders of ideological PACs insist that their committees are still 
democratic sina= contributors will simply stop giving if dissatisif ied with the 
PACs' candidate choices. But these Pl'Cs, like most indeperilent committees, 
raise money by direct mail. Except for an occasional news article, if that, the 
average PPC donor's only scura= of information atcut the PAC's activ_ities is the 
PAC's own direct mail which, not surprisingly, tends to be upreat and selective 
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in reporting the canmittee's work. Moreover, as political scientist Frank 
Sorauf has stressed, since direct mail can succeed with only a 2-5 percent 
response rate, and since prospecting for new donors is continuous, decisions by 
even a lar~ number of givers to drop out will have little impact on PAC 
fundraising. 9 
PAC Money and Legislative 'Vote-Buying' 
The most serious charge levelled at PACs is that they succeed in buying the 
votes Of state and federal legislators on issues important to each PAC's 
constituency. That many PACs are shopping for legislative votes seems hardly 
worth arguing. That PN:. money buys access -- o~ns doors -- to legislators is 
similarly disputed by few. But the "Y9t:e-buying" allegation is ~nerally not 
"~.,., • ·' "< '"'-''"""' ·'> "•'-"'•\"-' 
supported by a careful exa!llil}qtigp 9J;: t:h~ iac::ts.10 PAC contributions do make a 
\ •••<~"''-o ,' '"~ •' ' ' • • ' •'• / 
difference, at least on some occasions, in securing access and influencing the 
course of events. But those occasions are not nearly as frequent as anti-PAC 
spokesmen, even legislators themselves, often suggest. 
PN:.s affect legislative proceedings to a decisive degree only when certain 
conditions prevail. First, the less visible the issue, the more likely that PAC 
funds can change or produce votes on it. A corollary of this low visibility 
rule might be that PAC money has more ef feet on the early stages Of the 
legislative process, such as agerrla setting and votes in st.i:>committee meetings, 
than on later and more public floor delib=rations. Press, public, and even 
"watchdog" groups are not nearly as attentive to initial legislative 
proceedings. 
PAC contributions are also more likely to influerce the legislature when 
the matter at hand is specialized and narrow, or unopposed by other organized 
interests. P/lC gifts are less likely to be decisive on broad national or state 
issues. But the more technical measures seem tailor-made for the special 
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interests. Additionally, PAC influence is greater when large PACs or groups of 
PACs {such as rosiness and labor PACs) are al.lied. In rea:nt years, despite 
their natural ennity, business and labor have lobbied t03ether on a numter of 
issues including environmental. regulation, transportation, and nuclear power.11 
'Ihe combination is a weighty one, checked in many instaices only by a terrlency 
for business and labor in one irrlustry {say, the railroads) to combine and 
optX>se their coop:rating counterparts in another industry {perhaps the truckers 
and ireamste rs) • 
It is worth stressing, that most legislators are TIQt. undUly 
influenced by PN:. money on most votes. 'Ibe sp:cial conditions I have outlined 
simply do not apply to most iss~s. Other considerations -- foremost among them 
a legislator's i;arty affiliation, his ideology, and especially his constituents' 
needs and desires -- are the overriding factors in determining his votes. After 
all, PAc gifts are merely a means to an end: reelection. If accepting money 
will cause a candidate embarassrnent, then even a maximum donation will likely t:e 
rejected. If an incumt:ent is faced with a choice of either voting for a PAC-
backed bill that is very unpopUlar in his district or foregoing the PJ'.IC's or 
even a whole irrlustry's money, the crlds are that any politician who depends on a 
majority of votes to remain in office is going to side with his constituency and 
vote against the PAC's interest. 'Ibe flip side of this proposition makes sense 
as well: if a P.AC's parent organization has many memters or a major financial 
stake in the legislator's home district, he is much more likely to vote the 
PN:.'s way -- not so much tecause he receives PN:. money but tecause the group 
accounts for an important r:art of his electorate. When the PAC :i;:henomenon 
is viewed in the broad p:rsp:ctive, and when the complex nature of the 
legislative and electoral process is fully considered, the belief that merit 
matters in the votes most legislators cast -- merit as defined by th~ sp:cifics 
of each case, general ideological beliefs, r:arty loyalty, and the interests of 
9 
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district constituents -- seems soorrl. It is ludicrously naive to conterrl that 
POC money never inflLEnces legislator's decisions, but is it irred=emably 
cynical to believe that POCs always, or even usually, push the voting buttons in 
congress or the state legislatures. 
PACs in Perspective 
As this brief examination of the 'vote-buying' controversy and the other 
charges made aoout political action committees has suggested, PACs are 
misrepresented and unfairly maligned as the emoodiment of corrui:t special 
interests. contemporary political action committees are another manifestation 
of what James Madison called factions. Through the flourishing of competing 
interest groups or factions, said Madison in his Federalist tb • .!ft, literty 
would be preserved: "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an element 
without which it would instantly expire. nl2 
In any democracy, and particularly in one as pluralistfc as the united 
states, it is essential that groups be relatively unrestricted in advocating 
their interests and positions. Not only is unrestricted political activity by 
interest groups a mark of a free society, but it provides a safety valve for the 
competitive pressures that build on all fronts in a capitalistic democracy. It 
also provides another means to keep representatives responsive to legitimate 
needs. This is not to say that all groups' interests are legitimate, nor that 
vigoroosly competing interests alone ensure that the public <_Pod prevails. 'Ihe 
press, public, and valuable watchdog groups sudl as Common Cause must al ways be 
alert to instances in which narrow private interests can prevail over the· 
commonweal -- occurrerces that generally happen when no one is looking. 
Besides the press and organizations like Common cause, there are two major 
institutional checks on the evils of factions, associations, and now POCs. '!he 
most fundamental of these is regular free elections with g=neral suffrage. As 
Tocqueville commented: 
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Perhaps the most p:>werful of the causes which tend to mitigate the excesses of J;Olitical 
association in the United states is Universal Suffrage. In countries in which universal 
suffrage exists, the majority is never doubtful, t:ecause neither party can preterrl to 
represent that portion of the canmunity \\hich has not voted. 
The associations which are formed are aware, as well as the nation at large, that they do 
not represent the majority: this is, inceed, a condition inse:i;arable from their 
existerce; for if they did represI~t the prepondering power, they would change the law 
instead Of soliciting its reform. 
senator Rotert Dole (R-Kansas) has said, ~ere aren't any poor PA.Cs or Food 
stamp PACs or Nutrition PACs or Medicare PACs,"14 and PAC critics frequently 
make the point that certain segments of the electorate are underrepresenterl in 
the PAC canmunity. Yet without much supFQrt from PACs, there are food stamps, 
p01Terty and nutrition programs, and Medicare. Why? Because the recipients of 
governmental assistance constitute a hefty slice Of the electorate, and votes 
matter more than dollars to politicians. Furthermore, many citizens outside the 
affected groups have also mad: known their support Of aid to the FOQr and 
elderly -- making yet a stronger electoral case for these PAC-less programs. 
'Ihe other major institution that checks PAC influence is the two-p::i.rty 
system. While PACs represent particUlar interests, the political p;irties build 
coalitions Of groups and attempt to present a national perspective on policy. 
They arbitrate among special-interest claims, and they seek to reach a consensus 
on matters Of overriding importance to the nation. 'Ihe i:arties are one Of the 
few unifying forces in an exceptionally diverse country. If interest groups and 
their PACs are useful to a functioning democracy, then the political p::i.rties 
must re considererl essential. Yet just as PACs have reen gathering stren:Jth, 
the i:arties (until the last decad= or so) have reen steadily declining in· power. 
In recent years the rehabilitation of the party system has begun, but there is a 
long wey to g::>. A 02ntral goal of the reform ag:mda should te to strengthen the 
political :p3.rties, and to grant them a kind of "most favorerl nation" status in 
the machinery of elections arx1 campaign finance. Reforms to bolster the i:arties 
also have a usefUl side effect: they temper the excesses Of PACs by reducing 
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their proportional. impact on the election of public officials. 
THE REFORM N;;ENDA 
LIMITATIONS CN PACS 
Before discussing p:trty strengthening, I want to look at a currently 
popular proposal. for campaign finance reform: limiting the amount of PAC money 
any legislator may ac~pt. Like many reforms, it has a certain sui:;erficial. 
api:;eal. but the hidd:!n oosts arrl consequ=nces of the proposal are enormous and 
destructive. 
The effects of such a limitation on POC gifts make it a most undesirable 
innovation. First of all, such limits would aid incurntents. While incurntents 
as a group raise far more PAC money than do challengers, in competitive races 
(where there is a g:>cd dlana= for the incurntent to lose) challengers sometimes 
match or outraise incumbents among PACs, and the extra PAC money is ust.ally much 
more useful to a little-known challenger than to a well-known incurntent. A cap 
. 
on PPC gifts would give additional insurance to incumbents that, should they 
firrl themselves in electoral difficulty, their challengers will have less dlance 
to raise enoogh money to defeat them. The "PAC cap" may in reality be a 
"challenger cap. n 
The most disturbing consequeoce of further limits on P!C contributions 
would be an inevitable increase in indepmdent expenditures. Indei:;endent 
experrliture is the least accountable form of political sperrling, and combined 
with the unfortunate fact that it often is viciously negative in tone, it is 
hardly scmething the system Of campaign finance should en:::ourage. More.ver, PACs 
are establiEhed organizations with the proven ability to raise money, and if 
their direct contributions are restricted they. will find other useful ways to 
speoo their funds. Reformers may be able to squeeze PAC cash out of candid:ttes' 
election accounts, but they will not succeed in forcing it out of the political 
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system. Other activities will simply come to the fore, such as undisclosed 
"sOft money" gifts to parties in states without restrictions on corporate or 
union treasury contributions, lcbbying carnpaigis, and political education and 
involvement programs galore. 
Finally, an Oilerall PAC limit might increase the chances that legislative 
votes could be swayed by P"AC gifts. If toth the railroads and the trucking 
industry, for instance, tried to make a contribution to a legislator, but only 
the railroads sucreeded before the incurnl::ent's P"AC limit was reached, might not 
the legislator be more beholden to railroad interests as a resUlt of this P"AC 
limitation scheme? Allowing the legislator to accept donations from roth the 
railroads and their natural competitors maintains sQne talance among competing 
interests. 
Strengthening The Political Parties 
As we have seen, one sure way to lessen the importance of PACs is to shore 
up competing institutions and to increase the pool of alternative money. while 
individt:als and PACs represent particuJ.ar interests and further the atomization 
of public policy, the µirties encompass more g:neral conrerns and push the 
system toward consensus. Their role is absolutely central to American 
democracy's future health and success, and for that reason if no other, the 
parties should be acoorded s~cial, preferential treatment by all national and 
state carnp:iign finance laws. 
Beyorrl 100 percent tax credits for small gifts to parties and other forms 
of public funding channelled through the µirties, it would be wise for congress 
to reclaim a portion of the public:s airwaves and require that television and 
radio stations -- among the most profitable corporate ventures in the country -
turn Oiler a Cbzen five-minute blocks of prime time each year to ooth the state 
parties and another dozen blcx:::ks to l:Dth national parties (rather than to 
individual candidates) so that more g=neric, institutional advertising can be 
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aired even ~ the relatively und:!rf inanced Democrats.15 (Politicians would 
still be free to make unlimited additional purchases to promote their own 
individual candidacies.) 'Ihe :i;arties should have wire discretion in cetermining 
the uses to which the time is put. They may wish to conserve it all for the 
~neral election or they may allocate some Of it to the :i;arty's primary 
candidates to assist their efforts to become known before the party selects its 
naninees. 
Public Financing and Tax Credits 
Most states do not have any form of pt.t>lic financing, but whenever and 
wherever public financing is passed, however, it should be designed in wcrys that 
benefit the political 5)7stem. Public funds should be given to candidates as 
floors rather than as ceilings. Under this eystem, every candidate who can 
qualify by raising a certain amount in smal1 contributions will be eligible for 
matching funds from the state treasury for all similar small gifts, up to an 
agreed up:::m public funds maximum per candidate. Then in the general election, 
each naninee of a major :i;arty would receive a certain flat amount (a floor) in 
pt.t>lic funds to ensure that he reached the minimal financial threshold necessary 
to conduct a modern campai.91. Beyond that, in l::oth the primary and general 
election, he should be permitted to raise as much as he can in unrestricterl 
famion fron PACs and individuals. 'Ibis approach gi:arantees at least basic 
competition in each district and augments the ability of candidates to 
canrnunica.te with voters while preserving for individuals, PACs, and interest 
groups a rightful and legitim:ite role in elections. A ceiling on expenditures, 
by contrast, almost Q:!rtainly benefits incuml:ents ·since challengers must usually 
s~rrl more than average to upend an incumbent. Moreo\Ter, a ceiling restricts 
the flow of canmunica.tions l:etween candid:ltes and voters, and unfairly minimizes 
the direct p::irticipation of PACs in the political process. And as is true of 
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other limitations on PN:. contributions, a public-funds ceiling would squeeze PAC 
money into less accountable and less desirable dlannels, such as indep:mcent 
sperrling. A beneficial state public-fuming scheme would also filter treasury 
money through the state political p;irties, fermitting them to keep a 02rtain 
percentage for their own administration and party-building activities, and 
perhaps also allowing them some degree of flexibility in allocating funds to 
their nominees. 
Realistically, these reform measures do not have a <pod chance Of 
enactI1EI1t. Legislators are unlikely to give their :plrties any cilditional 
leverage to use CNer them, nor are they going to do any favors for their 
opponents by enacting public-funding floors that favor dlalleng:rs rather than 
ceilings that favor themselves. Probably the best form of public financing with 
a reasonable dlanoo Of passag: is the tax credit option, wheret¥ a taxpayer can 
be given a 50 or 100 percent tax credit for all contributions to candidates, 
PAcs, and political committees Of up to $50 for an individual and $100 on a 
joint return. 
Disclosure: PACs in the Sunshine 
The most universally supported and oortainly the most sucressful asP=ct Of 
campaign finance laws is disclosure, whereby PACs and candid:l.tes are required at 
various intervals to reveal their contribUtors and their experrlitures. Not only 
do the disclosure prCNisions eXf(>se the motives and decisions of PACs and 
politicians but they alert comfeting interests to the need for mobilization. 
Disclosure is no cure-all, however. '!he volume Of financial disclosure reports 
'· 
in many states is cruEhing, and it is usually well after election day l:efore any 
thorough analysis of the d:l.ta can begin -- too late to affect the election 
results. Still, disclosure serves many useful purposes, from i:;errnitting post-
election enforcement of the laws to allowing corn:plrisons to be mace l;::etween 
campaign contributions and legislative votes cast. Disclosure itself generates 
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pressure for more reform. When campaign finance was out of signt, it was out of 
rost p:ople's minds; now that the trail of money can be more easily followed, 
indignation is only a press release away. 
Disclosure is the single greatest dieck on the excesses Of campaign 
finance, for it eocourages corrective action, whether judicial (prosecution in 
the courts) or political (retribution bf the voters at the polls). It is such 
an essential and welcome device in American democracy that it should be 
broadened to bring to light a nurnb=r Of abuses or p=rceived abuses in the PAC 
community. No PN:. practice is so distasteful as the distortion and reception 
found in many direct-mail solicitations, especially from the id:ological 
committees. P~s using any form of direct-mail furrlraising should be required 
to enclose a CX>P.f of all letters with their periodic reports. 
Just as private charities must do in many states, PAC.s using direct mail 
should also be forced to disclose in each letter and on each contributor card 
how mudl of all money raised is devoted to fundraising and administrative costs. 
Granted, prospecting for direct-mail donors is a necessary and expensive first 
step in the process, but it takes only a couple of p:i.ragraphs to explain this to 
letter recipients. '.Ibey may not like what they read and consequently may refuse 
to give, but they are entitled to kn<M how their money will be sp::mt if any 
degree of accmmtability is to exist. Furthermore, all PACs, not just those 
using direct mail, should be required to report their list of candidate 
selections to their contributors. Most PACs already do this, but the 
ideological PN:.s, which frequently use direct mail and are far remaved from 
their donors, are usually exceptions. 
Honoraria and other Fees 
Those who fear the vote-buying potential of PAC money might better direct 
their attention to the millions awarded ~ interest groups directly to 
legislators, not as camp:.lign contributions but as "si;x=aking fees" and honoraria. 
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While PAC and other campai91 contributions are devoted to the legitimate public 
purpose of democratic elections, honoraria are placed directly in the pockets of 
lawmakers for their private enrichrrent. Also disturbing is an enticement 
interest groups sometimes of fer legislators: all-expense paid trips to resorts, 
possibly including family memters. PAC contributions may receive the media 
attention, but honoraria and free trips ought to be the focus of toose worried 
about urrlue influerce and corruption in the legislatures. 
Conclusion 
PACs are not the chaste and innocent political dleerleaders or selfless 
civic roosters that their proponents often contend they are. Neither are they 
cessp::>ols of corruption and greed, modern-day versions of Tammany Hall. PPCs 
will never be popular with icealistic reformers because they represent the 
rough, cutting edg: of a democracy teeming with different -peoples and 
a:mflicting interests. Inceed, PACs may never be hailed even ~ natural allies; 
it was the business-oriented Wall Street Journal, after all, that editorially 
comp:i.red Washington, D.C. to "the mutants' saloon in 'Star wars' - a place where 
politicians, PACs, lawyers, and lob~ists for unions, business or you-name-it 
shake each other down full time for political money and political support."16 
Viewed in perspective, the root of the problem in campaign finance is not 
PN:.s, it is money. Americans have an enduring mistrust Of the mix of money 
(particularly business money) and politics, as Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley 
revealed: 
I niver knew a pollytician to go wrong ontii he1d been contaminaterl be contcct with a 
business man ••• rt seems to me that th' on'y thing to do is to keep pollyticians an' 
business men apart. They seem to have a tad infloonce on each other. Whiniver I see an 
alrerman an' a banker walkin' down th' street together I know th' Recordin' Angel will 
have to ordher another lx>ttle iv ink.17 
As a result of the new campaign finance rules of the 1970s political action 
ccmmittees superceded the "fat cats" of old as the public focus and symbol of 
17 
the role of money in politics, and PACs inherited the suspicions that go with 
the territory. '!hose suspicions are valuable l::ecause they keep the sr:otlight on 
PACs and gt.:ard against urrlue inflLEnce. It may be regrettable that such 
s~rvision is rEquirerl, but human nature -- not PACs -- demands it. 
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THE ROLE OF PARTIES 
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22 OCTOBER 1987 
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 
John K. White 
Political parties have a unique and important role in the 
American polity. For nearly tour decades, political scientists 
have passionately argued their case. In 1942, E.E. 
Schattschneider wrote: "The political parties created 
2 
democracy .... Modern democracy is unthinkable in terms of 
parties."1 Eight years later the Committee on Political Parties 
of the American Political science Association declared: "The 
party system ... serves as the main device for bringing into 
continuing relationship those ideas about liberty, majority rule 
and leadership which Americans are largely taking for granted." 
The committee, which counted Schattschneider among its members, 
described the parties as the "indispensable instruments of 
government."2 The same year Herbert Agar spoke of the parties in 
like fashion: "These [American] parties are unique. They cannot 
be compared to the parties of other nations. They serve a new 
purpose in a new way. Unforeseen and unwanted by the fathers, 
they form the heart of the unwritten constitution and help the 
written one to work." 3 
The weakened condition of the political parties, a 
diminution that began in the late 1960s and accelerated during 
the 1970s, has enhanced the long-standing view that the parties 
perform vitally important functions. A call to strengthen the 
moribund organizations was issued. Among the first to sound the 
alarm was the Committee for Party Renewal, a group formed in 1976 
and for which I currently serve as Executive Director. In its 
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first position paper, "Strengthening the Political Parties," the 
Cammi ttee warned: "Without parties there can be no organized and 
coherent politics. When politics lacks coherence, there can be 
~
no accountable democracy. Parties are indispensable to the 
realization of democracy. The stakes are no less than that."4 
The vigorous defense of parties given by its students is not 
simple emotion, but a recognition of the important functions they 
have historically exercised: (1) assimilating new voters into 
the political life of the nation; (2) extending democracy; (3) 
simplifying voter choices by presenting alternative programs and 
candidates; (4) enhancing the accountability of government; and 
(5) organizing the government and providing order to it. An 
elaboration of each of these functions follows. 
Assimilating New Voters 
Throughout our history political parties have educated 
voters, particularly newcomers, in the ways of American politics. 
The stories of the immigrants are replete with illustrations of 
how the parties helped families find food, clothing, and shelter. 
Beginning with the Irish in the 1840s and later with the migrants 
from eastern, central and southern Europe, the parties--
especially the Democrats--pertormed the essential task of 
assimilating the new citizens into the political p:roc-~~.:;:;.~ ... Ji'!<.~·lt& 
parties exacted their price tor their generosity: support at the 
ballot box. 
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The establishment of social service agencies during the New 
Deal era resulted in the parties ceding this function to career 
civil service bureaucrats. The current weakened condition of the 
political parties limits their ability to assist the new 
immigrants, particularly the Hispanics and the Asians, who are 
arriving on our shores. While social service agencies can help, 
progress toward the assimilation of the newcomers into our 
political way of life is stunted. 
Extending Democracy 
In his famous 1942 work Party Government E.E. 
Schattschneider observed: "Parties are not appendages of modern 
government; they are at the center of it and play a determinative 
and creative role in it."5 The Constitution of the United States 
does not mention political parties. Its framers hoped that their 
appearance would not be necessary and actively sought to prevent 
it. Shortly after he was inaugurated president Thomas Jefferson 
wrote: "Nothing shall be spared on my part to obliterate the 
traces of party and consolidate the nation, if it can be done 
without abandonment of principle."6 But Jefferson later changed 
his position and together with Madison used the party apparatus 
as a means of expanding popular participation. The Electoral 
College was democratized by the parties; the United States Senate 
was subjected to direct popular election; women were given the 
right to vote. Each of these developments was unfors~en by the 
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Founders, and in each case the political parties were a catalyst 
tor the extension ot egalitarianism. 
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Since the constitutional changes ot the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the parties have continued to serve as 
democratic agents. Interest groups win only a traction ot 
support from the citizenry, but political parties remain the only 
broad-based, multi-interested organizations we have that can 
nominate candidates tor office, mobilize popular support behind 
them, and organize the elected into a government. 
Simplify Voter Choices 
Political parties have historically simplified voter choices 
through the presentation ot nominees tor elective off ices who 
advocate programmatic change. Thomas Jefferson and Andrew 
Jackson were the first to use them to articulate policies that 
would alter the direction ot government. The subsequent 
development ot party platforms served to establish the party 
program, thus allowing voters to choose among sometimes stark 
alternatives. Parties continue to perform this important task. 
In 1984, tor example, the Democratic and Republican Party 
platforms painted very different pictures ot the United States 
and ottered voters a clear choice between Walter Mondale and 
Ronald Reagan. 
Parties determine the organization of the ballot and make 
selections regarding its candidates.7 By simplifying.and 
defining alternatives the party becomes an important instrument 
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of the people's will. Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) says that 
political parties exist "not just to win elections but to move a 
country. Its purpose is not to placate a cacophony of voices, 
but to attract diverse groups to a common purpose. It is built 
not on television, but on a national vision."8 
Enhancing Government Accountability 
Political parties are the primary institutions in our 
electoral system that can be held accountable for what 
governments do. If a national, state, or local government 
performs well in the eyes of the majority, the party in charge 
will be rewarded at the polls. If not, it will suffer the 
consequences. That lesson, perhaps the oldest in American 
politics, was relearned by the Democrats in 1980. After four 
years of what the public perceived as ineffective presidential 
leadership and a general sense of national malaise, voters tossed 
the Democrats out of the presidency and the senate. Reagan won 
in a landslide and brought to Washington freshly elected 
Republicans committed to the party's platform of tax cuts and 
budget reductions. Four years later an overwhelming majority 
judged Reaganomics a success--keeping Reagan in the White House 
and retaining a Republican majority in the U.S. Senate. The 
Reagan experience of 1981-1984 illustrates what can happen to a 
political party when the public approves of its performance. The 
GOP, which had been reduced to half-party status after Watergate, 
rebounded to a position of near-parity with the Democrats. 
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Organizing the Government 
In our complex system of divided and shared powers it is 
difficult to bring coherence to the operations of government. 
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The check and balances built into our federal and state 
constitutions institutionalize conflict, thus making 
accountability difficult to achieve. During the 1980s voters 
have added another check and balance: large majorities prefer 
divided government, with the executive branch controlled by one 
party and the legislative branch by another. The politics of 
personality enhances that trend, as voters make decisions about 
individual candidates. But today's discriminating voter has also 
concluded that the Democrats and Republicans have certain 
strengths and weaknesses, with neither winning a decisive vote of 
confidence. Twenty-nine states presently have divided 
government, with the executive held by one party and the 
legislature controlled by the opposition. In 1952, by contrast, 
only eight states were similarly divided. This makes "party 
responsibility"--namely, the ability of a party to articulate a 
program, capture the governmental apparatuses, and enact its 
platform planks--an immeasurably more difficult task. Party 
accountability also suffers. 
PARTY DECLINE 
Beginning in the late 1960s political parties we.akened 
considerably, and with the ebbing of their strength they became 
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increasingly unable to perform their traditional functions. The 
Committee tor Party Renewal declared that the decomposition of 
the parties was responsible tor a new politics characterized by 
excessive media influence, political tad-of-the month clubs, 
massive private financing by various 'fat cats' of state and 
congressional campaigns, gun-tor-hire campaign managers, lowered 
concern tor policy, and maneuvering and management by self-chosen 
political elites.9 The clanking of the engines of government 
resulted in part from the parties inability to supply the oil. 
George Washington Plunkitt predicted what would happen in the 
parties collapsed: "First, this great and glorious country was 
built up by political parties; second, parties can't hold 
together if their workers don't get offices when they win; third, 
if the parties go to pieces, the government they built up must go 
to pieces too; fourth, then there'll be hell to pay."10 When 
they did falter, government suffered. In 1972 Washington Post 
columnist David Broder wrote: "The governmental system is not 
working because the political parties are not working."11 
George Washington Plunkitt's defense of the parties is one 
tew Americans agree with. Most do not like political parties. 
From time to time, voters have endorsed party "reform" efforts--
the overhaul of presidential nomination procedures after the 1968 
Democratic National Convention is the most prominent and 
troubling ot these. Each of the reforms eras have been aimed at 
reducing the inf 1 uence of the "party bosses" and air i.ng out the 
"smoke-filled rooms." Not all of the reforms have hurt the 
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parties. But many have and to paraphrase George Washington 
Plunkitt, "There has been hell to pay." 
This is not to say that some modest reforms are not needed. 
They are. But the well-being of the political parties should be 
uppermost in the minds of the reformers, remembering that in the 
-final analysis how the parties are doing their jobs is an 
excellent barometer of how government is performing its job. 
SOME MODEST REFORMS 
1. Public Financing of the Political Parties 
Since 1977, the Committee for Party Renewal has advocated 
public financing of the two major political parties. The 
committee reiterated its stand in a 1984 position paper: 
No service to candidates is more important than the 
provision of money, and there should be few restraints 
on the ability of parties to raise and spend money in 
campaigns .... Limits on annual individual contributors 
to parties that qualify for a full tax deduction or 
credit should be raised significantly. Statutory 
9 
limits on group contributions to candidates and parties 
should be retained. Parties themselves should be able 
to make unlimited contributions to the campaigns of 
their candidates for offices at all levels.of 
government. If a system of public financing of 
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elections is adopted, it should use the parties as 
channels through which to distribute these funds as 
they see fit.12 
Sixteen states provide some type of public financing for 
their election campaigns, either a $1.00 income tax check-off 
system or a $1.00 tax surcharge. Of these, nine states 
distribute the collected monies to the political parties. The 
parties use the funds for a variety ot purposes: administration, 
financing primary elections, and providing funds to their general 
election candidates. 
I advocate a $1 income tax check-oft system tor New York 
State. The resultant funds would greatly strengthen party 
organizations and promote accountability. The political parties 
of this state are currently engaged in a losing battle for scarce 
funds. Some of that competition comes from the national parties 
themselves--not only the national committees, but the 
congressional campaign organizations established by the 
Democratic and Republican parties. More importantly, the state 
parties fare poorly at home as party loyalists are beseeched by 
individual candidates for funds. With the infusion of public 
money, the state parties would be able to bolster their largely 
moribund organizations. Ruth Jones notes that the hiring of 
additional staff "is viewed by most party leaders as the key to 
expanding the influence of the party."13 More importantly, 
parties would be able use the funds to assist their nominees. 
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This would enhance the party's traditional function of providing 
accountability among its officeholders. Too many candidates 
believe, often quite rightly, that they owe little to their party 
for securing an election victory. In many instances it provided 
them with almost no money and little else in the way of support. 
The parties could also use the additional funds and staff to 
improve voter turnout. Historically, parties have exercised 
their mobilization functions in "get-out-the-vote" drives. But 
as their resources have dwindled, their ability to enhance voter 
turnout has also suffered. 
The dollar check-oft would significantly alter the rules of 
the political game. Candidates could call upon the party tor 
funds, and in some cases staff members from the state 
organization could be dispatched to help. The result would be to 
increase the winner's sense of obligation to his party and, not 
incidentally, cause an ofticeholder to think twice before 
abandoning the party's platform. 
Funding of state parties would also remove the issue of 
candidate surpluses. As you are aware, the successful candidates 
in the last statewide election in New York State amassed large 
sums of money, not all ot which they were able to spend. This 
raises an important question of ethics. These monies can be 
applied by the candidates toward their next political campaign; 
they ,may be used~sist other candidates; or for some:::>other 
purpose. Elected officials, however, have the resour.ces of their 
..----~ 
incumbency that they can use to communicate with constituents or 
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enact their legislative program. Governor Cuomo, to cite one 
example, has nearly unlimited access to the news media. He also 
has the tools of a rather large state bureaucracy to assist him 
in carrying out his legislative agenda. 
Political parties do not have such automatic access to such 
resources. Yet theirs is an important and unique function in our 
society, one that is not merely limited to a particular election 
cycle. Therefore, should a candidate receive public funds from a 
political party. Should that candidate not spend all of the 
allocated funds I recommend that the money be returned to the 
political party so that it may continue its full-time job of 
party-building. This eliminates the ethical questions resulting 
from surpluses accumul~ted by individual campaigns. 
Jesse Unruh coined the phrase: "Money is the mother's milk 
of politics." The dollar check-off would provide important 
sustenance to the parties. It is far more preferable than a $1 
tax surcharge that is law in six states--largely because the 
revenues generated from the check-off are far greater. 
Consequently, I oppose a proposal for public tinancing of 
candidates tor elective office now under consideration by the New 
York City Council. Aside from its dubious constitutional 
standing, this law would institutionalize the trend toward 
..,/""' 
t:' /. candidate-centered campaigns. It would do nothing to strengthen 
J' ~ i,..AY the parties. The law would also provide funds for candidates 
~ f '',,.f~eng~:ed in pr ima~x,_:_~c~ Primaries are intra-J!.arty squabbles. 
f~ State law implicitly recognizes this by allowing only registered 
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party members to vote in a primary. This is as it should be. I 
am most uncomtortable with funds trom the city's treasury being 
used to settle intra-party disputes. Finally, by giving aid to 
the candidates the proposed law is a device tor the preservation 
of incumbents. Elected officials, thanks to voter name 
recognition and the tools of their office, begin their campaigns 
with an enormous advantage over their opponents. The relative 
lack of turnover in the state offices and legislature reflects 
this. To say that candidates tor Mayor of New York, for example, 
can spend no more than $3 million apiece if they receive public 
funding wrongly implies that each begins the contest on an equal 
footing. They do not. Incumbents, and in New York City that 
usually means Democrats~ begin their campaigns with several 
built-in advantages. This law would institutionalize the one-
party-Democratic system already in place in New York City. One-
partyism of any kind inevitably leads to bad government. The 
relative weakness of the Republican party in the city that has 
contributed to the recent scandals there. 
Abolish Cross-Endorsement 
As I have mentioned, a vital function of the parties is to 
provide coherence to electoral politics and the operations of 
government. New York's cross-endorsement law undercuts the 
ability of the Democrats and Republicans to accomplish this task. 
The power of the Conservative, Right-to-Life, and Liberal parties 
to endorse Democratic or Republican candidates gives them undue 
John K. White 14 
influence. From 1964 to 1980, the endorsements of the 
Conservative and Liberal parties determined the winner in 
slightly more than 16 percent of the races held in the state.14 
For all practical purposes Democrats believe that they must have 
the backing of the Liberal party to win; Republicans believe that 
the endorsement of the Conservative Party, and to a lesser extent 
the Right-to-Life Party, is crucial. 
The result is a governing coalition composed of nervous 
minorities. Successful candidates owe some fealty to the minor 
party who back them. This can result in officeholders working at 
cross-purposes: when the positions of the major party and minor 
party conflict accountability and responsibility suffer. Given 
the prevailing view that minor party support is an insurance 
policy for victory, these small parties become, in Edward Koch's 
phrase, "the tail that wags the dog. "15 A Democratic Party 
resolution declared: "The process has led to many cases where 
the people able to disperse such cross-endorsements obtain 
influence out of all proportion to the people they represent."16 
Former Republican State Chairman George Clark agrees: "I have a 
problem with the fact that [the Conservatives] are the tail 
wagging the dog. My thought is if the Conservatives are so 
concerned about running conservatives, they should put up an 
enrolled Conservative tor office."17 
Only two other states provide tor cross-endorsement: 
Vermont and Connecticut. The once dominant Republican.party in 
Vermont--now being replaced by a competitive Democratic party--
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precluded cross-endorsement from having much effect. In 
Connecticut a minor party must receive 20% of the votes in a 
gubernatorial election before it can secure a ballot position and 
endorse major party candidates. 
Fearing retribution from the minor parties, the state 
legislature will never repeal New York's cross-endorsement law. 
In a 1981 interview, former governor Malcolm Wilson told me that 
the best available method tor repealing the statute is a 
constitutional convention.18 I agree. 
Combine the Direct Primary for Governor and Lieutenant Governor 
In its 1950 report the American Political Science 
Association declared: "The crux of public affairs lies in the 
necessity for more effective formulation of general policies and 
programs and for better integration of all the far-flung 
activities of modern government."19 The direct primary for 
lieutenant-governor has had a very negative impact when it comes 
to unity in the executive branch. I recognize, of course, that 
the New York State Constitution places the lieutenant governor in 
the state senate--much like the vice president of the United 
states is a member of the U.S. Senate. However, the lieutenant 
governor can be a vital partner to the governor: running mate in 
a general election; liaison to the legislature; helping in the 
development of the governor's legislative program; and as the 
governor's emissary to the people of the state. But th~ direct 
primary allows for the election of a lieutenant governor who was 
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not the governor's choice. In 1982 Alfred DelBello, Ed Koch's 
man tor the job, won his primary while Koch lost to Cuomo. The 
Cuomo-DelBello ticket was an awkward, unworkable arrangement. 
Politically, it made little sense to have two Italo-Americans 
heading the Democratic ticket. Party conventions have 
historically devised slates that take both geographic and ethnic 
considerations into account. This has enhanced the 
representation of all ethnic groups and regions in Albany. From 
a governing standpoint, the Cuomo-DelBello combination was doomed 
from the start. After two years of frustration, DelBello 
resigned.20 
Last year Cuomo named Stanley Lundine as his choice tor 
lieutenant governor. However, the Governor went to some lengths 
to be sure that Abraham Hirshteld did not quality to compete in a 
primary against Lundine. Hirshteld was stricken from the ballot. 
Had that not happened there was a possibility that Hirshteld 
could have defeated Lundine in a primary, especially one 
characterized by low voter turnout. The result would have been 
as disastrous as before. 
Former governor Malcolm Wilson, who served fifteen years as 
lieutenant governor, maintains that the current law is "totally 
disruptive and destructive to what should be the closest 
relationship: Governor and Lieutenant Governor."21 I agree. I 
believe that the nominee and those who may quality to run in a 
primary should name their candidate tor lieutenant gove~nor 
either at the party convention or, say, ten days before the 
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convention is to meet. Thus, in 1982 Koch would have named 
DelBello and Cuomo would have chosen someone else. Each team 
would have been paired on the primary ballot--just as the 
presidential and vice presidential candidates are joined in the 
general election. The likely outcome would be to insure a better 
working relationship between the state's two top elected 
officials. It would give more coherence to state government, 
while at the same time assisting the parties in their £unctions 
ot accountability and government organization. This is a modest 
reform, but a much needed one. 
A Word to the Parties 
The major parties in New York State need to take their 
responsibilities more seriously. The functions they perform are 
vital. Ot these, choosing their nominees is among the most 
important. In 1950 the American Political Science Association 
Report on political parties declared: "A democratic internal 
[convention) procedure can be used not merely to test the 
strengths ot the various factions within a party but also to 
resolve the contlicts."22 Party conventions are appropriate 
forums tor settling disputes between competing candidates and 
philosophies. Delegates to contested conventions should not 
throw their vote to a challenger in order to satisfy a demand 
that the case be taken to the voters. Sometimes conventions 
cannot be the final arbiter as the division of opinion is 
sufficient to warrant a primary. But the convention has a 
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legitimate role to play in this regard, and delegates should take 
their responsibilities seriously. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1978 political scientist Everett C. Ladd wrote, 
"Restoring the organized parties to vigorous health ... should be 
the number one reform objective of the next decade."23 Nearly 
ten years later Ladd's call carries additional urgency. It is my 
view that the recent scandals that have afflicted the politics of 
New York City, and the ethical questions that have arisen from 
the financing of political campaigns in New York State generally, 
result from the overall weakness of the political parties. As 
the Commission makes its recommendations, I urge that it remember 
the unique and valuable role that political parties have in 
American society. The Committee for Party Renewal in a 1984 
position paper advised reformers to proceed with caution: 
As private associations with public responsibilities, 
parties should be as free as possible from state and 
federal regulation to determine their own structure and 
functions. The public interest requires that parties 
operate in an open, honest, fair, and accountable way, 
but these goals may be achieved through reporting and 
disclosure requirements and not by detailed regulation 
of party organization and activities .... The public 
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interest is best served by law that complements party 
self-regulation not by statues that substitute tor 
it.24 
I urge the Commission members to keep these words in mind in 
their deliberations. 
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APPENDIX 
COMMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL POSITION PAPERS 
COMMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL 
Declaration of Principles 
The Committee is a voluntary, bipartisan association of 
political scientists and practitioners committed to strengthening 
political parties in the ~~nited States. Organized in 1976, the 
Committee has sponsored panels on political parties at the annual 
meetings of the American Political Science Association and issued 
periodic statements on public policy questions pertaining to the 
American party system. In September 1977, the Committee presented 
the following declaration of principles, which was read by 
Professor James HacGregor Burns at the Jefferson Memorial. 
************************ 
We meet today, at this shrine of American democracy, to 
deplore the disintegration of a basic American institution. Our 
political party system, first inspired by Thomas Jefferson, is in 
serious danger of destruction. 
Without 
politics. When 
able democracy, 
democracy. The 
parties there can be no organized and coherent 
politics lacks coherence, there can be no account-
Parties are indispensable to the realization of 
stakes are no less than that. 
We are not speaking today in defense of the boss-ridden 
parties of an earlier era. Indeed, the demise of the boss has 
opened a new opportunity for a strong two-party system. Currently, 
in certain states, new-style parties have already taken shape, 
providing a model of broad participation, focused on issues. 
But such local rebuilding is struggling against powerful 
counterforces that are undermining party structures everywhere. 
If these forces ultimately prevail, it would mean the end of 
potentially the most powerful political organizations acting for 
the people as a whole--poor people, middle class people, all those 
who lack specialized political organizations of their own. It 
would mean the end of a crucial link between the mass of people 
and the issue-discussing and policy-making process. It would mean 
the end of an organized "loyal opposition" that can keep officials 
under watch and on their toes. It would mean the end of any real 
hope for national party leadership with enough clout to hold 
Presidents to their campaign promises and curb tendencies toward 
the "imperial presidency." 
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What would take the place of parties? A politics of celeb-
rities, of excessive media influence, of political fad-of-the-month 
clubs, of massive private financing by various "fatcats" of state 
and congressional campaigns, of gun-for-hire campaign managers, of 
heightened interest in "personalities" and lowered concern for 
policy, of manipulation and maneuver and management by self-chosen 
political elites. 
To reverse the decline of party and reinvigorate these great 
instruments of democracy, we urge the following steps: 
1. Public financing of campaigns through parties. 
Instead of giving money to individual candidates, 
the federal and state governments should provide 
funds to the parties, which would use it both to 
strengthen their organizational and educational 
programs and to help candidates with their campaign 
costs. Public funding of parties already exists 
successfully in a half-dozen states, and is a part 
of the presidential campaign finance law. These 
sound precedents should be taken as a model for any 
proposal to finance congressional campaigns. 
2. Mid-term conventions for both major parties. 
We urge that each party hold a mid-term national 
convention, where issues may be debated and voted 
upon, and the party's platform renewed. Delegates 
to the convention should include both elected 
office-holders and persons chosen by the party rank-
and-file. Holding such a convention is at least as 
important for the party out of power as for the 
party in power. 
J. Reverse the trend toward more and more primaries. 
Primaries, in an appropriate misture with other 
devices such as caucuses and state conventions, are 
part of the traditional process by which the major 
parties choose their nominees for President. But the 
system has gotten out of balance. About three-
quarters of the delegates to national conventions 
are now chosen in primaries. More states are planning 
to adopt president~al primaries, if only to share in 
the kind of media attention a small state like New 
Hampshire receives. Collectively these primaries are 
expensive, exhausting, confusing, and unrepresentative. 
In the interest of democracy and for the sake of the 
party system, we call upon state legislatures to reverse 
the trend toward proliferation. 
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These steps, taken together, will serve the important purpose 
of helping to broaden party participation, revitalize party activity, 
and hence strengthen democracy in wards, precincts, and communities 
throughout the country, 
It is more than three years since Watergate, We are in 
danger of forgetting the main revelation of that episode: the per-
nicious influence that big-time campaign contributors can have over 
government, The best remedy for that disease is the revitalization 
of the party system, We call upon all friends of democracy to join 
us in working for party renewal. 
COMMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL 
Strengthening the Political Parties* 
The Cammi ttee for Party Renewal is a voluntary group of some two 
hundred political practitioners and researchers. Bipartisan in member-
ship, we share a common concern for the survival of our political parties. 
We see them as vital instruments of democracy, but as organizations which 
are threatened in their very existence. 
As we declared. at our founding at the Jefferson Memorial in 1977, 
"Without parties there can be no organized and coherent politics. When 
politics lacks coherence, there can be no accountable democracy." With-
out parties, we then warned, we are threatened. by "a politics of celeb-
rities, of excessive media influence, of political fad-of-the-month clubs, 
of massive private financing by various 'fatcats' of state and congres-
sional campaigns, of gun-for-hire campaign managers, of heightened interest 
in 'personalities' and lowered concern for policy, of manipulation and 
maneuver and management of self-chosen political elites." 
As we approach the culmination of the presidential election of 
1980, the need for party renewal is even more evident. It has begun to 
be recognized by respected commentators, by the voting public, and by 
political leaders of both the Republican and Democratic Parties. Discontent 
with the present arrangements is widespread, as evident in the low degree 
of trust in our national institutions, in decreased voting turnout, and 
in the widespread abandonment of party loyalties. 
Rebuilding our political parties will require greater involvement 
by individual citizens, but we are not content to rely on vague urgings of 
participation. Effective participation requires appropriate institutional 
structures, which must be deliberately designed by the parties themselves 
and by formal statutory change. The actions we recommend are directed 
toward three goals: increasing the membership of the parties and the 
effectiveness of political participation; providing the parties with 
necessary resources, particularly money; and re-establishing functions 
for the political parties in the overall political system. 
Toward these goals, we recommend the following specific actions: 
1. Less emphasis should be placed on primary elections for 
the choice of national convention delegates~ while more 
delegates should be chosen through party caucuses and con-
ventions. Increased representation for party officials is 
also desirable. 
*This position paper was adopted in 1980 by the Executive Committee 
of CPR and presented. to both national party committees. 
2. If public financing of campaigns is adopted, these 
funds should be channelled through the parties, with a 
portion reserved for general party purposes. Direct 
public financing of the political parties is also widely 
advocated. Many backers of strengthened parties believe 
that public funds should be provided for such purposes 
as party organization, research, publicity, and fund 
raising, and such support is now provided by a number 
of states. Other analysts urge increased private support 
of the parties. While acknowledging these different 
approaches, we agree that support must be provided to 
the parties themselves, rather than to individual 
candidates. 
J. The parties should be given more freedom in their 
financing. Contributions to the parties should be allowed 
in greater amounts than to individual candidates, and 
expenditures by parties for researcfi~ation 
should not be included in campaign expenditure limits. 
State and local party committee expenditures on behalf 
of national slates should not be included in expenditure 
or contribution limits. In general, party contributions 
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to candidates should be preferred above those of individual 
or political action committees. 
4. State law should provide for party caucuses and conven-
tions, open to all party members, to endorse candidates in 
the party primary. Such endorsement should be indicaT:ed 
on the primary ballot, with the endorsed candidate normally 
given the first place on the ballot. 
5. Parties should consider holding periodic issue conven-
tions (e.g., in congressional election years), on the state 
and national levels. These meetings may invigorate the 
organization, consider policy questions, and hold officials 
elected under the party label accountable for the actions 
on party platform positions. 
6. State parties should establish rules that facilitate 
widespread participation. These rules should include adop-
tion of formal charters, broad public notice of nominating 
procedures and dates, affirmative action to promote parti-
cipation by all elements of the population, and apportion-
ment of representation in party bodies on the basis of 
population and/or electoral strength within the party. 
?. Local parties should regularly hold open, well-
publicized meetings, at which current issues and contemp-
orary problems are discussed. Positions adopted at such 
meetings should be forwarded to state and national plqt-
form committees. 
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8. Parties should establish a dues-paying membership. 
For modest fees, the parties should provide their members 
with such benefits as copies of the national platform and 
other policy statements, and a regular report of activities. 
They should regularly determine members' opinions, and 
provide information on means to influence the choice of 
convention delegates and party officials. 
9. Federal law should be amended to provide regular 
access to television for the major political partieso In 
particular, debates for President and other major offices 
should be under the control of party bodies, such as the 
national party committees. Access should also be provided 
for third-party and independent candidates with sizeable 
followings. 
10. The political parties should establish commissions 
nationally, and in each state, to promote joint efforts 
to strengthen the parties, particularly through public 
education programs and statutory change. Training and 
research programs through academic institutions should be 
developed. 
COHMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL 
Principles of Strong Party Organization* 
"A political party is the instrwnent of the people's 
will. It exists not just to win elections but to 
move a country. Its purpose is not to placate a 
cacophony of strident voices, but to attract diverse 
groups to a common purpose. It is built not on 
television, but on a national vision. And when that 
party is out of power, its charge is to provide an 
alternative." 
Senator Ernest F. Hollings** 
Political parties are an American invention. Jefferson and Madison 
devised them as means of changing the policy directions of government; 
Jackson and Van Buren revised them as means of expanding popular parti-
cipation in government. Since the 18JOs, they have, albeit imperfectly, 
continued to serve these ends. Parties are the only broad-based, multi-
interested organizations we have that can nominate candidates for office, 
mobilize popular support behind them, and organize those elected into 
a government. Unlike special-interest groups, parties must appeal to 
pluralities in the electorate if they are to win; and unlike single-
candidate organizations, they must win many races if they are to govern. 
Parties, moreover, give coherence to American politics. We have a consti-
tutional system and a political culture dominated by disunifying forces: 
separated powers, federalism, pluralism, individualism, Parties have been 
a unifying force in this system, cutting across the branches and levels 
of government as well as across voting blocs to aggregate interests, 
build coalitions, and make mass democracy possible. 
Political parties have always had a difficult time in our consti-
tutional system and will always have to compete for influence here. 
Historically, their influence has waxed and waned. But strong parties 
and a strong party system remain the best hope for representative and 
responsible democracy in an extended and diverse republic like ours. 
They are the only institutions in our electoral system that can be held 
accountable for what government does. Those elected to public in their 
name must make policy, not just advocate it, and are answerable for their 
actions to the electorate as a whole, not to a narrow constituency of 
lii11ited and special interest. 
*This position paper was prepared by Jerome Mileur, Executive Director 
of the Committee for Party Renewal, reviewed by the Committee's executive 
committee, submitted to the full membership for comment, and approved at 
the Committee's annual business meeting, September 1, 1984. 
HThe Washington Post (I:ational Weekly Edition), July 2J, 1984, p. 2J. 
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Strengthening our political parties ultimately means making them 
more representative and accountable institutions that link elections to 
government, so that voters can influence the direction of public policy. 
A strong party system, therefore, should be both competitive and parti-
cipatory, and should structure electoral choice as to the direction of 
government. A strong party should have the organization and resources 
to formulate a coherent set of public policy principles, to nominate and 
elect candidates for public office consistent with these principles, to 
withhold party support from candidates who do not support its principles, 
and to advance these principles in government. A strong party should be 
open to all party members, should have active committees at all levels, 
should support candidates for all public offices, should be professionally 
staffed, and should have clear lines of internal authority. We believe 
the following principles of strong party organization are a guide to 
these ends. 
(1) Political parties should govern themselves. As private associ-
ations with public responsibilities, parties should be as free as possible 
from state and federal regulation to determine their own structure and 
functions. The public interest requires that parties operate in an open, 
honest, fair, and accountable way, but these goals may be achieved through 
reporting and disclosure requirements and not by detailed regulation of 
party organization and activities, Parties should define their organization 
and powers formally and publicly through party constitutions or charters and 
by-laws, so that all who affiliate with them may know the rules of party 
governance. In our political system, parties differ organizationally and 
functionally from political action committees and other special interest 
groups, and they should not be treated the same in law. Indeed, state and 
federal courts have regularly recognized this distinction, The public 
interest is best served by law that complements party self-regulation, 
not by statutes that substitute for it, 
(2) Political parties should use caucuses and conventions to draft 
platfonns and endorse candidates, Caucuses and conventions are avenues of 
general participation in party affairs that encourage dialogue and peer 
review of party programs and candidates, The quantity of participation in 
them may not be as large as in primaries, but the quality of participation 
is much higher. Local caucuses open to all registered party members are 
useful checks on both the programmatic direction of a party and the ambition 
of individuals seeking party endorsement for public office. Party conven-
tions, representative of local caucuses and committees, should devise plat-
forms and endorse candidates for public office, Party primaries closed to 
all but party registrants can be an effective rank-and-file check on party 
endorsements and should therefore follow party conventions. 
(3) Political party organization should be open and broadly based 
at the local level, Local politics is a basic testing ground for candidates 
and the principal arena of direct citizen participation in politics, Strong 
local party committees should be the foundation upon which state and 
national party structures are built. They should be the principal party 
instrument for defining membership, registering voters, recruiting candidates, 
and conducting campaigns, They should also be central to the development of 
a party platform and to public education with respect to party programs 
for government. 
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(4) Political parties should advance a public agenda. Parties are 
the most broadly-based organizations in our democratic system and thus best 
able to define priorities for government and to develop programs that serve 
general interests, They serve the public interest best by developing and 
defining a broad philosophy of governance that differentiates one party 
from another and by giving voters a reasonable choice in the direction of 
government. Parties should develop platforms at all levels of government 
through open and representative procedures that begin with caucuses at the 
local level in which all registered party members may participate. They 
should publicize their platforms in order both to inform their members and 
to educate the public, and should develop procedures through which to hold 
party nominees and office holders accountable to party platforms. 
(5) Political parties should endorse candidates for public office. 
If parties are to present voters with a choice of policy alternatives and 
if they are to be accountable for governance, they must have a measure of 
control over who runs for office in their name. At the very least, parties 
should be able to establish threshhold tests for candidate access to primary 
ballots of 15-20% of the vote at endorsing conventions, thereby assuring 
that all candidates for nomination represent significant factions within 
the party. Checks may be legislated on party endorsement processes to 
ensure full and fair participation of party members, but the ultimate 
check will and should be whether a party's program for and performance 
in government merit the support of the general electorate. 
(6) Political parties should be effective campaign organizations. 
Parties will be strong insofar as candidates depend upon them for election 
and insofar as they are key to the success of those who seek election in 
their name. To this end, parties should recruit candidates who share their 
philosophy and should provide them with training and expert advice and direc-
tion in the organization and conduct of their campaigns, with research on 
the district and the opponent, and with polling, media, and other state-
of-the-art campaign services. Parties should also endeavor to coordinate 
campaigns of all party candidates in a given election to minimize conflicts 
and to maximize resources, 
(7) Political parties should be a major financier of candidate 
campaigns, No service to candidates is more important than the provision 
of money, and there should be few restraints on the ability of parties to 
raise and spend money in campaigns. Limits on individual contributions to 
parties should be removed, and limits on annual individual contributions 
to parties that qualify for a full tax deduction or credit should be raised 
significantly, Statutory limits on group contributions to candidates and 
parties should be retained. Parties themselves should be able to make 
unlimited contributions to the campaigns of their candidates for offices 
at ::ill le\rels of gover:r.Inent. If a system of public financL'>1g of elections 
is adopted, it should use the parties as channels through which to distribute 
these funds as they see fit. 
(8) Political parties should be the principal instruments of governance. 
Parties should be instruments of collegial governance which broaden and unite 
leadership in the different branches and levels of government and by means of 
which specific programs may be developed to implement party platforms. State 
.. 
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central and national party committees should work closely with party leaders 
in the legislative and executive branches of government to advance the party 
platform. Party leaders in Congress and state legislatures should make maximum 
use of caucuses in setting a party agenda and developing strategy, Presidents 
and governors should make maximum use of party platforms and committees to 
develop their programs and to educate voters. Equally important, the opposition 
party(s) should be institutionalized, through question periods or in other ways, 
so as to provide a more effective check on specific policy decisions of the 
government. Between elections, the opposition is the key to accountability, 
and the quality of democratic government turns as much on its performance as 
it does on that of the party in power. 
(9) Political parties should maintain regular internal communications. 
Parties at all levels should keep members informed of activities, decisions, and 
plans through newsletters or other house organs. This is another avenue of 
accountability and also one of participation, for it facilitates an exchange 
of ideas, positions, and analyses about the party and politics of the moment. 
Organizationally, a good house organ can build support for party positions and 
programs and also lance sores before they become cancers. It also makes for 
"news" about the party. 
(10) Election law should encourage strong political parties. Hore than 
other forms of political organization, parties have served egalitarian and 
majoritarian values and encouraged widespread citizen participation in American 
politics, They are our most democratic institutions and should be sustained 
and encouraged by public policy, This can be done in many ways, including 
requiring voter registration by party, adopting the party column ballot, and 
restoring partisan local elections, Public policy should also recognize the 
difference between parties and other political groups in the regulation of 
campaign finance, the making of endorsements, and access to both the ballot 
and the news media. By law, parties should have a privileged position in our 
political system. They should be given advantages over special interest groups 
and over individual candidates. 
In recent years, there have been widespread reports that our political 
parties are dying. These obituaries are premature. Indeed, party organization 
at the state and national levels may never have been healthier than it is today, 
as the number and professionalism of staff has grown along with the financial 
resources and activities of parties at these levels. Rather than on their 
deathbed, our parties have been in a long transitional period from an old 
politics of patronage and machine organization to a new politics of issues 
and high technology, Since the 1960s, both national parties have sought to 
renew themselves by adapting organizationally to the changed realities of 
American politics. The two parties, however, have not taken the same approach 
to renewal: the Democrats have concentrated on internal reform, while the 
Republicans have focused on candidate services. But a truly strong party 
should travel both these paths: it should be both internally democratic and 
electorally effective, We believe that the principles outlined above will 
produce the kind of party organization that can realize these goals and 
strengthen American democracy as a result. · 
STATE OF MINNESOTA 
STATE ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD 
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET, SUITE 102 
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 55101-2520 
PHONE: (612) 296-5148 
October 7, 1987 
TO: 
FROM: 
John D. Feerick, Chairman 
Commission on Government Integrity 
84th Floor 
Two World Trade Center 
New York, N. Y. 10047 
Mary Ann McCoy 
Executive Director 
SUBJECT: Forum on Campaign Financing 
I am pleased to accept your invitation to participate in the Commission 
forum on October 23 in Buffalo, New York. Your letter of September 30 
arrived in the Ethical Practices Board office today, and as you requested, 
I am sending you the following materials that you may wish to circulate to 
the Commissioners: 
Candidate and Principal Campaign Committee Handbook, with 
information about Minnesota's public financing program and 
spending limits at pages 5 - 8; 
Public Financing Agreement, form ET-10, the voluntary agreement that 
a candidate for state executive or legislative office must sign in 
order to receive money from the State Elections Campaign Fund; 
Leaflet: Information about Public Financing, prepared for distribution 
to state candidates in election year 1986; and 
Annual Report of the Ethical Practices Board for Fiscal Year 1987, 
with summary data on public financing for election year 1986 at 
pages 4, 5, and 12 - 16. 
You may duplicate any of the enclosed for distribution before or during the 
forum. Thank you for sending me information about the New York City public 
financing bill, to review before the forum. I am looking forward to my 
participation with Professor Ruth Jones in the public financing and expendi-
ture limits panel, tentatively scheduled at 10:00 - 11:15 a.m. on October 23 
at the Buffalo & Erie County Public Library. In the meantime, if you have 
questions about the enclosed, please call me at (612) 296-1720. 
y)U.~ a~.u..._'-fi;JC(3r 
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625 North Robert Street 
St. Paul, MN 55101-2520 {612) 296-1721 
NOTE: This HANDBOOK is intended to serve as an aid to state candidates 
and their treasurers. It should be used as a supplement to Minn. Stat. 
Ch. lOA and Minn. Rules, Chs. 4500-4525 -- not as a substitute. For 
specific information not included in this HANDBOOK, please refer to the 
law and rules, together with periodic newsletters from the Board office. 
"Candidate" - an individual who seeks nomination or election to the 
office of Governor, Lt. Governor, Attorney Gen.era!, Secretary of State, 
State Auditor, State Treasurer, State Senato~, State Representative, 
or an Elective Judgeship. 
"Principal campaign coHittee" - a single political committee desig-
nated by a candidate to receive all contributions and authorize all 
expenditures on behalf of the candidate. 
A CANDIDATE or TREASURER must register a PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE 
with the Ethical Practices Board within 14 days after receiving contri-
butions or making expenditures in excess of $100 to influence that 
candidate's nomination or election. Exception: A candidate who· spends 
in excess of $100 using only that c~ndidate's own money, need not 
register a committee but MUST file a Report of Receipts and Expendi~ 
tures with the Ethical Practices Board on or before the required filing 
date. All candidates who wish to receive public financing funds or to 
give their contributors the benefit of a tax credit must register with 
the Board. 
To register a PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE the treasurer or candidate 
files a Statement of Organization and Registration (ET-00001) with ~he 
Board. All forms required to be filed are available in the Board 
office upon request. Each STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND REGISTRATION 
must list the names of the candidate, chair and treasurer of the com-
mittee, together with addresses and telephone numbers of each, the name-' 
of the bank(s) in which the campaign funds will be kept, and for legis-
lative candidates, a list of all counties in the legislative district. 
Each candidate must list the office sought. Candidates, other than 
those seeking judicial offices, must list political party affiliation. 
The REGISTRATION FORM should be filed with the Ethical .Practices Boifd, 
625 North Robert Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2520. The form must be .• 
amended within 10 days of any change by notifying the Board in writirig. 
The written notice may be on a Statement of Organization form or by 
letter indicating the information to be changed, and must be signed 
and dated either by the treasurer or candidate. 
STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST ~~~~~~--------------
Once the CANDIDATE has filed an AFFIDAVIT OF CANDIDACY -- the candi-
date MUST file a STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST with the Ethical 
Practices Board*. This STATEMENT must be filed within 14 days after 
filing with the filing officer an affidavit of candidacy or petition 
to appear on the ballot. The STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST (ET-00003) 
will be provided to all candidates by the filing officer or may be 
obtained from the Board off ice. 
* Does not apply to elective judgeships. 
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• TREASURER 
The treasurer of a principal campaign committee 
authorizes all expenditures of the committee, 
authorizes in writing expenditures in excess of $20 
entities on behalf of the candidate, 
obtains receipts for expenditures in excess of $100 
a calendar year, 
preserves all receipted bills and accounts for four years, 
deposits all receipts promptly, 
issues a check to the contributor for the amount by which the contri-
bution exceeded the limit at the time of deposit of the contribution, 
credits a joint check to the individual signing the check unless 
otherwise specified, 
records the name, address,and employer, together with the date and 
amount, of each source of cash or inkind contributions in excess of 
$20, 
accepts no contributions in excess of $100 from an association, 
political committee, or political fund unless it is registered with 
the Ethical Practices Board OR it provides the recipient committee 
with a Report of Receipts and Expenditures containing all infor-
mation required by Minn. Stat. §lOA.20 for the reporting period "in 
which the contribution was made: 
• forwards an anonymous contribution in excess of $20, in its entirety, 
to the Ethical Practices Board, 
maintains signed agreements for each loan made or received, 
reports a forgiveness or repayment of a loan by another entity as a 
contribution to the principal campaign committee in the year in 
which the loan was ORIGINALLY made, 
records the name and address of each entity to whom aggregate ex-
penditures in excess of $100 in a calendar year have been made, to-
gether with the date, amount and purpose of each expenditure, 
records the name of each candidate, political committee or political 
fund to whom contributions of $100 in aggregate in each calendar 
year have been made, 
timely files the Report of Receipts and Expenditures as explained 
on page 4, 
• is personally liable for penalties associated with failure to file. 
However, the Board believes that the candidate"has the ultimate responsi-
bility to ensure that the treasurer and the committee adhere to applicable 
laws and rules. 
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Call the Board office, (512) 295-1711, for suggested recordkeeping 
bulletin. 
Candidates without committees and treasurers must report any expendi~ 
tures made in excess of $100 • 
. REPORTS OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES 
The treasurer of a PRINCIPAL-CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE is required to file an 
annual Report of Receipts and Expenditures on January 31, of each year. 
In addition to the annu~l report; every candidate w~ose name is oil a 
ballot du~ing an election year must file a report of receipts and ex-
penditures 10 days before the primary election and another report of 
receipts and expenditures 10 days before the general election. A Jciis 
in the primary ele'ction or inactivity on the part of the committee d'oe'S 
not eliminate the requirement to file a report. Reporting forms, t-;;:-
gether with instructions for filling out the report, will be mailed td 
the treasurer of record about four weeks before a filing date. The re-
port must be signed by the treasurer or candidate, who should make a 
copy for committee records b~fore submitting the report to the Board. 
Additional reporting requirements occur in the tw6 week period before a 
primary or general election. Contribution(s) f~cii anf oni io~fc~ total-
ing $200 or more ($2;000 or more in a'ny statewide election), recE!ived 
between the last day covered in the last report prior to an eleitio~ 
and and election must be reported to th'e Board in person or by telegram', 
mail gram, or by certified mail within 48 hours after receipt. This 
information must be included in the next required Report of Receipts 
and Expenditures, also. 
• TERMINATION 
The treasurer or candidat~ of a principal campaign committee may file a 
termination report for the committee at ariy time when the~e art ~o notes 
or loans outstanding and the cash balance i~ $100 or less. 
Limits are placed on the dollar amount of contributions which a princi-
pal campaign co~mittee may accept from entities other than the candidate. 
(There are no limits on the amount a candidate may contribute to that 
candidate's own campaign.) Please refer to ~he listing on page 5 to 
determine the limits that apply to your com~ittee during an election or 
nonelection year. The election year limits apply only to years during 
which your candidate files an affidavit of candidacy. 
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• 1986 CONTRIBuTION LIMITS* 
The following contribution limits are applicable for 1986: 
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 
From individual, From political 
Office sought or held political conimi ttee party; in 
or fund: aggregate 
Election Nonelection Election Nenelection 
Year Year Year Year 
Governor & Lt.Governor $60,000 $12,000 $300 ,000 $60,000 
Attorney General $10,000 $ 2,000 $ 50 ,000 $10,000 
Secretary of State $ 5,000 $ 1,000 $ 25,000 $ 5,000 
State Treasurer $ 5,000 $ 1,000 $ 25,000 $ 5,000 
State Auditor $ 5,000 $ 1,000 $ 25,000 $ 5,000 
State Senator $ 1,500 $ 300 $ 7,500 $ 1,500 
State Representative $ 750 $ 150 $ 3,750 $ 750 
Elective Judgeships No limit No limit No limit No limit 
Contribution limits apply to ALL candidates, except judicial candidates. 
EXPENDITURE LIMITS 
Expenditure limits apply to all candidates who sign either a Tax Credit 
Agreement, Public Financing Agreement or both*. Expenditure limits are 
established, using a formula provided in law based on the Consumer Price 
Index, and published by the Ethical Practices Board by June 1 of each 
election year • 
• The following campaign expenditure limits are applicable for 1986: 
Governor & Lt. Governor 
Attorney General 
Secretary of State 
State Treasurer 
State Auditor 
State Senator 
State Representative 
Elective Judgeships 
Election 
Year 
$1,418,213 
$ 236,369 
$ 118,185 
$ li8,185 
$ 118,185 
$ 35,456 
$ 17,728 
No limit 
Nonelection 
Year 
$283,643 
$ 47,274 
$ 23,637 
$ 23,637 
$ 23,637 
$ 7,092 
$ 3,546 
No limit 
If you have questions about expenditure limits, please.call the Board 
office (612) 2g6~1721. 
*Does not apply to elective judgeships. 
A candidate who exceeds the contribution or expenditure limit may be 
liable for a civil fine up to 4 times the amount by which the Limit was 
exceeded. 
. TAX CREDIT AGREEMENT 
This voluntary Agreement provides an income tax credit for a taxpayer ~ho 
contributes to a legislative or statewide candidate or officeholder who 
has a TAX CREDIT AGREEMENT in effect. This Agreement binds the candidate 
and officeholder to expenditure limits in both election and nonelection 
years. A Tax Credit Agreement once signed MAY NOT BE RESCINDED. A Tax 
Credit Agreement may be signed through December 31 to be in effect during 
that calendar year, and remains in effect until filings open for the 
next election for the off ice held or sought when the Agreement was 
signed, or until the principal campaign committee terminates, which-
ever occurs first. 
Tax credit receipts in books of 25 are available from the Board to 
candidates and officeholders upon receipt of a signed Tax Credit Agree-
ment. These receipts may be provided to a contributor. The receipts 
are not mandatory for a taxpayer to receive a tax credit. Only a candi-
date or officeholder who has an effective Agreement may issue a Tax 
Credit Receipt or a facsimile thereof. A taxpayer may claim a tax 
credit of one-half of the amount of the contribution to a candidate 
or officeholder with an effective Agreement ($50 maximum per individual). 
. PUBLIC FINANCING AGREEMENT 
A CANDIDATE may also ELECT to file a PUBLIC FINANCING AGREEMENT with 
the Board. This voluntary Agreement enables qualifying candidates to 
receive public financing from the State Elections Campaign Fund desig-
nated by taxpayers through an income tax or property tax refund checkoff, 
The money comes from the general fund of the state through a maximum 
checkoff of $2 per taxpayer to either the general account or the party 
account of the State Elections Campaign Fund. The Agreement may be 
signed when the candidate files an affidvait of candidacy through Septem 
ber l of an election year. If not rescinded by September 1, the Agree-
ment binds the signer to the EXPENDITURE LIMITS until filings for the 
candidate's office open for the next election, or until the candidate's 
principal campaign committee terminates, whichever occurs first. 
CANDIDATES qualify for PARTY ACCOUNT funds by --
winning the primary election of a major political party; or 
petitioning of a minor political party to the general election 
ballot. 
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The amount of this payment will vary among legislative candidates of a 
political party depending on the number of tax checkoffs for that party 
made by tax filers in that legislative district • 
•• LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES qualify for GENERAL ACCOUNT funds by receiving 
10% of the votes cast for the office sought. 
STATEWIDE CANDIDATES qualify for GENERAL ACCOUNT funds by receiving 
5% of the votes cast for the office sought. 
The amount of this payment will 'be the same for each candidate for a 
particular office. A preliminary estimate of the amount which may be 
paid out to each office is provided to the filing officer. The Board 
sends to each candidate by August 15 of each election year an updated 
estimate of the amount a candidate may expect ~o receive • 
.• Candidates may be required to return a portion or all of the public 
financing received under the following conditions: 
1. The candidate receives more in public financing than the expenditure 
limit for the office sought by the candidate -- the difference must 
be returned. 
2. The candidate receives more in public financing than the actual cam-
paign expenditures of that candidate's principal campaign committee--· 
the difference aust be returned. 
3. The candidate receives actual aggregate contributions in excess of·the· 
"aggregate contribution limit" (which is different for each candidate). 
The following formula defines the method of calculating the "aggre-
gate contribution limit": 
ADD: Campaign expenditure 
limit (for office sought) 
+ Actual noncampaign dis-
bursements 
+ Actual ballot question 
expenditures 
= Aggregate contribution limit 
ADD: Beginning cash balance 
1-1-86 
+ All contributions received 
during 1986 
+ Public financing received 
= Actual aggregate contributions 
Calculate: Actual aggregate contributions 
- Aggregate contributions limit 
Public financing to be returned 
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Example: 
Expenditure limit 
Noncampaign disburse-
ments 
Ballot question expendi-
tures 
Aggregate contribution 
limit 
$25,000 Beginning Cash Balance 
Contributions received 
1,500 Public Financing 
received 
0 
Actual aggregate 
$26,500 contributions 
Actual Aggregate Contributions •••••••••••••• 
Aggregate Contribution limit ········~······· 
Return of Public Financing •••••••••••••••••• 
$28,.000 
26,500 
$ 1,500 
$ 2,000 
20,000 
6,000 
$28,000 
The return of Public Financing money in the form of a check or money 
order, payable to the State of Minnesota, shall be submitted to the 
Ethical Practices Board with the principal campaign committee's election 
year-end Report of Receipts and Expenditures. Returned Pt,!blic Fin_ancing 
is deposited by the Board in the General Fund of the State of Minne-
sota. 
A committee returning Public Financing is not in violation of M.S. Ch. 
lOA, the Ethics In Government Act, nor is a committee required to return 
more Public Financing than the committee received. 
For additional information about Public Financing, please call 
Ethical Practices Board at (612) 296-1721. 
COMPLAINTS 
--------------------------------------------------An individual may file a complaint with the Ethical Practices Board 
concerning suspected violations of Minn. Stat. Ch. lOA. 
ADVISORY OPINIONS 
Individuals or associations may request an advisory opinion from the 
Board on the requirements of Minn. Stat. Ch. lOA to guide their 
conduct. 
PUBLIC INFORMATION 
Agreements, statements, and reports are available for public viewing and 
photocopying at cost within 4B hours after receipt by the Board. 
All legislative candidate statements or reports are photocopied and 
filed by the Board in the county auditor's office in each county of the 
candidate's legislative district within 72 hours of receipt in the Boar~ 
office. 
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STATE OF MINNESOTA 
STATE ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD 
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET 
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 55101-2520 
PHONE: <612> 296-5148 
PUBLIC FINANCING AGREEMENT 
(All the information on this form is public information.) 
name of candidate office sought (district #) 
address city state zip 
1. As a general election candidate in 1986, I request my appropriate share of the State 
Elections Campaign Fund. 
2. As conditions of my receipt of money from the State Elections Campaign Fund, I agree 
that my principal campaign committee will abide by the following limitations, in ac-
cordance with Minn. Stat. §lOA.32, Subd. 3: 
A. Campaign expenditures and approved expenditures for the period January 1, 1986, 
through December 31, 1986, will not exceed the expenditure limit for the office 
for which I am a candidate, as set forth in Minn. Stat. §lOA.25, subd. 2. In a 
nonelection year, campaign expenditures and approved expenditures will not 
exceed the expenditure limit set forth in Minn. Stat. §lOA.25, Subd. 6, which is 
20 percent of the election-year expenditure limit. 
B. Aggregate contributions accepted on my behalf, and approved expenditures made on 
my behalf, for the period January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, including 
all money in the committee's account on January 1, 1986, will not exceed the 
difference between the amount which may legally be expended on my behalf and the 
amount I receive from the State Elections Campaign Fund. However, contributions 
equal to the amount of any election-year noncampaign disbursements, and of any 
contributions or expenditures to promote or defeat a state ballot question, 
shall not count toward these aggregate contribution and expenditure limits. 
C. If my campaign expenditures are less than the amount received from the State 
Elections Campaign Fund, I will return the difference between the amount of 
public financing received and the total amount of my campaign expenditures to 
the Ethical Practices Board by February 2, 1987, together with the Report of 
Receipts and Expenditures due on that date. 
D. By February 2, 1987, I will return to the Ethical Practices Board any amount by 
which the aggregate contributions accepted on my behalf, or the approved ex-
penditures made on my behalf, exceed the aggregate contribution and approved 
expenditure limit set forth in Minn. Stat. §lOA.32, Subd. 3, up to the amount 
received in public financing. 
3. This agreement remains effective until the dissolution of my principal campaign com-
mittee or the opening of filing for the next succeeding election to the office I hold 
or seek, whichever occurs first . 
.__s_i_·g __ n_a_t_u_r_e----------------------------------------------------''I ~--d-a---te __________________________ _, 
File this agreement with the ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD on or before September 2, 1986. 
ET 00010-06 
STATE OF MINNESOTA 
ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD 
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET 
ST. PAUL, MN 55101-2520 
Phone: (612) 296-1721 
INFORMATION ABOUT PUBLIC FINANCING 
M.S.§§lOA.31 - M.S. lOA.32 
PUBLIC FINANCING AGREEMENT 
A CANDIDATE for executive (statewide) or legislative office may ELECT to file a PUBLIC 
FINANCING AGREEMENT with the Ethical Practices Board. This voluntary Agreement enables 
a qualifying candidate who has a principal campaign committee ~egistered with the Board 
to receive public financing from the State Elections Campaign Fund designated by tax-
payers through an income tax or property tax refund checkoff. The money comes from the 
general fund of the state through a maximum checkoff of $2 per taxpayer to either the 
general account or the party account of the State Elections Campaign Fund. The Agree-
ment may be signed when the candidate files an affidavit of candidacy (July 1 through 
15, 1986) through September 2, 1986. If not rescinded by September 2, the Agreement 
binds the signer to CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE LIMITS until filings open for the next election 
for the office sought or held, or until the candidate's principal campaign committee 
terminates, whichever occurs first. 
CANDIDATES qualify for PARTY ACCOUNT funds by --
winning the primary election of a major political party; or 
.. petitioning of a minor political party to the general election ballot. 
The amount of this payment will vary among legislative candidates of a political 
party depending on the number of tax checkoffs for that party made by tax filers in 
that legislative district. 
Legislative Candidates qualify for GENERAL ACCOUNT funds by receiving 10% of the 
votes cast in the 1986 general election for the office sought. 
Statewide Candidates qualify for GENERAL ACCOUNT funds by receiving 5% of the 
votes cast in the 1986 general election for the office sought. 
The amount of this payment will be the same for each candidate for a particular 
office. A preliminary estimate of the amount which may be paid out to each office 
is provided to the filing officer. The Board sends to each candidate by August 15, 
1986, an updated estimate of the amount a candidate may expect to receive. 
A candidate may be required to return a portion or all of the public financing re-
ceived under the following conditions: 
1. The candidate receives more in public financing than the expenditure limit 
for the office sought by the candidate -- the difference must be returned. 
2. The candidate receives more in public financing than the actual campaign ex-
penditures of that candidate's principal campaign committee -- the difference 
must be returned. 
3. The candidate receives actual aggregate contributions in excess of the ''aggre-
gate contribution limit" (which is different for each candidate), the difference 
must be returned. 
The following formula defines the method of calculating the ''aggregate contri-
bution limit" and the amount of public financing to be returned. 
(continued ---;) ) 
ADD: Campaign expenditure limit 
(for office sought) 
+ Actual noncampaign disbursements 
+ Actual ballot question expenditures 
Aggregate contribution limit 
Calculate: Actual aggregate contributions 
-Aggregate contribution limit 
=Public financing to be returned 
EXAMPLE: 
Expenditure limit 
Noncampaign disbursements 
Ballot question expenditures 
Aggregate contribution limit 
$25,000 
1,500 
0 
$26,500 
ADD: Beginning cash balance 1-1-86 
+ All contributions received 
dur.i ng 1986 
+ Public financing received 
Actual aggregate contributions 
Beginning cash balance $ 2,000 
Contributions received 20,000 
Public Financing received 6,000 
Actual aggregate contributions $28,000 
Actual Aggregate Contributions ............................... $28,000 
Aggregate Contribution Limit ................................. 26,500 
Return of Public Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 1, 500 
The return of Public Financing money in the form of a check or money order, payable to 
the State of Minnesota, shall be submitted to the Ethical Practices Board with the 
principal campaign committee's election year-end Report of Receipts and Expenditures, 
due February 2, 1987. Returned Public Financing is deposited by the Board in the 
General Fund of the State of Minnesota. 
A committee returning Public Financing is not in violation of M.S. Ch. lOA, the Ethics 
In Government Act, nor is a committee required to return more Public Financing than 
the committee received. 
For additional information about Public Financing, please call the Ethical Practices 
Board at (612) 296-1721. 
* * * * * * * * * 
TAX CREDIT AGREEMENT 
A CANDIDATE for executive (statewide) er legislative office may ELECT to file a TAX 
CREDIT AGREEMENT with the Board. This voluntary Agreement provides an income tax 
credit for a taxpayer who contriubtes to a legislative or statewide candidate or office-
holder who has a TAX CREDIT AGREEMENT in effect. This Agreement binds the candidate 
or officeholder to campaign expenditure limits in both election and nonelection years. 
A Tax Credit Agreement once signed MAY NOT BE RESCINDED. A Tax Credit Agreement may 
bs signed through December 31, to be in effect during that calendar year, and remains 
in effect until filings open for the next election for the office held or sought when 
the Agreement was signed, or until the principal campaign committee terminates, which-
ever occurs first. 
Tax credit receipts in books of 25 are available from the Board to a candidate of 
officeholder whose principal campaign is registered with the Board, upon receipt of a 
signed Tax Credit Agreement. Tax credit receipts may be provided to a contributor. 
The receipts are not mandatory for a taxpayer to receive a tax credit. Only a candi-
date or officeholder who has an effective Agreement may issue a Tax Credit Receipt or 
a facsimile thereof. A taxpayer may claim a tax credit of one-half of the amount of 
the contributions or a candidate or officeholder with an effective Agreement ($50 maxi-
mum per individual taxpayer). 
July, 1986 
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A U G U S T, l 9 8 7 
MINNESOTA STATE ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD 
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET • ST. PAUL, MN 55101-2520 . (612) 296-5148 
SMITH, Mary 
Homemaker 3 Party affiliation( ) 
SAMPSON, Ellen 
Attorney 
Party affiliation: 
SCHOTZKO, Judith 
Attorney 
Party affiliation: 
ECKSTEIN, A. J. (Tony) 
Veterinarian 2 ) Party affiliation( 
EWALD, Douglas R. 
Consultant 1 Party affiliation( ) 
McGOWAN, Martin J. 
1986 - 1987 
ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD 
Chair** 
Independent-Republican 
Vice Chair* 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
Secretary* 
Independent-Republican 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
Retired Newspaper Publisher 
Party affiliation(3): Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
* Elected May, 1987 
** Elected September, 1986, to fill unexpired term, to July, 1987 
OGDAHL, Harmon T. 
Retired Banker l) 
Party affiliation( Independent- Republican 
Key 
Board Term: 
1/84 - 1/88 
Board Term: 
1/85 - 1/89 
Board Term: 
9/80 - 1/83 
1/83 - 1/87 
1/87 - 1/91 
Board Term: 
1/86 - 1/90 
Board Term: 
11/86 - 1/88 
Board Term: 
9/84 - 1/87 
1/87 - 1/91 
Board Term: 
2/84 - 9/86 
Position criteria, under Minn. Stat. §lOA.02, subd. 1: (1) former legislator, party 
other than that of the governor; (2) former legislator, same party as the governor; 
(3) not a public official, party officer, or elected to party-designated office 
for three years prior to appointment. 
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STATE OF MINNESOTA 
STATE ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD 
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET 
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 55101·2520 
PHONE: C612l 296·5148 
August 11, 1987 
TO: 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: 
Honorable Rudy Perpich, Governor; Honorable Jerome M. Hughes, 
President of the Senate, Honorable Robert E. Vanasek, Speaker 
of the House; and the People of Minnesota 
Ethical Practices Board, Ellen Sampson, Chair 
Annual Report, in accordance with Minn. Stat. §lOA.02, Subd. 8, 
July 1, 1986 - June 30, 1987 
During the 1986-1987 Fiscal Year, the Ethical Practices Board reviewed its 
administrative rules and procedures in order to provide consistent guidance 
to the thousands of individuals and associations whose disclosure of certain 
economic interests, political and lobbying activities is regulated by the 
Ethics in Government Act, Minnesota Statutes Chapter lOA. 
Included in this Annual Report is information about the campaign finance 
disclosure and public financing associated with the 1986 elections, which 
marked the second time since enactment of Chapter lOA in 1974 that all 
executive and legislative offices were elected at the same election. 
Throughout our activities, we affirm the need for timely enforcement, dis-
closure, and public information, ever mindful of the depth and breadth of 
volunteer and professional resources expended annually to comply with this 
important public disclosure law. We continue to note that as the interest 
in political and lobbying activities rises, there is a concurrent need for 
public trust in government, in candidates, in public financing of campaigns, 
and in public disclosure laws. 
We renew our commitment to a reasonable and balanced approach to the policies 
enacted by constitutional amendment, statute, and through administrative 
rules, as expressed in the Mission Statement of the Board: 
To promote public confidence in state government decision-
making through development and administration of disclosure, 
public financing, and enforcement programs which will ensure 
public access to information filed with the Board. 
I 
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ANNUAL REPORT - FISCAL YEAR 1987 
(July 1, 1986 - June 30, 1987) 
SUMMARY OF BOARD ACTIVITIES 
The Ethical Practices Board held six regular meetings and four subcommittee meetings, 
issued one Advisory Opinion, and investigated five complaints. The Board brought 
seven court actions and concluded six court actions to secure required disclosure, 
payment of late fees (six involving campaign finance program and one involving eco-
nomic interest disclosure). Additionally, the court ruled in favor of the Board in 
two cases brought against the Board (campaign finance program) . The Board adopted 
amendments to rules governing campaign finance, economic interest disclosure, lobby-
ist registration and reporting, conflicts of interest, representation disclosure, and 
hearings. The Board amended its administrative procedures in April, 1987, to hold 
its annual election of officers, for one-year terms, at the first meeting of each 
fiscal year. Accordingly, in July, 1987, the Board elected Ellen G. Sampson, chair; 
Judith G. Schotzko, vice chair; and A. J. (Tony) Eckstein, secretary. Officers for 
Fiscal Year 1987 are listed on page two of this report. 
Twelve publications were issued by the Board: Campaign Finance Summary 1986: Princi-
pal Campaign Committees of Candidates for State Office; Campaign Finance Summary 
1986: Principal Campaign Committees of Nonofficeholders; Campaign Finance Summary 
1986: Political Committees and Political Funds; Lobbying Disbursement Summary 1986; 
Committee and Fund List (July, 1986; December, 1986); Lobbyist Handbook (December, 
1986; April, 1987); Advisory Opinions Nos. 90-95 (compilation); Index to Advisory 
Opinions Nos. 1-95; Minn. Stat. Ch. lOA with 1987 law changes; and Minn. Rules Chs. 
4500-4525 (1987). 
The initial phase of the Strive Toward Excellence in Performance (STEP) Board staff 
project, in progress from December, 1985, was completed by December 31, 1986, as 
planned. The project received honorable mention at the Second Annual Governor's 
Award for Excellence in State Government Management in September, 1986. Using 
programs developed by the STEP volunteer partners, Board staff stores campaign fi-
nance and lobbyist report data to verify periodic reports, prepare summary reports, 
including the quarterly listing of all registered lobbyists, associations repre-
sented, and lobbying subjects, under Minn. Stat. §lOA.05. 
In the 1987 session, the Legislature repealed certain portions of the Ethics in 
Government Act provisions regarding confidentiality of invesigations or complaints 
that were declared unconstitutional by a state district court in 1982. 
II CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND PUBLIC FINANCING PROGRAMS 
A. LEGISLATIVE ACTION - 1987 
Disclosure thresholds - Contributions to a political fund must be itemized at more 
than $100 (was $50) ; contributions to legislative candidates and to candidates 
and committees or funds under the Hennepin County Disclosure Law must be itemized 
at more than $100 (was $50); and contributions to a legislative candidate from a 
single source received just before an election totaling more than $400 must be 
disclosed to the Board within 48 hours of receipt (was $200 and more). 
State Elections Campaign Fund - checkoff amount $5 ($10, married c~uple filing 
jointly); raised from $2 and $4, respectively; effective with tax year 1987. 
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Tax credit for contributions to state candidates signing Tax Credit Agreement with 
the Board - repealed, beginning with tax year 1987. 
Expenditure limit calculations - reflecting a change in the publication date of the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) referenced in Minn. Stat. §lOA.255, beginning in 1987, 
calculations will be based on the CPI in December of the year preceding the 
election year for the office sought; repealed obsolete reference to population 
factors inoperative since adoption of the Campaign Finance Amendment to the Minne-
sota Constitution by voters in 1980. 
Return of public financing - amends provision for possible need to return public fi-
nancing due to total contributions received. {See Legislative Recommendations - 1988, page 11) 
Greater Minnesota Corporation, board of directors - eleven members; president and 
each director must file a statement with the Ethical Practices Board disclosing 
the nature, amount, date, and recipient of contribution to any public official, 
political committee, political fund, or political party, as defined in Minn. Stat. 
Ch. lOA, that was made within four years preceding appointment of the directors 
or election of the president, provided the contribution was subject to the report-
ing requirements of Chapter lOA. This statement must be updated annually. 
B. PUBLIC FINANCING - 1986 ELECTION 
In 1986, 377 candidates (79%) who filed for office signed and complied with public 
financing agreements with the Board to abide by campaign expenditure limits in order 
to receive payments from the State Elections Campaign Fund. 
Based upon increases in the consumer price index from April, 1982, to April, 1986, 
the Board determined 1986 Election Year Expenditure Limits of $1,418,213 for governor/ 
lieutenant governor; $236,369 for attorney general; $118,185 for secretary of state; 
$118,185 for state auditor; $118,185 for state treasurer; $35,456 for state 
senator; and $17,728 for state representative. The 1986 limits are 11.6% above 1982 
election year expenditure limits. 
Under provisions of the public financing law, 46 candidates returned a total of 
$64,946 in public financing from the 1986 election, and $194 was collected from one 
candidate from the 1982 election through the Revenue Recapture Act. All public fi-
nancing returned to the Board has been deposited in the state general fund. A summary 
of the State Elections Campaign Fund for the 1986 legislative election appears on 
pages 12 to 16 of this report. 
C. COMPLIANCE WITH LIMITS 
All candidates for state executive and legislative offices must abide by statutory 
contribution limits when accepting contributions. From reports filed by candidate 
committees for 1986, staff referred to the Board one potential violation of this 
law. Upon investigation, the case was determined to be inadvertent and was concluded 
by conciliation agreement to pay a civil fine imposed by the Board. The civil fine 
paid to the Board was deposited in the state general fund. 
1986 - Facially-excessive -
One candidate committee paid a civil penalty of $352.80. 
Candidates for state executive and legislative offices who choose to sign an agree-
ment with the Board in order to receive public financing for their campaigns must 
abide by statutory campaign expenditure limits. From reports filed by candidate 
committees for 1986, staff referred to the Board one potential violation. Upon 
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investigation, the case was determined to be inadvertent and was concluded by con-
ciliation agreement to pay a civil fine imposed by the Board. The civil fine paid 
to the Board was deposited in the state general fund . 
. 1986 - One candidate committee paid a civil penalty of $145.93 for exceed-
ing the 1986 election year expenditure limit of $17,728 for a 
House candidate. 
D. COMPLIANCE WITH FILING DEADLINES 
During fiscal year 1987 there were 1,386 political committees, political funds, 
ballot question committees and funds, and principal campaign committees registered 
and reporting to the Board. 
Board efforts to improve on-time filings during the early 80's continued into fiscal 
year 1987. During 1986-1987, $9,466 was collected in late filings from 71 de-
linquent committees and funds, including $4,375 from 25 candidate committees for 
failure to send notice of large contributions. For late filings other than pre-
election candidate committee notices or reports, written requests to waive late fees 
submitted by 78 delinquent committees and funds were granted. 
E. DESK REVIEW - CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORTS 
For fiscal year 1987, approximately 3,615 reports of receipts and expenditures were 
filed by political party committees, political committees, political funds, and 
ballot questions committees and funds. Also during fiscal year 1987, approximately 
1,580 reports were filed by candidate campaign committees. Each report was re-
viewed by Board staff for compliance with the disclosure law requirements including 
correct reporting of assets and liabilities, accurate accounting for expenditures 
and receipts, proper use of required disclosure schedules, and adherence to appli-
cable contribution and expenditure limits. 
Less than ten percent of the reports required amendments based on the initial desk 
review of the report. Corrections and amendments to filed reports assist treasurers 
in performing duties required by law and promote increased user confidence in the 
accuracy of filed documents. Under the Board's 1983 amendment policy, certified 
letters to treasurers have greatly improved the timeliness of required amendments. 
The improved quality of reporting observed by the Board during fiscal year 1987, 
and recent years, demonstrates treasurers' increased awareness of the require-
ments of the law as well as the effect of Board outreach to political party staff, 
campaign workers, and the public, including election-year information meetings 
conducted by Board staff since 1978. In 1986, during July and August, 20 campaign 
finance meetings were held at 17 locations around the state. A total of 146 
treasurers, candidates, campaign workers and county auditors attended either an 
afternoon or evening session of two hours. Sessions included line-by-line expla-
nation of reporting forms, review of record keeping and reporting requirements, and 
a question-answer forum. 
F. FIELD EXAMINATION OF RECORDS 
In January, 1987, the Board reviewed results of the program conducted after the 
1980, 1982, and 1984 elections and noted that although no major problems with 
committee or fund records were disclosed, the program assisted treasurers and the 
Board in identifying reporting and recordkeeping deficiencies which have 
strengthened the Board's information materials in subsequent elections. The Board 
decided to suspend the program for the 1986 election and allocate staff time toward 
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development of the campaign finance data entry and retrieval program so that the 
system would be in maintenance mode before the beginning of the 1988 election cycle. 
The Board plans to review the examination of records program for the 1988 election. 
III LOBBYIST PROGRAM 
The lobbying disclosure program focuses attention on disbursements by individuals 
and associations in efforts to influence legislative or administrative action. 
During 1986-1987, approximately 1,275 registered individuals filed 1,925 reports 
quarterly, as compared with 1,800 reports in 1985-1986, and 1,700 reports in 
1984-1985 fiscal years. Since each lobbyist files four times a year, there were 
approximately 7,675 filings in 1986-1987. 
A. DESK REVIEW - LOBBYIST DISBURSEMENTS REPORTS 
During 1986-1987, desk review of lobbyist quarterly reports included disclosure of 
the source of additional funds over $500 for lobbying purposes, receipt of more than 
$500 in a calendar year including salary, expenses, or fees for lobbying purposes, 
and public officials who received a gift, loan, honorarium, item or benefit equal 
in value to $50 or more from lobbyists. The Board included notice of this infor-
mation in the annual summary of lobbying disbursements published in March, 1987. 
B. COMPLIANCE WITH FILING DEADLINES 
The quarterly reporting by lobbyists improved in FY87, compared with the period 
1984-1986, possibly reflecting Board outreach to lobbyists, the associations they 
represent, and the public. Each quarter of FY87, the Board sent information about 
lobbying disbursement disclosure to associations represented by registered lobby-
ists prior to the quarterly reporting dates. 
During 1986-1987, $335 was collected in late filing fees from 11 delinquent 
lobbyists. Late filing fees were waived for seven lobbyists who requested the 
waiver in writing, stating a sufficient reason for the late filing. 
IV ECONOMIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE PROGRAM 
The economic interest disclosure program provides the public with information to aid 
in evaluation of candidates and to reassure the public that public officials are 
not personally profiting from their roles as decision makers. During FY 1987, 
approximately 1,950 public officials and candidates for state executive and legis-
lative office filed an original or supplementary Statement of Economic Interest with 
the Board. Public officials are required to file a "termination statement of 
economic interest" from the period of their previous statement through the last day 
of their service as a public official. In 1984, the Board approved and began dis-
tributing a simplified termination statement to assist former public officials. 
A. LEGISLATIVE ACTION - 1986 
Newly-created multi-member agencies whose members, chief and deputy administrative 
officers must file Statements of Economic Interest with the Ethical Practices Board: 
Board of Marriage and Family Therapy (7) 
Board of' Social Work (10) 
Board of Unlicensed Mental Health Service Providers (17) 
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Board of Water and Soil Resources (12) 
Minnesota Amateur Sports Commission (9) 
Minnesota Public Facilities Authority (7) 
Rural Development Board (15) 
Change in name of the following agencies whose public officials file Statements of 
Economic Interest with the Board: 
Department of Trade and Economic Development (formerly: Department of 
Energy and Economic Development) 
Rural Finance Authority (formerly: Rural Finance Administration) 
Change in number of public officials who file Statements of Economic Interest with 
the Board: 
Attorney General's Office - assistant attorneys general - 35 (formerly: 16) 
Minnesota Zoological Board - increased to 30 members (formerly: 15); members not 
required to file Statements of Economic Interest with the Board, effective: 
May 27, 1987. 
Abolished 
Energy and Economic Development Authority 
Full Productivity Coordinator 
Minnesota Humane Society 
State Soil and Water Conservation Board 
Water Resources Board 
B. COMPLIANCE WITH FILING DEADLINES 
Timeliness of Economic Interest Statement filing by public officials improved in 
FY87, compared with previous fiscal years. During 1986-1987, three public officials 
paid $55 in late filing fees. Late fees were waived for four public officials who 
requested the waiver in writing, stating a sufficient reason for the late filing. 
v CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND REPRESENTATION DISCLOSURE 
Potential Conflict of Interest Statements were filed with the Board by four public 
officials. No Potential Conflict of Interest Statements were filed by employees 
of the Public Service Department under provisions of that department's law. 
No Statements of Representation Disclosure were filed. 
VI HENNEPIN COUNTY DISCLOSURE LAW 
Enacted as Laws of 1980, Chapter 362, this special law was codified in Minnesota 
Statutes 1986 as Sections 383B.041 - 3838.058. Under these statutes, elected 
officials and candidates for elective office in Hennepin County and the cities of 
Minneapolis and Bloomington are required to disclose their personal economic inter-
ests and campaign contributions and expenditures. Required statements, registration 
of political committees, and reports are filed with their filing officer: the 
Hennepin County Auditor. 
By terms of this law the Ethical Practices Board supplies to the Hennepin-County 
Auditor all registration and reporting forms and statements of economic interest 
required by the law. 
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The Board has directed its staff to assist the Hennepin County Auditor in reviewing 
administrative procedures required by the law. Since 1986 was an election year for 
certain Hennepin County offices, and 1987 is an election year for certain Minneapolis 
and Bloomington city officials, the Board noted a corresponding increase in activi-
ties related to this law. 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION - 1987 
Disclosure threshold - contributions to a candidate, political fund, or political 
committee must be itemized at more than $100 (was $50). 
Minneapolis School Board - changes in the number of board members (to 9, from 7) and 
in the manner of election (6 by district, 3 at-large) are part of a special law 
to be submitted to the voters in 1987 for approval. If approved by the voters 
and the required certificate of approval filed with the secretary of state by 
school board, candidates for school board would be subject to certain disclosure 
provisions of the Hennepin County Disclosure Law, Minn. Stat. §§383B.041-
383B.058. 
VII PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION {PERA) TRUSTEE CANDIDATES 
Minn. Stat. §353.03, subd. 1, as amended in 1985, provided for the election of three 
PERA Trustees for staggered four-year terms. Candida~es for election as PERA 
Trustee are required to file certain campaign finance disclosure with the Ethical 
Practices Board, beginning with the January, 1986, election. 
A Trustee candidate who (1) receives contributions OR makes expenditures in excess 
of $100; or (2) has given implicit or explicit consent for any other person to 
receive contributions or make expenditures in excess of $100 for the purpose of 
bringing about that candidate's election as a PERA Trustee must file a report with 
the Board within thirty days after the results of the election are announced. The 
report must disclose the source and amount of all contributions received. 
Under this statute, the Board prescribes the reporting form and instructions for 
completing the form. Forms were distributed to 21 candidates and filed with the 
Board by five candidates who filed in November, 1986, for the election of two 
trustees in January, 1987. The next election under this law will be for one trustee 
in January, 1990. 
VIII ADVISORY OPINIONS 
The Board is authorized to issue advisory opinions on the requirements of the Ethics 
in Government Act (Minn. Stat. Chapter lOA) and the Hennepin County Disclosure Law 
(Laws 1980, Chapter 362). Individuals or associations may ask for advisory opinions 
about these laws to guide their own conduct. Full texts of and an index to opinions 
issued are published in booklet form, most recently in June, 1987, advisory opinions 
Nos. 90-95, June, 1984 - April, 1987, and updated index to Nos. 1 - 95. Advisory 
opinions of the Board are annotated in Minnesota Statutes Annotated. A summary of 
the opinion issued in FY87 is included in this annual report, for reference. 
Lobbyist Program 
Re: Lobbyist Disbursement Report 
#95. Because reference to "rate setting, power plant and powerline siting" in Minn. 
Stat. §lOA.01, subd. 2, is not modified by "Ch. 116J", a lobbyist's attempts to 
influence rate setting by an executive branch agency must be reported under Minn. 
Stat. §lOA.04. 
(Issued to David L. Sasseville on April 10, 1987.) 
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IX FISCAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 1987 BUDGET - EXPENDITURES 
PERIOD: JULY 1. 1986 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1987 
SALARY/FRINGE 
Regular/Unclassified 
Part-time Seasonal 
Per Diem 
Sub-Total 
SUPPLIES/EXPENSES 
Rent and Leases 
Repair/Maintenance 
Printing/Binding 
Prof ./Tech. Services 
Communications - Postage 
Communications - Telephone 
In-State Travel 
Out-State Travel 
Memberships & Training 
Supplies 
Equipment 
Misc. Expense 
Sub-Total 
TOTAL 
BUDGET 
. . . . . . .. 
. . . . . . . 
$166,748 
11,173 
1,225 
--------
$179,146 
$11,923 
2,384 
3,030 
1,995 
9,951 
1,251 
3,284 
2,090 
445 
4,680 
752 
164 
$41,949 
EXPEND 
. . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
$166,748 
11,173 
1,225 
--------
$179,146 
$11,923 
2,383 
3,018 
1,995 
9,951 
1,248 
3,284 
2,090 
445 
4,677 
752 
164 
$41,930 
$221,095 $221,076 
BALANCE 
. . . . . . .. 
. . . . . . . 
$0 
0 
0 
--------
$0 
$0 
1 
12 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
$19 
% BUDGET 
EXPENDED 
........ 
. ...... 
100% 
100% 
100% 
--------
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
-------- -------- -------- --------
-------- -------- -------- --------
(Al · 
Returned to State General Fund 
STAFF SALARIES 
JULY 1, 1986 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1987 
POSITION 
Executive Director 
Fiscal Manager 
Programs Assistant 
Lobbyist Technician 
Administrative Secretary 
Clerk-Typist (50% time) 
TOTAL F.Y. 1987 SALARIES 
STAFF 
Mary Ann McCoy 
Jeanne Olson 
Jim Maloney 
JoAnn Hill 
Cecilia Gerlach 
Michelle Mechtel Arcand 
SALARY 
$ 45,787 
28,613 
20, 138 
22,884 
24,384 
9,579 
$151,395 
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x LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS - 1988 
Annually, the Ethical Practices Board reviews the Ethics in Government Act as 
part of the authority assigned to the Board by the Legislature under Minn. Stat. 
§lOA.02, subd. 8 (a). Accordingly, the Board respectfully submits the follow-
ing recommendations to the Legislature for consideration. Legislative action 
on these matters will further enable the Board to perform its legislative mandate 
and to serve the people of Minnesota. 
1. Prevent the use of campaign funds for personal use and provide for dis-
position of unexpended campaign funds. 
Chapter lOA does not put any restrictions on what campaign funds may be 
used for. This allows money seemingly collected for campaign purposes 
to be used for personal gain. The Board believes this is not in the 
best public interest. A statutory standard for disposition of unused 
or unexpended campaign funds should be enacted. 
2. Prohibit any fundraising during regular and special legislative session, 
except caucus fundraisers. 
The Board's study i~ 1981 of fundraising during the legislative sessions 
in 1978 and 1981 and surveys conducted in 1983 support this recommen-
dation. 
Technical Reconmendation - Minn. Stat. §lOA.32, subd. 3, as amended in Laws of 
1987, Chapter 214, section 8, is ambiguous and 
internally conflicting. In preparation for the 1988 and subsequent elections, 
the Legislature should clarify how the limit on the return of public financing 
is intended to be interpreted or administered. 
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XI MINNESOTA ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD 
STATE ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN FUND 
1986 LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTIONS 
I CANDIDATES 1986 ELECTIONS: 
A. House of Representatives -
Democratic Republican All Other 
Total Party Party Parties 
Candidates Filing For Office 281 - 100% 142 - 50% 138 - 49% l - 1% 
Candidates Not Accepting Public 
Financing 59 - 100% 11 - 19% 48 - 81% 
Candidates Who Accepted And Qualified 
For Public Financing 210 - 100% 123 - 59% 86 - 40% l - 1% 
B. Senate -
Candidates Filing For Office 145 - 100% 79 - 54% 66 - 46% 
Candidates No Accepting Public 
Financing 28 - 100% 7 - 25% 21 - 75% 
Candidates Who Accepted And Qualified 
For Public Financing 102 - 100% 61 - 60% 41 - 40% 
c. Constitutional Off ices -
Candidates Filing For Office 52 - 100% 22 - 42% 22 - 42% 8 - 16% 
Candidates Not Accepting Public 
Financing 14 - 100% 6 - 43% 2 - 14% 6 - 43% 
Candidates Who Accepted And Qualified 
For Public Financing 13 - 100% 6 - 46% 6 - 46% l - 8% 
D. House of ReEresentativesL 
?enateLCo~stitutional Off ices 
Candidates Filing For Office 478 - 100% 243 - 51% 226 - 47% 9 - 2% 
Candidates Not Accepting Public 
Financing 101 - 100% 24 - 24% 71 - 70% 6 - 6% 
Candidates Who Accepted And Qualified 
For Public Financing 325 - 100% 191 - 59% 133 - 40% 2 - l% 
(continued) 
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II PUBLIC FINANCING FUNDS: 1986 ELECTIONS 
A. Funds Available For Distribution By Account 
General Account 
Democratic Party Account 
Republican Party Account 
All Minor Parties 
Total 
Amount Available 
For Distribution 
$ 728,521 1 
1,037,900 
889,348 
7,063 
$2,655,782 
(100%) 
Funds Returned 
To State 
(General Fund) 
$ 
60,369 
204,577 
7,049 
$272 I 740 
(10%) 
Total Amount 
Distributed 
$ 728,521 
977 t 530 
684,771 
14 
$2,390,836 
(90%) 
1
rncluded in the General Account figure is $5,170 of Minor Party funds which were trans-
ferred to the General Account and made available for distribution, per M.S. §lOA.32, 
subd. 4, due to a Minor Party not having any candidate for constitutional office on the 
1986 Primary or General Election ballots. 
B. Funds Distributed By Party 
Party General 
Account Account 
Funds Funds Total 
Democratic Party Candidates s 977' 531 $402,580 $1,380,lll 
58% 
Republican Party Candidates 684, 771 324,881 1,009,652 
42% 
Other Minor Parties Candidates 14 1,059 1,073 
.04% 
$1,662,316 $728,520 $2,390,836 
(70%) (30%) (100%) 
C. Legislative Office Funds Distributed - Democratic Party 
House Of 
Representatives Senate 
Total Distributed $410,225 $405,166 
High Amount Distributed $ 5,878 $ 11, 024 
Low Amount Distributed $ 1,800 $ 3,767 
Average Amount Distributed/Candidate $ 3,335 $ 6,642 
Candidates Receiving Public Financing $ 123 61 
(continued) 
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II PUBLIC FINANCING FUNDS: 1986 ELECTIONS (Continued) 
D. Legislative Office Funds Distributed - Republican Party 
House Of 
Representatives Senate 
Total Distributed $235,128 $255,493 
High Amount Distributed $ 6,101 $ 13, 901 
Low Amount Distributed $ 1,627 $ 3,523 
Average Amount Distributed/Candidate $ 2,734 $ 6,232 
Candidates Receiving Public Financing 86 41 
E. Constitutional Office Funds Distributed - Democratic/Republican Parties 
Office 
Governor-Lt. Governor 
Attorney General 
Secretary of State 
State Auditor 
State Treasurer 
F. Minor Party Funds Distributed 
Legislature 
House of Representatives 
(1 candidate) 
Constitutional Office 
State Treasurer 
Total 
Minor 
Party 
Accounts 
$ 14 
$ 14 
Amounts Distributed 
Democratic 
Candidate 
$395,304 
$ 67,766 
$ 33,883 
$ 33,883 
$ 33,883 
General 
Account 
$ 1,059 
$ 1,059 
Republican 
Candidate 
$363,321 
$ 62,284 
$ 31,142 
$ 31,142 
$ 31,142 
Total 
$1,059 
$ 14 
$1,073 
(continued) 
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III RETURN OF STATE ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN FUNDS -
1986 ELECTIONS - DEPOSITED TO STATE GENERAL FUND 
A. House of Representatives, Senate, and 
Constitutional Office Candidate Committees 
Total Amount Returned 
Number of Committees Returning 
IV TAX RETURN PARTICIPATION RATE 
TOTAL NO. OF 
TAX YEAR I INCOME TAX 
1974 Actual 1,669,794 
1975 Actual 1,584,086 
1986 Actual 1,616,441 
1977 Actual 1,667,924 
1978 Actual 1,722,053 
1979 Actual 1,761,586 
1980 Actual 1,752,137 
1981 Actual 1,738,194 
1982 Actual 1,712,796 
1983 Actual 1,721,645 
1984 Actual 1,773,807 
1985 Actual 1,801,993 
Democratic 
Party 
43,925 
29 
RETURNS 
PROPERTY 
TAX REFUNDS 
938,791 
880,185 
797,327 
806,698 
703,470 
660,854 
630,530 
571,772 
Republican 
Party 
20,988 
17 
TOTAL NO. 
Minor 
Parties 
OF CHECKOFFS 
372, 311 
376,223 
391,799 
451,512 
516,300 
458,586 
401,566 
395,804 
403,371 
416,606 
426,514 
393,424 
Total 
64,913 
46 
% OF PAR-
TICIPATION 
22.3% 
23.8% 
24.2% 
27.1% 
19.4% 
17.4% 
15.8% 
15.6% 
16.7% 
17.5% 
17.7% 
16.6% 
STATE ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN FUND 
INCOME TAX AND PROPERTY TAX CHECKOFFS(A) 
OTHER 
ACCOUNTS 
GENERAL % OF DFL % OF IR % OF (MINOR % OF 
TAX YEAR ACCOUNT TOTAL ACCOUNT TOTAL ACCOUNT TOTAL PARTIES (B) TOTAL TOTAL % 
-
1974 - Actual $125,169 - 33.6% $175,259 - 47.1% $ 68,395 - 18.4% $ 3,488 - 0.9% $372 I 311 - 100% 
1975 - Actual 125,979 - 33.5% 164,071 - 43.6% 83,218 - 22.1% 2,955 - 0.8% 376,223 - 100% 
1976 - Actual 106,303 - 27.2% 186,927 - 47.7% 89,227 - 22.8% 9,252 - 2.3% 391,799 - 100% 
1977 - Actual 118,774 - 26.3% 187 I 812 - 41. 6% 132,913 - 29.4% 12,013 - 2.7% 451,512 - 100% 
1978 - Actual 127,740 - 24.8% 220,116 - 42.6% 153,921 - 29.8% 14,523 - 2.8% 516,300 - 100% 
1979 - Actual 118,454 - 24.2% 197,503 - 40.3% 160,327 - 32.7% 13, 529 - 2.8% 489,813 - 100% 
1980 - Actual 198,028 - 24.7% 332,394 - 41.4% 258,748 - 32.2% 13 I 962 - l. 7% 803I132 - 100% 
1981 - Actual 206,640 - 26.1% 307,286 - 38.8% 262,240 - 33.1% 14,331 - 2.0% 791,608 - 100% 
1982 - Actual 207,014 - 25.7% 356,800 - 44.2% 229,748 - 28.5% 13I180 - l.6% 806,742 - 100% 
1983 - Actual 208,328 - 25.0% 330,206 - 39.6% 282,790 - 34.0% 11, 888 - l.4% 833,212 - 100% f-"' m 
1984 - Actual 230,294 - 27.0% 356 I 074 - 41. 7% 266,658 - 31.3% 0 - 0% 853,026 - 100% 
1985 - Actual 241,682 - 30.7% 299,904 - 38.1% 245,682 - 31.2% 0 - 0% 786,848 - 100% 
f 
(A) 
Beginning with tax year 1980 taxpayers may check off $2.00 per individual taxpayer 
(B) 
Beginning with tax year 1984, under a 1984 law change, no minor parties qualified for inclusion on the state 
income tax blank. 
